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Chapter I
Introduction
“Dear Mr. President: In regards to selling American ports to the United Arab Emirates, 
not just NO but HELL NO!”
(Republican Member of Congress cited in the Washington Post, 23-3-2006).
1.1 Introduction
This quote refers to the political controversy in the United States that occurred in early 
2006, at the moment I started writing up this dissertation. The controversy in the U.S. 
concerned the issue that Dubai Ports World (DPW) from the United Arab Emirates had 
taken over the London-based P&O Ports in January 2006, an international terminal op-
erating company with assets in six major U.S. seaports. Through this takeover, DPW 
would have successfully entered the American market and would become the third larg-
est container terminal operator in the world after the Hutchison Ports Holding (HPH) 
from Hong Kong and PSA from Singapore.  
In itself not really spectacular - a foreign company that takes over another foreign com-
pany happens almost every day in any sector- so why the political controversy in the 
U.S.? The controversy was about the fact that due to this takeover, an Arab-based and 
state-controlled firm acquired control over container terminals in U.S. seaports. Proba-
bly this deal would not have been politically problematic before ‘9/11’ and before the 
U.S. announced the War on Terrorism. However, after 9/11 attitudes changed. Seaports 
and containerized transport are considered since then, by the newly founded Department 
of Homeland Security, as vulnerabilities. Seaports located near metropolitan areas could 
serve as potential targets for terrorist organizations. At the same time, containers could 
be used for launching such attacks, or they could be used for transporting Weapons of 
Mass Destruction and/ or terrorists into the country. An Arab firm with control over 
American ports therefore, or more specifically with control over American container 
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terminal facilities, was seen by American politicians as dangerous.  
Nevertheless, the takeover was initially approved on 17 January 2006 by the White 
House, after a review by the Committee on Foreign Investments (part of the Treasury 
Department, the American version of the Ministry of Finance) which stated that this 
transaction did not pose any threat to national security. But after the public announce-
ment of the transaction, members of Congress reacted with great indignation. They 
threatened to block the deal at any cost. The arguments which the opponents of the deal 
used showed how little politicians really know about the ‘state of play’ in their ports and 
about the maritime sector in general. First of all, the ports themselves are not taken over 
by DPW as some members of Congress feared, but the container terminals within ports. 
Even more accurate is to say that DPW would takeover the lease concessions to operate 
terminals for a period of roughly 20 years. This means that the land and management of 
the port would remain in the hands of the port authority, which is in most cases part of 
the local government or the state. That same port authority is free to negotiate a new 
concession with another operator once the lease term expires after 20 years. Actually, 
most of the terminals in American ports and elsewhere in the world are run in such a 
way by foreign companies. For example, Chinese state-owned shipping lines COSCO 
and China Shipping Lines have lease concessions in the ports of Long Beach and Los 
Angeles. In Europe’s biggest port, Rotterdam, the majority of the container terminals are 
run by a local division of HPH from Hong Kong. Apparently it is not a problem for the 
politicians when a British or Chinese company operates terminals in U.S. seaports, but it 
is when an Arab firm does so. Probably, the members of Congress were completely 
ignorant of the complexity of port management and operations before the announcement 
of the controversial takeover. 
The second illustration of the opponents’ ignorance has to do with security, something 
which they argued, an Arab firm could not guarantee. Security is however the prime 
responsibility of the American government: U.S. Customs and the U.S. Coast Guard. 
These state agents, part of the American Department of Homeland Security, have set up 
and implemented several programs to improve security at the ports since 9/11. One such 
example is the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which stimu-
lates cooperation between local customs, the coast guard, port authorities and the private 
sector when implementing measures that improve the security of the complete logistical 
chain. Numerous foreign companies are participating in C-TPAT, including all the ma-
jor shipping lines and terminal operators. There is therefore no reason to think that DPW 
could not participate in C-TPAT and by doing so take up some responsibility for secu-
rity. Related to the issue of security was the argument of the opponents that the termi-
nals run by DPW could more easily be infiltrated by terrorist cells that could do the 
unloading of containers. A great example of political ignorance once again, since dock-
workers in the U.S. need to have an American nationality by law and have their personal 
files carefully checked. Finally, the most ridiculous argument raised by some Con-
gressmen was that the United Arab Emirates maintain a political and economic boycott 
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against Israel, one of America’s main allies in the Middle East, and with such a country 
America should not conduct business. According to the same argument, the U.S. should 
also immediately close the oil tap in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the director of the Israeli 
(formerly state-owned) shipping line ZIM declared on 22 February 2006 in a letter to 
Congressman Clinton that DPW does in fact handle their ships and containers at termi-
nals outside Dubai, in spite of the boycott. Nevertheless, the political opponents of the 
deal succeeded in their campaign. On 9 March 2006, DPW declared that it would trans-
fer the American portfolio of P&O Ports to an American entity. 
What does this illustration tell us besides the fact that America’s obsession with national 
security expresses itself in a political prejudice against Arab businesses? First of all, it 
shows the (geo) political and economic importance of seaports. Ports are of economic 
importance because they are strategically located at the crossroads between water and 
land, and they function as gateways for urban, regional and national economies to trade 
internationally. Ports have a symbiotic relationship with industrial activity, population 
centers and markets. A location near a port provides transport cost-reducing benefits for 
industries, such as manufacturers, which are dependent on the import of raw materials or 
export of (semi-finished) end products. Another example of this symbiotic relationship 
is that ports generate jobs (either directly or indirectly), and population centers accom-
modate labor. Population centers in their turn generate consumer demand on which the 
port’s activity depend. Consumer markets and production centers are nowadays worlds 
apart, and are increasingly linked by institutional, logistical and physical arrangements 
and networks (Henderson et al, 2002). The ongoing process of containerization has re-
duced transport costs considerably, allowing manufacturers to move their plants to 
places where they enjoy lower production costs, which in turn leads to increased trade 
flows: “[c]ontainerisation and multi-modal integrated transport have revolutionised trad-
ing arrangements of value-added goods and have given traders and global managers 
more control and choice over their ‘production-transport-distribution’ chain (Haralam-
bides, 2002, p327).  Seaports are therefore essential to the global economy and crucial 
elements for the worldwide distribution of goods. Seaports are furthermore local suppli-
ers of jobs, engines of regional and national economic growth, and a frontline for (na-
tion) states to combat international terrorism and organized crime. On the other hand, 
ports produce also negative social costs especially for the environment. They are also 
highly capital intensive to develop and they are to a large degree dependent on financial 
support of the state. No wonder that ports automatically acquire political importance. 
Secondly, the illustration shows the maritime sector’s high level of global integration
(and its dynamics). It has been estimated that 90% of the world trade is done by ship 
(IMO, 2005). Within this distribution process, ports operate as logistical nodes in vast 
global supply chains (Robinson 2002). Consider the following simplified example. An 
American-based toy-company fabricates its products for the European market in the 
Chinese industrial heartland. The toys are transported in a container from the port of 
Shanghai by a Japanese shipping company carrying under a Panamanian flag and which 
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unloads the container in the port of Rotterdam after a number of calls in Singapore, Du-
bai, Algeciras and Le Havre. In Rotterdam, a Hong Kong based terminal operator 
unloads the container. The container with the toys is then transported by a Dutch truck-
ing-company that makes use of a Polish driver to a distribution-centre in Southwest 
Germany. From here, the toys are sent to local franchised shops of the American-based 
toy-company in Strasbourg, Basel and Stuttgart (cf. Levinson, 2006, for a similar exam-
ple). Incidentally, it makes little difference if this container destined for Southwest Ger-
many passes through the port of Rotterdam, Antwerp or Hamburg, i.e. the container has 
little ‘loyalty’ to any given port (Haralambides, 2002). Indeed, the port-maritime sector 
is both subjected to, and is one of the main facilitators, of the process of global eco-
nomic integration (Pinder & Slack, 2004). 
Thirdly, the illustration emphasizes the importance of market regulation and institutions 
in the port- maritime (transport) sector. The sector provides an excellent example of
‘nestedness’ of institutions between spatial levels (Hollingsworth et al, 1994) varying 
from international free trade agreements to local land use plans and pattern of property 
rights. Economic activity cannot solely be understood by the rational behavior of agents 
operating in ‘free markets’. Instead markets and individual behavior are structured by all 
kinds of social, economic, cultural and political rules, regulations, procedures and con-
ventions. Indeed, the political controversy over the DPW takeover is all about owner-
ship of, and control over, vital economic and territorial assets, in this case mediated by 
lease constructions. The government has the political power to intervene in economic 
activity located within its jurisdiction through regulation, law enforcement, policy im-
plementation and financial instruments such as taxes and subsidy. At the same time, we 
see how markets themselves are regulated by private law through contractual agree-
ments, e.g. the lease concessions, and how they evolve through corporate takeovers and 
trans-national transfer of property rights.  
Related to the role of institutions, to regulatory structures and to the interaction between 
states, markets and economic sectors are the public and private agents and their strate-
gic behavior and power. What we observe is a trend towards integration of activity and 
services by firms, both horizontally and vertically. Shipping lines, private terminal op-
erators and land-based hinterland transporters have rationalized and integrated their 
operations and services through strategic alignments, corporate takeovers and applica-
tion of new technologies. As a result, the bargaining power of these players (in terms of 
tariffs, terminal lease concessions and service provision) has enhanced considerably vis-
à-vis public port authorities that are themselves constrained by their physical immobility 
and degree of political accountability to the public. At the same time, we witness a proc-
ess of market maturation: with the ongoing growth of containerization, new private con-
tainer ports and port operators are entering the regional competitive game. That makes 
established ports reconsider their services, overall capacity, property rights arrange-
ments, pricing policies and hinterland connections. 
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On the one hand, ports are faced with the ongoing, ‘global’, developments in the mari-
time trade sector, in which a market orientated focus is required in order to stay com-
petitive (World Bank, 2001) and in which “cargo votes with its feet”. On the other hand, 
ports still need to be sensitive to a territorial, politicized institutional structure in which 
“cargo does not vote”. In order to develop a conceptual understanding of the political 
economy of port competition, we need to take into account existing international re-
search on ports and the maritime sector.  
1.2 Political Economy of Port Competition 
International (comparative) research on the political economy of ports is scarce. A nota-
ble exception is Doig’s “Empire on the Hudson” (2001) in which he provides a detailed 
historical account of the formation of the bi-state port authority of New York-New Jer-
sey and its development into one of America’s biggest state-enterprises. Another excep-
tion is Callahan’s (1981) detailed analysis of the interwoven interests of public and pri-
vate players in the port of Rotterdam during the second half of the nineteenth century. 
These accounts however lack secure theoretical foundations and as such remain rather 
isolated stories. Being primarily historical, these contributions will not help us much to 
understand the politics of port development in the era of global economic integration, 
nor the associated structural developments within the maritime transport sector. 
Since the 1990s, scholars started looking at the interrelationships between operations 
within seaports, the organizations and interests that are involved, as well as the set of 
institutions and forms of coordination that regulate the functioning of seaports within a 
dynamic market environment. Most influential in that respect is the work done by Baird 
(1995) on port privatization. Based upon developments in Britain, where the govern-
ment privatized its seaports, he developed a model that allows to us to analyze the role 
of public and private agents in the operations, ownership, management and regulation of 
seaports. In spite of its usefulness, the model falls short in the attention to the wider 
institutional environment in which seaports are located: as a result, that work does not 
help us to understand why particular port governance models at different places in the 
world are the way they are. In his explorative study, Stevens (1997) mapped the rich 
diversity of institutional arrangements of ports that exist across the globe. Though rich 
in empirical material (some 14 cases have been analyzed), his work provides a static 
picture of the institutional environment in which particular ports in Europe, Asia and 
North America function. Kreukels & Wever (1998) provided us with a more dynamic 
picture. Looking at the ports in Northwest Europe, they emphasized the strategic con-
cern of ports for their competitiveness and for the quality of their hinterland connections 
against the background of European integration. However, European economic integra-
tion is just one, albeit important, development that affects the competitive context in 
which individual ports operate. 
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The strategic reorganization in the (global) maritime sector, and the consequences for 
port governance, has been the focus of many recent studies. The impact on port per-
formance and management of the ongoing processes of integration among global operat-
ing shipping lines specialized in containers, the rise of global terminal operators, and the 
scale enlargement within containerized shipping in general, has been addressed by sev-
eral scholars (Notteboom, 2004; Notteboom & Winkelmans 2001; Slack et al 2002; 
Pinder & Slack 2004, Heaver et al 2000, Brooks 2000). Others have addressed the issue 
of efficiency of container terminal operations, given the fact that many of these opera-
tions have been dedicated to the private sector over the last decade (Turner 2000, Hara-
lambides et al 2002, Cullinane et al 2005a). In the light of greater private sector in-
volvement, some recent studies have focused on the relationship between (port) govern-
ance structures and economic performance; either from a strategic management perspec-
tive (Brooks, 2004) or on the basis of cluster-theory (cf. De Langen 2003). In fact, the 
institutional reforms towards a more market-oriented role of port authorities and the 
privatization (or devolution) of port operations have been advocated by multilateral state 
associations such as the World Bank (2001) and the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD, yearly reports) on the grounds of improved opera-
tional efficiency and reduced public costs. 
Based upon the process of the global integration of vast logistical and production net-
works, Robinson (2002) argues that ports are logistical nodes embedded within value-
driven chains. As a third-party service provider, ports provide value to shipping lines, 
stevedores and hinterland transporters, and in doing so, to themselves. Robinson (2002, 
p. 252): “In any case, the role of ports and the way in which ports position themselves in 
the new business environments beyond 2001 must be defined within a paradigm of ports 
as elements in value-driven chain systems, not simply as places with particular, if com-
plex, functions”. The role of port authorities thus is to contribute to cost minimization 
for (actors operating in) logistical chains and, in doing so, provide the conditions to 
become embedded in global supply chains. At the same time, ports still pursue their own 
(public) objectives of maximizing cargo handling, and deal with public duties related to 
the environment, safety and security. This implies that ports are, besides value-creating 
elements for private logistical parties, crucial territorial nodes that produce positive and 
negative social costs for national and local economies and communities. 
Ports are therefore not only embedded within these networks or chains, but also within a 
particular territorialized institutional framework (Henderson et al, 2002). This implies 
that we have to take into account the (scalar) structure of the state, the role of its agen-
cies and its ‘capacity to act’ within increasingly globally organized and privately con-
trolled supply chains and production networks. We also need to take into account a par-
ticular state’s historical commitment to the port’s development through policy formula-
tion, infrastructure investments and the overall regulation of national markets. The latter 
issue encompasses a wide range of strategic issues such as international trade agree-
ments, industrial politics, spatial planning, environmental legislation and labor laws. 
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The way ports are territorially institutionalized is thus crucial for their competitiveness 
and growth potential, as it determines their scope of strategic action. Indeed, as shown in 
a recent study (Cullinane et al 2005b) on the competition between the Chinese ports of 
Shanghai and Ningbo, governmental policy and political favoritism, even within one 
country, can make a difference, besides the simple logic of supply and demand.  
In fact, it is through the ports that these global supply chains become territorially em-
bedded, something which is rather neglected in Robinson’s (2002) analysis. It is argued 
that the mode of territorial embeddedness, and more specifically the degree of a firm’s 
commitment to a particular location, is an important factor for value creation, enhance-
ment and capture (Henderson et al 2002, pp 459). Thus, we have to recognize a two-
way interaction: at the same time that ports as territorialized service providers need to 
embed themselves into supply chains in order to safeguard and strengthen their competi-
tive positions, ‘footloose’ firms operating in supply chains need to be sensitive about the 
implications for value creation of the territorially rooted institutional structure of ports 
within which they become embedded. Once embedded within a port, these players be-
come more or less dependent on the port’s development for their own competitive posi-
tions. The dependency materializes physically through investments in the built environ-
ment of ports; institutionally in the form of a set of rules of engagement and contractual 
agreements; and politically in the form of an arena or governance structure in which the 
former two issues are contested and negotiated. This dependency of port users might 
result in networks of engagement (Cox, 1998) with other public or private agents, per-
haps at different spatial levels, in order to further their interests collectively.  
In addition to more conventional strategies (such as construction and marketing of ter-
minal space) the increased competition between ports, as well as the more structural 
developments in the maritime sector, provides pressures to reform the port institution-
ally. As mentioned earlier, there is a general trend towards privatization of port opera-
tions and the decentralization or corporatization of port authorities. There is in that way 
a tendency towards institutional convergence of ports that is happening not only region-
ally, but also globally. Although we recognize that competition between ports provides 
pressures for institutional convergence, we maintain that the ultimate resolution of this 
competition is contingent on the path dependent and territorially rooted structures of 
power and interests, or as Hall (2003, p.350) puts it: a port is a local ‘community of 
practice’, which constitutes a relatively strong countervailing force against convergent 
institutional change and for persistent institutional variation. 
This leads to our central research objectives. What we are interested in, is developing an 
understanding of the political economy of port competition given the dynamics in the 
maritime transport sector over the last decade. To do this, we take into account the role 
and strategic behavior of agents (both public and private) and the degree to which they 
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are institutionally embedded in the global supply chain, in a particular (state) territory 
and in a particular port. In particular, we are interested in developing a theoretical un-
derstanding of how institutionally related strategies affect the materiality and politics of 
port development in a globally organized sector.  
1.3 Research Objectives 
The research aspires to make a theoretical contribution by increasing our understanding 
of the way port competition is played out. More specifically, we want to understand how 
port’s stakeholders actively try to modify the institutional context in which they operate 
in order to optimize the port’s competitive position. The main research question is: How
do port dependent agents change the port’s institutional and physical structure in order 
to optimize their competitive positions in the international transport of containers? 
To answer this question requires empirical work. Our empirical analysis is on the level 
of the maritime sector, in particular the container sector. The research centers on the 
container sector for a number of reasons. The container sector is the fastest growing 
sector within maritime trade, and therefore crucial for the growth of ports. However, as 
the market grows and matures, opportunities arise for new container ports to enter into 
the regional competitive game, putting pressure on established container ports to recon-
sider their competitive positions in terms of service provision, capacity, and pricing. 
This latter aspect is influenced by the fact that the sector is also characterized by proc-
esses such as scale enlargement of ships, and functional integration (both horizontally 
and vertically) between different logistical service providers (shipping lines, stevedores 
and hinterland transporters). These processes alter the power relationships within the 
sector at the expense of port authorities. The new competitive landscape in which ports 
operate, provide pressure to institutionally reform the port, but the way this process of 
institutional change is played out is however path dependent and place specific, depend-
ing on the way a port is embedded territorially in a set of institutions and social relation-
ships. It can be analyzed only by detailed case study analyses at the local level of the 
port, which forms the second part of our empirical work. 
Three case study areas have been selected, which include four ports: Rotterdam, South-
ern California (Los Angeles and Long Beach) and Dubai. The selection of the case stud-
ies is based upon three reasons. First, the ports included in the case studies are market-
leaders in their specific regions and all are specialized in containerized traffic. All four 
ports belong to the top ten busiest container ports in the world. Though these ports, with 
the exception of the ports in Southern California, are not competing with each other 
(exactly because they are located in three different regions), they all are confronted with 
the same competitive dynamics and structural developments that have been taking place 
in the maritime sector over the last decade. The second reason for the selection of these 
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ports is that they cover a wide variety of institutional make-ups and histories, territorial 
embeddedness and regional competitive landscapes. This will allow us to analyze more 
broadly the (institutional) possibilities for strategic action in relation to port develop-
ment, as well as to provide a more detailed account of the globalized nature of the sector 
as a whole. A third reason is more practical, in the sense that access to information was 
more secure due to proximity (in the case of Rotterdam) and due to linguistic back-
grounds. The central question for our case study research is then: What are the similari-
ties and differences in the material and institutional strategies between the ports of Rot-
terdam, Dubai, Los Angeles and Long Beach, given the fact that they are all subjected 
to similar dynamics in the maritime sector? 
The study looks at four ports in three regions in great detail, but expects that similar 
contextual factors are in place in other major (container) hubs and in other major trade 
regions of the world. This is because the ports cases are not understood as autonomous 
entities. They need to be understood as nodes that are embedded in vast, globally organ-
ized production networks and/ or supply chains. The key is to identify institutional 
change at the level of the port in the context of changes in the sector as a whole. As a 
result, our research findings from the four ports should apply to other ports as well. It is 
therefore expected that the research findings can be applied to ports in Southeast Asia 
(e.g. Singapore, Hong Kong), Northeast Asia (e.g. Shanghai, Pusan), U.S. East Coast 
(e.g. New York-New Jersey, Hampton Roads) and the Mediterranean (e.g. Algeciras, 
Marseilles).
1.4 Outline of the Book
The book’s main background is the political economy of seaport development within a 
dynamic institutional environment. The book’s focus is on the interrelationships be-
tween institutions and the strategic behavior of agents in a dynamic economic sector. 
The locus of the book is on how this interaction unfolds in four particular ports: Rotter-
dam, Dubai, Los Angeles and Long Beach. The book is structured in seven chapters. 
The next chapter will be devoted to theory. It addresses several institutional approaches 
to economic geography. It will result in a conceptual model, which is specifically de-
signed to understand port competition as an institutionally embedded process. Based 
upon those theoretical insights, the third chapter will present the methodological ap-
proach, which allows us to investigate these relationships empirically. The next two 
chapters report on the empirical part of the study. Chapter four provides a picture of the 
dynamics that are taking place in the maritime sector and its implications for ports and 
their development worldwide. Chapter five zooms in on four ports in three of the 
world’s major trade regions, and analyzes how they take part in the dynamics as 
sketched in the previous chapter by making use of the conceptual model. Empirical con-
clusions of the research will be presented in chapter six, in which the ports are com-
pared. The final chapter provides an answer to the research question as well as a theo-
retical reflection.  
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Chapter II 
Institutional Approaches to Economic Geography 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we look at theories that will help us in our quest to conceptually under-
stand the political economy of port competition. This focus requires that we take into 
account the competitive position of ports and the factors which influence their competi-
tiveness. Clearly, the competitive strength of ports is closely related to some basic geo-
graphical and material features of ports. A strategic location with regard to hinterlands is 
important for ports, as well as the provision of the crucial hardware such as quays, 
cranes, wharves and on-dock rail facilities. In addition, looking at the political economy 
implies that we are specifically interested in the strategic behavior of, and power rela-
tionships among, public and private agents involved in the development of ports.  In that 
respect we observe a greater involvement of the private sector in ports across the globe 
over the last decade. Private players involved in the international transport of containers 
such as shipping lines, stevedores and freight forwarders have rationalized and inte-
grated their services into vast logistical chains that are truly global in scope (cf. Chapter 
IV). This development is the result of macro-economic restructuring, commonly associ-
ated with the process of globalization. In order for us to understand the political econ-
omy of port competition we therefore need to take into account the development of the 
international transport sector and how this development is the result of some significant 
structural changes of the capitalist world economy.  
To do that latter, this chapter deals with the impact of institutions on the behavior and 
performance of economic agents such as firms, states, collectivities and- in aggregated 
form- of particular territorial economies and economic sectors. The aim is to generate 
understanding of the way institutions act, both as a spatial differentiator of economic 
development as well as being the historical outcome of the social interaction between 
political and economic agents in space. This implies that we pay specific attention to the 
role and structure of the state. What we seek therefore is a conceptual model which is 
multi-scalar by nature and which includes the material and institutional environment of 
ports as well as the strategic possibilities and actions of agents.  
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This chapter is structured as follows. First we discuss institutionalist approaches to the 
structure and functioning of the space economy and we critically assess this ‘institu-
tional turn’ in economic geography (par 2.2). In the third section, we elaborate on Regu-
lation Theory and the way it deals with the role of institutions in macro-economic de-
velopment. Next we present the perspective of global production networks (GPNs), 
which will help to analyze the way collective agents are organized both functionally and 
geographically in a global economy. In the fifth section, we look at the micro-meso 
levels by making use of the New Urban Politics, which provide us with insights into 
how local governance is arranged, and how both public and private agents act together 
along institutional lines to boost the local economy. In the sixth section we introduce the 
‘structure of provision’ approach, which allows us to look at the social relationships that 
are involved in the provision of the built environment of ports. The final section will 
provide a synthesis of these theoretical insights in the form of a conceptual model. 
2.2 The Institutional Turn in Economic Geography 
Uneven spatial development has been studied by urban researchers and economic geog-
raphers who are interested in the institutional bases of regional and local economic de-
velopment. The latter has been described as the ‘institutional turn’ (Amin 1999; Martin 
2000; MacLeod 2001; MacLeod & Goodwin 1999, Boschma & Frenken 2006). The 
institutional turn came as a reaction to more behavioral approaches prominent in the 
1960s and early 1970s.
What is meant by the institutional approach to economic geography? Economic activity 
is socially and institutionally situated: it cannot be explained by reference to atomistic 
individual motives alone, but has to be understood as enmeshed in wider structures of 
social, economic and political rules, procedures and conventions. More specifically, 
Martin (2000, p.79) defines the institutionalist approach to economic geography as an 
attempt to answer the following question: to what extent and in what ways are the proc-
esses of geographically uneven capitalist economic development shaped and mediated 
by the institutional structures in and through which those processes take place? The 
implicit assumption is that, although institutions are unlikely to be the sole cause of 
geographically uneven development, they enable and constrain economic development 
in spatially differentiated ways. 
The institutional turn within economic geography follows from a general revival of in-
stitutionalist approaches within the social sciences during the 1990s. Three main con-
ceptual approaches in this ‘new institutionalism’ are distinguished: rational choice, so-
ciological institutionalism and historical (evolutionary) institutionalism (Hall & Taylor, 
1996; Martin 2000). The first approach focuses on how particular institutional environ-
ments give rise to particular institutional arrangements (organizational forms such as 
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markets, corporate hierarchies, associations, networks) and how far and in what ways 
institutions serve to reduce transaction costs and increase economic efficiency. Institu-
tions are seen as the outcome of market behavior, constantly changing through a process 
of competitive selection in response to shifts in relative prices and transactions costs (cf. 
Williamson, 1985). The sociological approach seeks to understand the economy as a 
socio-institutionally embedded system. Proponents of this model (cf. Granovetter 1985) 
see institutional change as arising out of collective processes of interpretation, and em-
phasis is put on the ways in which existing institutions structure and circumscribe the 
range of institutional change and creation. The historical approach focuses on under-
standing how institutional structures evolve over time, and how this evolution impacts 
on and relates to the historical dynamics of the capitalist economy (cf. North, 1990). 
Stress is put on the asymmetrical power relations associated with institutions, and on 
major periods of transformation of the institutions of economic regulation and govern-
ance. Incremental evolution is only one way in which institutional change occurs. More 
significant is the tendency for institutional structures to undergo major episodic recon-
figurations, as highlighted by the neo-Marxist Regulation Theorists. 
The institutional turn has been criticized for being too much oriented to interactions, 
mostly collaborative, within the boundaries of the territories under study (MacLeod 
2001) as is the case with the concept of ‘institutional thickness’ (Amin & Thrift 1994). 
The uncritical application of the concept of institutional thickness is not unproblematic 
(cf. Coe et al 2004, MacLeod & Goodwin 1999, MacLeod 2001, Martin 2000, Amin 
2001, Lagendijk 2006). MacLeod warns us against this ‘soft institutionalism’ (2001, 
p.1154): “This would be to fall foul of a tautology whereby we view institutional thick 
regions to be successful economies because they are institutionally thick”. In response to 
this alleged introversion and parochialism, the debate has broadened by taking account 
of organizational and sociological work which sheds more light on the development of 
markets, production chains and sectors (Dicken 2004;  Peck 2005, Coe et al 2004, Hen-
derson et al 2002), and by a renewed interest in the role of the state (MacLeod 2001). In 
that respect Lagendijk (2006) calls for a better appreciation and a further elaboration 
(and perhaps even rediscovery) of existing concepts and debates within economic geog-
raphy. In particular, he argues that the relational perspective on urban and regional de-
velopment be refined, by focusing on ‘middle level’ concepts which can connect local 
specificities and powers to more structural developments at the macro-level (see also 
Amin 1999). This has been accompanied by a recent revival of older, more structuralist 
accounts, Regulation Theory in particular, within economic geography and regional 
studies.
2.3 Back to the Macro: Regulation Theory
The interest of economic geographers in Regulation Theory is not new (cf. Storper & 
Walker 1989, Piore & Sabel 1984). This current interest in the relationship between 
economic performance and institutions is not surprising, given the extra-ordinary geopo-
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litical events such as the breakdown of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the political economic 
failure of communism and the consequent disintegration of the Soviet Union. But also in 
‘the West’, the limits of national economic regulation of the international capitalist sys-
tem through forms of state socialism became increasingly apparent after the late 1970s 
with the collapse of the ‘Bretton Woods’ monetary system, the oil crises, the move of 
industrial capital to low-wage nations in Asia and the consequent fiscal crises of the 
welfare state. The post-1945 economic miracle of ‘the West’ had come to a stop as capi-
talist firms started to exploit the opportunities offered by the deregulation of national 
capital markets, the transport-cost reducing effects of technology and the opening up of 
new national markets for competitive production factors. It is this world-wide institu-
tional restructuring of national economies, that induced the interest of economic geogra-
phers to focus on the role which institutions play in the economic development of loca-
tions (whether cities, regions or nations) and on the strategic behavior of agents in-
volved in this process. As Martin (2000, p78) puts it: “[T]he institutional landscapes of 
capitalism are being redrawn and, rightly geographers have become closely interested in 
the nature and implications of this process”. 
2.3.1 Regulation through Institutions 
Regulation Theory originates from a radical, neo-Marxist critique of neoclassical eco-
nomic theory by group of French economists in the late 1970s (cf. Aglietta 1976, Boyer 
2002). The critique rests on the issues of methodological individualism, rationality, 
equilibrium and efficiency. The neoclassical economic paradigm considers the outcome 
of social and economic processes as being the aggregate of rational decision making by 
sovereign individuals. The governance mechanism which would best support these 
processes is the market, with the role of the state limited to the protection of private 
property rights. It is argued that competition within the market will lead to an efficient, 
competitive equilibrium in the distribution of resources. 
In contrast, Regulation Theory views the economy as a social relation. It takes as its 
starting point one of Karl Marx’s main insights, that capital accumulation is a contradic-
tory process and thus cannot reproduce itself without the assistance of extra-economic 
social, political, and cultural mechanisms (Lauria, 1997, p.130). The process of capital 
accumulation is reproduced at any given moment through the dynamic of the prevailing 
regime of accumulation. According to Painter (1997, p.123) a regime of accumulation 
specifies the broad relationships between production, consumption, saving, and invest-
ment, and also defines the geographical extent and degree of autonomy of the circuit of 
capital (national, global). Systems which are capable of managing these tendencies are 
said to be regulated; without regulation the process of capital accumulation would col-
lapse through its own contradictions. Another way to put it is that capital relations need 
a ‘social fix’ or mode of regulation (Jessop, 2002): an ensemble of both formal and in-
formal institutions and conventions which help to stabilize the prevailing regime of ac-
cumulation. Regulation is thus perceived as a process (Goodwin, 2001): it is the result 
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of institutional structures and dynamics, of political and social processes, and of cultural 
discourses. Together, a particular accumulation regime and a mode of regulation can 
form a structurally coherent system capable of temporarily managing the contradictions 
of capitalism. Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997) speak in this context about a social sys-
tem of production.
This structurally coherent system needs a spatio-temporal fix (Harvey, 1985). This can 
be understood in the following way. A large portion of capital is literally fixed in and on 
land for a relatively long period of time through investments in the built environment. 
Also other social expenditures such as health care (hospitals), energy (power plants) and 
public education (universities) become territorialized, that is geographically immobile 
through political and financial commitments by the state. However, at a certain moment 
markets become saturated and/or there is capital over accumulation. In such a situation, 
mobile capital tends to expand into new areas and new markets while abandoning older 
ones. Regulation Theory is in this way concerned with the temporal and spatial variabil-
ity of capitalism. Uneven development is inherent, given the time-space specific context 
of these regimes of accumulation. It is this uneven development of capital accumulation 
in space which is the focus of Regulation Theory. 
Regulation Theory in its original form was primarily devoted to differences between 
nation-states in the performance and regulation of the capitalist economy in the period 
after the Second World War. In 1945-1970s, the dominant mode of production has been 
identified as Fordism (named after the American car-maker Henry Ford): large verti-
cally integrated firms in the search for economies of scale involved in standardized mass 
production using assembly-lines and performed by a large unionized workforce. The 
dominant mode of regulation has been named Keynesianism (named after the British 
economist John Maynard Keynes). It aimed at the provision of infrastructure and wel-
fare services by the central state that would support mass consumption and full em-
ployment, accompanied by the support of collective bargaining and price-wage inflation 
corrections by the state within relatively closed national economies (Jessop, 2002). The 
spatial fix of the regime of accumulation is thus the nation-state in the Western world, 
under the economic, political and military leadership of the United States. This is why 
Jessop also talks about ‘Atlantic Fordism’. 
However, this system came in crisis during the 1970s and 1980s, as a result of several 
interrelated economic, political and socio-cultural causes. In the search for economies of 
scale, Fordist firms started to expand and move abroad as their domestic markets be-
came saturated, while at the same time they increasingly started to resort to foreign 
credit and to escape national taxes. The vulnerability of the Fordist production process 
to unionized strikes, and the high costs of labor in general, accelerated the move of 
firms. There were also limits to adopting Fordism as a model for the growing service 
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sector in First World countries. All this undermined the tax-base upon which national 
Keynesian demand management by the state depended. Things became worse as rising 
unemployment generated even more demand for welfare services and social security, 
which in turn led to more political resistance to increased taxes. So, the contemporary 
structural coherence between Fordism and the national Keynesian welfare state started 
to break down. As Hollingsworth & Boyer put it (1997, p.438): “[T]hus, the erosion of 
post-World War II institutions has accelerated and addressed a key question: What other 
economic institutions should replace the configuration of postwar regulatory regimes 
and Keynesian strategies?” 
The Fordist accumulation regime became slowly but surely replaced by one that is ori-
ented to flexible production, innovation, economies of scope and differentiated patterns 
of consumption and which is referred to in the literature simply as post-Fordism. The 
shift towards post-Fordism is associated with the rise of the ‘network society’ (Castells, 
1996), the internet and other Information Technology (IT) applications, and the ‘knowl-
edge based’ economy. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Communist re-
gimes in the early 1990s furthermore fostered the idea among neo-liberal thinkers and 
politicians that the capitalist market-system was the superior form of economic organi-
zation (cf. Fukuyama, 1991). In short, the post-Fordist accumulation regime is based 
upon a flexible mode of capitalist production allowed by flexible machinery operated by 
a small, flexible and skilled workforce. This flexibility furthermore allows for product 
diversity and delivery to match the diversifying consumer demand which stimulates 
economies of scope as opposed to economies of scale. Profits are reinvested in both the 
‘innovation’ of products and the production process that in turn further stimulates flexi-
bility and economies of scope. The typical institutional arrangement within post-
Fordism is a decentralized organization that co-operates through economic networks 
based upon the integration possibilities of IT. 
The network metaphor is further elaborated in the work of Castells (1996), where he 
speaks of a transition from a ‘space of places’ to ‘space of flows’. The first one refers to 
a spatial order in which societal dynamics and the mobility of production factors are 
restricted by and located within territorial units, in casu the urban locales and territory of 
nation-states. The latter refers to a spatial order which is to be understood as a dynamic 
societal and macro-structural configuration organized around physical, institutional and 
digital networks that transcend and to some degree challenge the traditional, territorial-
ized order and sovereignty of nation-states. Another way to put it is that the mobile pro-
duction factors have become ‘footloose’ and are no longer restricted by the location near 
fertile or resource rich land and geopolitical boundaries set up by a state. Examples of 
the ‘space of flows’ are, a decade later, abundant: financial transactions and capital 
transfers that occur 24-hours a day across the globe within a few seconds with a click on 
the mouse-button; millions of containers filled with goods that are being shipped every-
day from one distant place to another; satellite transmissions, global positioning systems 
and mobile telephony providing easy and super-fast individual access to information and 
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propaganda worldwide; the thousands of ‘illegal’ immigrants that daily try to reach the 
‘promised land’ for political and economic security; the transnational formation and 
integration of crime-syndicates. 
This theory of a paradigmatic shift from Fordism to post-Fordism has been criticized as 
being too crude, as if there is nothing in between. In that respect, it remains unclear to 
what degree there will be a ‘spatio-temporal fix’ of post-Fordism and what the appropri-
ate mode of regulation would be. In addition, Regulation Theory in its original connota-
tion and its ontological focus on the nation-state ignores or neglects the governance 
practices and the role of agencies at the sub-national level (Macleod & Goodwin 1999, 
p.706). It reduces capitalism’s complexity to transformations between homogenous 
accumulation regimes, ignoring how material practices constitute modes of regulation 
across a variety of spatial scales (cf. Lauria 1997). 
The concept of post-Fordism became in that respect overshadowed by both popular and 
academic literature on ‘globalization’ (Macleod 2000). Globalization as a concept 
emerged in academia in the late 1980s and early 1990s, was adopted by the international 
political establishment not much later, and became commonplace in the international 
popular media at the dawn of the 21st century.  However, the concept quickly became 
ambiguous in the sense that it received the status of an internationally endorsed politi-
cal-economic ‘doctrine’ and its historical uniqueness can be questioned. Understanding 
globalization as a historically unprecedented phenomenon is indeed questionable, if one 
takes into account the high degree of global political and economic integration during 
the late 19th century and early 20th century. Admittedly, at that time the world economy 
was more organized in the form of empires and colonial enterprises. Be that as it may, 
the concept of globalization is also disturbingly used as an explanation for all kinds of 
structural developments that have been taking place since the 1990s, and as the legitimi-
zation for all kinds of neo-liberal political and economic reforms. It has become as such 
an umbrella-concept that in itself does not tell us anything. Indeed as indicated by criti-
cal scholars (Coe et al, 2004, Dicken 2004), globalization is something which is to be 
explained and is not something which explains. Regulation Theory does provide ana-
lytical value for it shows the importance of macro-regulatory mechanisms and institu-
tions in understanding the geographical dynamic of the capitalist economy. In that way, 
the approach provides us with a useful set of abstractions that help to conceptualize 
macro-economic developments and restructuring, within a historically and geographi-
cally defined context. The advancement of Regulation Theory during the 1990s to eco-
nomic sectors as the unit of analysis is in that respect promising.  
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2.3.2 Regulation of Economic Sectors 
Regulation takes place not only along spatial-territorial lines, but also within certain 
functional-economic sectors (Hollingsworth et al 1994). There is in fact a strong rela-
tionship between the two. Regulation Theory viewed the ‘sector’, understood as a com-
plex social configuration of a historically identifiable productive sphere (Du Tertre, 
2002, p.205), as a relevant level of analysis. Hollingsworth et al (1994, p.8) define a 
sector simply as a population of firms producing a specific range of potentially or actu-
ally competing goods. These production spheres are identifiable since they make use of 
specific technologies (e.g. containers) with specific demands for labor (e.g. small but 
skilled workforce capable of operating the container-handling equipment) that create 
distinct production use values (e.g. efficient transport) and which are linked through the 
competitive confrontation of individual firms within an (inter)national market arena. A 
particular sector’s technological standards and market conditions influence its industrial 
organization (Hollingsworth & Streeck, 1994, p. 271, Henderson et al 2002), that is, the 
rate of market concentration, the degree of vertical integration of its member firms, the 
scope of their product range, and the extent to which the sector may rely on internal 
labor markets.  
These sectoral properties furthermore create sector-specific regulatory environments in 
which firms and labor, together (e.g. collective bargaining) or separately, engage in 
associative action. The most well known association is the labor union, but also firms 
and state authorities organize themselves in business associations and governmental 
platforms at various spatial scales. It is through these associations that economic gov-
ernance or coordination of sectors takes place. For example, the European Commis-
sion’s controversial legislative proposal for a Directive on open market access for port 
services, also known as the ‘Port Package’, was heavily supported by the European Sea 
Ports Organisation (ESPO), the European Community Shipowners Association (ECSA) 
and the European Shippers Council (ESC) (Psaraftis, 2005). The Port Package was ob-
jected too by the dockworkers and their representing labor unions that feared the compe-
tition of low cost, non-unionized labor from Eastern Europe or India. The Package Deal 
was defeated two times (in November 2003 and in January 2006) in the European Par-
liament under the pressure of strikes at Europe’s major ports and (violent) demonstra-
tions by dockworkers. In Australia, a similar labor conflict at the waterfront occurred in 
1998 as a result of the Workplace Relations Act (WRA) set in place in 1997 by the 
newly installed Conservative government. The aim of this legislation was to restructure 
the country’s industrial relations and improve the efficiency of the labor process by 
reducing the powers of organizations such as trade unions in workplace bargaining. 
Under the WRA, one of Australia’s major terminal operators, Patrick Stevedoring, 
locked out and sacked its entire unionized workforce, some 1,400 employees, with the 
intention to replace it by non-unionized (and former military personnel) dockworkers on 
an individual contract basis and initially to be trained in the port of Dubai. The case was 
brought to the Federal Court by the Maritime Union of Australia backed by the Austra-
lian Council of Trade Unions and the union won the case. 
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The regulation of economic sectors is, in turn, affected by national circumstances 
(Hollingsworth et al 1994). First, the degree and mode of state intervention within eco-
nomic sectors differ between countries. Intervention by the state can have various forms 
and occurs according to various rationales. As we saw in the first chapter, the transfer of 
container terminal lease concessions in American seaports to Dubai Ports World was 
blocked by American Congress on the grounds of ‘national security’. The defense indus-
try is another example in which the nation-state imposes considerable, non-economic 
constraints on the sector. It is highly regulated by the state through conditions on (and 
limits to) employment, sub-contracting, outsourcing and the transfer of specific, techno-
logical applications beyond the national military apparatus. Intervention by the state can 
also take place through financial support to certain underperforming ‘national’ indus-
tries for the sake of job security (and hence for the sake of electoral support) and/ or 
identity-related reasons. The latter case is most apparent in the aviation sector, where 
states frequently subsidize underperforming airline companies, partly because of the 
symbolic importance of having a ‘national’ carrier.  States can go even further by pro-
tecting their industries and markets against foreign competition. A good example of 
protectionism in this case is the European Union’s agricultural sector or the EU’s tem-
porary ban in the second half of 2005 on the import of cheaper Chinese textile products. 
But also within the single, ‘open market’ of the EU, nation-states sometimes still engage 
in very protectionist strategies, as the recent (2006) controversy around the energy-
sector clearly exemplifies (see also par 7.4). 
The last two examples show how in Europe considerable regulatory powers have been 
transferred upwards from the nation-state to the European Union. With the installment 
of the Single Market, the EU strives for a European wide level playing field. By this is 
meant equal and ‘fair’ market conditions in which subsidies by member-states are con-
sidered to be a distortion. The European Commission, for example, imposes limits 
through its 1997 ‘Green Paper on Sea Ports and Maritime Infrastructure’ on the extent to 
which member-states can subsidize infrastructure development at ports that would dis-
tort the market and competition between ports and port service providers. This is par-
ticular relevant since ports are reliant on huge capital investments in infrastructure to 
remain competitive. But the degree to which the (national-local) government is allowed 
to provide financial support to its ports is not clear. In Rotterdam, it is the port authority 
that dredges the channels in the port to keep the berths accessible and which finances 
that out of own revenues. However, in rival port Antwerp, the Flemish government was 
allowed by the European Commission to finance the dredging of the channel in the 
newly developed Deurganckdok terminal as it was considered a ‘maritime access route’ 
to terminals upstream (CEC, case No N520/2003). For such reasons, ports frequently 
accuse each other of unfair competition. 
What is ignored is that the competitive arena itself (notably markets) is also governed, in 
numerous ways, by (alliances of) organizations and sets of institutions. This amounts to 
a complex political-economic space of regulation and strategic action, in which different 
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strategies are pursued simultaneously. For instance, state agencies and business associa-
tions may advocate ‘fair play’ while at the same time bending specific ‘rules of the 
game’ to their own advantages. This is for instance clearly manifested in the EU’s Lis-
bon Agenda of 2000, in which the member-states aimed to make the EU the most com-
petitive economy on the globe by the year 2010, while explicitly juxtaposing it against 
its main global competitors China, the United States and Japan. In effect, the way in 
which organizations undertake macro-regulatory activities on the one hand, and on the 
other hand practice rules of market competition to boost competitiveness, is highly stra-
tegic and political. In general terms, an economic governance system can then be de-
fined as “the totality of institutional arrangements - including rules and rule-making 
agents - that regulate transactions inside and across the boundaries of an economic sys-
tem” (Hollingsworth et al 1994, p.5). Such an understanding of economic governance 
requires that we address both the role of institutions and agency, and how they structure 
the competitive process across spatial scales and territorial boundaries.  
In that respect, Hollingsworth & Boyer (1997) introduce the concept of spatial nested-
ness of institutions and they contrast this to national embeddedness. Spatial nestedness 
refers to the dependency of institutional arrangements on a variety of international 
trends (e.g. demography, macro-economic and geopolitical processes) and on the capa-
bility of sub-national entities. A second feature of nestedness is its relationship to the 
various levels of society: nations, sectors, free trade zones, large cities, international 
regimes etc. The relationship runs in every direction and it is neither pure bottom-up nor 
pure top-down. The third feature is that there is no single authority at whatever level that 
has the power to monitor or regulate such a complex system. In short, the institutional 
arrangements that at one time were coherent within the nation-state are now more dis-
persed between multiple spatial levels: from the local to the global. A crucial point of 
this study is the understanding of the development of ports and local agents in relation 
to broader regulatory changes and strategic maneuvering at higher levels of the state and 
at ‘global’ level, as is conceptualized in the Global Production Networks- perspective. 
2.4 Perspective of Global Production Networks (GPN) 
The perspective of global production networks was developed during the late 1990s by a 
group of economic geographers to study the process of economic globalization. This 
perspective is largely inspired by the works of the American economic sociologist Gary 
Gereffi on global commodity chains (GCC), which he developed with colleagues since 
the early 1990s. The GCC-framework is in its essence a relational approach to study the 
evolution of the production, distribution and consumption processes across the globe: 
“[t]he paradigm that GCCs embody is a network-centered and historical approach that 
probes above and below the level of the nation-state to better analyze structure and 
change in the world-economy” (Gereffi et al 1994, p2). Four main dimensions of the 
GCC are identified:
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1. Input-output structure: a value-added chain of products, services, and resources 
linked together across a range of relevant industries;
2. Territoriality: pattern of geographical distribution that may be spatially dispersed or 
spatially concentrated;   
3. Governance Structure: authority and power relationships between firms that deter-
mine how financial, material, and human resources are allocated and flow within a 
chain
4. Institutional Framework: identifies how local, national and international conditions 
and policies shape the globalization process at each stage in the chain.  
Though Gereffi’s work on GCCs during the 1990s has been widely endorsed as a pow-
erful analytical framework to study the process of economic globalization, it certainly 
has not been without critique. A group of scholars in the field economic geography es-
pecially, the so-called ‘Manchester School’ (cf. Dicken et al 2001; Henderson et al.
2002; Coe et al 2004), became very active in critically assessing and re-conceptualizing 
the GCC-framework. The core of the critique is formed by the fact that Gereffi has con-
centrated too much on just one of the four dimensions, namely the governance-structure, 
at the expense of the other dimensions. For example, the input-output relationships re-
main rather unexplored, both conceptually and empirically aside from a few sector 
cases. The way territoriality is conceptualized also remains rather restricted to a simple 
‘core-periphery’ dichotomy. A true geography of GCCs, i.e. how actors operating in 
various GCCs are anchored in different places and multiple scales, is not developed (cf. 
Hess & Yeung, 2006). Another shortcoming according to Dicken et al (2001, p.99), 
concerns the rather simplistic conceptualization of governance in just two ideal types, 
namely producer-driven commodity chains and buyer-driven commodity chains.   
However, most criticism is on the way the institutional framework is conceptualized, 
particularly the role of the nation-state (Dicken et al, 2001, p. 100). Although Gereffi 
(1994, p.100) recognizes the role that different institutional configurations of nation-
states have on the way GCC’s are organized, he views such influences as being eroded 
by the process of globalization. This contrasts with the work of Whitley (1996) and 
Hollingsworth et al (1994), who conclude that national institutional differences continue 
to have a strong influence on the international structure and development of economic 
activity and sectors. Nevertheless, and in line with Gereffi’s work, we must avoid a too 
state-centred focus and a methodological nationalism. Instead, emphasis should be put 
on the multi-scalar dimension of processes of value creation and industrial upgrading 
(Hess & Yeung, 2006), as well as the ‘nested’ nature of institutions within these proc-
esses.
In order to overcome the shortcomings of the GCC-approach, scholars developed the 
global production networks perspective (Henderson et al 2002, Coe et al 2004). Global
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production networks (GPN) can be defined as the globally organized nexus of intercon-
nected functions and operations through which goods and services are produced, dis-
tributed and consumed (Coe et al 2004, Henderson et al 2002). These GPNs need to be 
understood as multi-scalar, that is they range from the local and regional to the national 
and global level. They are constructed and transformed over time by agents with asym-
metrical positions of influence and power. A GPN consist of three categories: value, 
power and embeddedness (see figure 2.1). 
With value is meant the surplus value as well as economic rent. Of particular importance 
is the creation of value within each of the firms incorporated into a given GPN. Here we 
can think about the degree to which labor power is converted into actual production. The 
factors that contribute to the enhancement of value include the transfer of knowledge 
and technology; the degree to which firms in a GPN are acting together to improve the 
production and distribution process as well as the technological sophistication of prod-
ucts itself; and the demand for specialized and skilled workforce. These factors are all 
specific to an economic sector and are in turn influenced by national institutional differ-
ences (see also par 2.3.2). However, the creation and enhancement of value at a certain 
location is literally worthless when it is not captured. Here, three inter-related factors 
play a decisive role. First, governmental policy as regards the nature of property rights: 
as a result laws governing ownership structures and the repatriation of profits are of 
particular relevance. A second critical factor is the issue of firm ownership. We should 
be sensitive to the degree to which firms are completely foreign or domestically owned, 
to joint venture configurations, and to what degree the state is involved as a shareholder. 
The third relevant factor is the nature of corporate governance in a given national con-
text, e.g. the extent to which corporate governance is founded on stakeholder principles 
rather than on shareholder dominance. The latter aspect is particular relevant to the ex-
tent to which profits made at a certain location will be reinvested in that same location: 
“[t]he issue of value capture then, underlines the significance of the national form of 
capitalism- and thus matters of expectations, rights and obligations- for questions of 
economic and social development” (Henderson et al 2002, pp 449-50). 
The second category is the source and degree of power of the different agents within the 
GPN: this is decisive for value enhancement and capture. In this a relational notion of 
power is employed, defined as: “the capacity to exercise that is realized only through the 
process of exercising” (Dicken et al, 2001, p.93). Within a GPN this implies that a posi-
tion of power of an agent is relative to others and to key material and institutional re-
sources. Three forms of power are distinguished. Corporate power refers to the extent to 
which lead firms within a GPN have the capacity to influence, in their own material 
interests, the decisions and resource allocations in relation to other firms within the 
GPN. Institutional power refers to the exercise of power by the national and local state; 
by supranational inter-state agencies such as the European Union, the North American 
Free Trade Association (NAFTA), ASEAN and MERCOSUR; by the ‘Bretton Woods’ 
institutions (International Monetary Fund, World Bank) and the World Trade Organiza-
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tion (WTO); by various United Nations agencies; and the international credit rating 
agencies (e.g. S&P). The degree to which these agents are capable of influencing the 
investment and location decisions of firms integrated within GPN varies within and 
between these institutional levels. By collective power is meant the actions of collective 
agents such as business associations and labor unions as well as Non-governmental Or-
ganizations (NGO’s) such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International. These seek to 
influence companies at particular locations in GPNs, their governments and interna-
tional agencies such as the WTO.
Fig. 2.1: Framework for GPN-Analysis (Henderson et al, 2002, p. 448)
The third category distinguished in the framework is embeddedness. GPNs do not sim-
ply locate themselves at a particular location. Once a firm physically locates itself in a 
place, it is enabled and constrained by the economic activities and socio-cultural dynam-
ics that already exist in that place. In other words, firms and GPNs become territorially
embedded. The location of a certain lead firm within a sector at a particular location can 
work as a stimulus for other, small and medium sized enterprises that can provide the 
lead firm with additional or complementary services and industrial components. It can 
also work the other way around: the existence of a large number of small & medium 
sized firms (and their knowledge and social networks) can work as a locational advan-
tage for lead firms. This argument is associated with the work on clusters (Porter, 1990), 
industrial districts (Piore & Sabel, 1984) and agglomeration-economies (Krugman, 
1995). At the same time, national and local policies by the government may be targeted 
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explicitly to embed parts of the GPN in a particular city or region (e.g. setting up free 
enterprise zones). For example, De Langen (2003) highlights the emergence of port 
clusters, emphasizing the agglomeration-effects of port-industrial complexes and how 
they can be institutionally supported by appropriate governance structures. However, 
territorial embeddedness has not only positive effects. Once a lead firm decides to leave 
a location, it might result in a process of dis-embeddedness. Nevertheless it is safe to say 
that: “[F]rom a development point of view, then, the mode of territorial embeddedness 
or the degree of a GPN firm’s commitment to a particular location is an important factor 
for value creation, enhancement and capture” (Henderson et al, 2002, pp.453).  Firms 
operating in GPNs are not only characterized by their territorial embeddedness, but also 
by their links with other members of the GPN regardless of their country of origin or 
local anchoring. The durability and stability of these formal and informal relationships 
(‘architecture’) determines both the actor’s individual network embeddedness as well as 
the structure and evolution of GPN as a whole. Network embeddedness involves inter-
firm relationships as well as social relationships of firms with governmental agents and 
communities at different spatial scales. 
The processes of embeddedness in time and space form the core within the GPN-
perspective for the analysis of economic-geographical globalization as conceptualized in 
figure 2.2 (cf. Dicken 2004). The processes are understood as evolutionary, that is path 
dependent and contingent, leading to unique but uneven development trajectories in 
space. Space is in that respect understood in a relational sense, meaning a multi-scalar 
interdependent constellation of social relationships and institutions. As such the proc-
esses of embeddedness are both the outcome as well the driving force of economic-
geographical globalization.
In Dicken’s framework the ‘meso level’ is formed by networks of interaction among 
different types of collective agents (firms, labor, states, consumers), that are linked to-
gether with each other through their embeddedness in global production networks or 
trans-national social networks (e.g. the Catholic Church, E-communities). These net-
works of interaction are characterized by the fact that the agents do not hold equal 
power positions, chiefly because of the unequal access and control over material and 
institutional resources. The relationships between different collective agents and the 
organization of GPNs are furthermore sector-specific (cf. par 2.3.2). In some economic 
sectors the state plays a more dominant role than in others. Technological standardiza-
tion differs per sector, as do the rate of market concentration and the use of labor.  
The networks of interaction are in their turn ‘embedded’ within the macro-structure of 
the capitalist market system or global economy. As we know from Regulation Theory, 
these macro-structures and institutional frameworks are by no means universal even 
though capitalist relationships span the globe. Moreover, there are many different na-
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tional ‘varieties of capitalism’, that is geographically-specific configurations of institu-
tions and social relationships that regulate capitalism. It does not take much imagination 
to differentiate between the ‘laissez-faire’ approach typical for Anglo-Saxon countries, 
and the ‘étatiste’ approach more common in the countries of the ‘Rhineland’ (Jessop, 
2002) and Scandinavia (or in countries of Southeast Asia for that manner). Similarly, in 
some countries and sectors, labor unions enjoy a very powerful position, whereas as in 
others they do not, or they are outlawed completely by the state. In spite of the forma-
tion of supra-national trade blocs, this national variety exists and maintains itself be-
cause of the path dependent and place specific nature of institutions, which, in turn, lead 
to uneven economic development trajectories. It is these existing national varieties of 
capitalism and existing uneven economic development trajectories that produce oppor-
tunities for the participants of the GPN to (re)locate themselves where the conditions are 
most favorable (in terms of labor costs, access to raw materials, taxes, bureaucratic pro-
cedures), leading to new processes of embeddedness, and new patterns of economic 
development. The ‘varieties of capitalism’ and uneven economic development in space 
are both the outcome as well as the driving force of the functional and spatial constella-
tion of GPNs and economic activity.  
Fig. 2.2: Heuristic framework for analyzing economic-geographical globalization. 
(Dicken, 2004, p.10)
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Hall & Robbins’ (2007) analysis of the port of Durban’s insertion into global automo-
tive supply chain is illustrative. It shows how the port’s strategy for network insertion 
with Toyota became frustrated by national and capital city political interests and policy 
that ultimately favored BMW. Another way to put it is that BMW was more successful 
because it was more sensitive to South Africa’s centralized governance structure as re-
gards maritime trade in automobiles. This last example clarifies the important influence 
that political decision-making and national institutional frameworks can have on the 
possible territorial embeddedness of global operating firms, as well as on the capacities 
of localities and local firms to become embedded within a particular global production 
network. The example from South Africa shows us also that the GPN-perspective is 
essentially a heuristic approach to the interaction between structure and agency in the 
process of economic-geographical globalization. The GPN-perspective is therefore in 
need of specific empirical investigation at the level of a particular economic sector and 
territory. This brings us to the following questions. Why do some localities succeed 
better than others in becoming embedded within these GPNs? What is the role of the 
state in local economic development? What is the role of local institutions and public/ 
private agents in the processes of embeddedness? In order to answer these questions we 
conceptually move to the political economy of local economic development. 
2.5 Inserting the Micro: New Urban Politics 
The way in which public and private agents join forces to boost the competitive posi-
tions of cities has been at the centre of urban research in the U.S. for over two decades 
in what has been coined the New Urban Politics (Cox, 1991). Within that period, two 
closely related, although different ‘strands’ evolved. The first on is based upon 
Molotch’s thesis “The City as a Growth Machine” from 1976, which he later developed 
into a co-authored book named “Urban Fortunes” (Logan & Molotch, 1987). The other 
strand evolved out of Stone’s concept of urban regimes (1989), which he used to study 
the long-term development of Atlanta. During the mid 1990s, both concepts were in-
creasingly transferred to situations outside the U.S., by which the limits of the concepts 
in their original connotations soon became apparent. This made scholars critically assess 
the theoretical and methodological value of the concepts, as well as attempting to over-
come their shortcomings and to develop the concepts in order to make them applicable 
outside the U.S. What are these concepts about and how have they developed? How do 
they relate? What are their shortcomings and strengths? 
2.5.1 The Urban Growth Machine 
The central idea behind the urban growth machine is that coalitions of land-based elites, 
being tied to the economic development potential of certain places, drive urban politics 
in their quest to expand the local economy and accumulate wealth (Molotch, 1976; 
Jonas & Wilson, 1999). The concept is based upon two hypotheses. First, the primary 
agenda of local governments in the United States is ‘growth’, understood as the rise of 
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property values and as attracting more residents and jobs into a city’s jurisdiction. The 
second hypothesis is that there is a coherent coalition of local elites with direct material 
stakes in development, in particularly landowners and property developers, who have 
the power to make this happen. Later, Logan & Molotch (1987) named this local elite 
the ‘rentier class’ and considered also how their stakes might conflict with the interests 
of groups of residents. The heart of this rentier class is still formed by those who have 
an interest in the exchange of urban land and real estate, but is surrounded by a number 
of other ‘auxiliary’ players that might have indirect stakes in urban growth such as local 
media, universities, local chambers of commerce, sports teams. This made the growth 
machine theory more in line with urban regime theory as we will see later. 
The concept of the growth machine came as a reaction to the dominant pluralist ap-
proaches (e.g. public choice) in North American studies of urban politics, which ne-
glected issues of unequal distribution of power and social stratification. Public choice 
theorists see local governments as mere producers of services in competition with each 
other rather than as political entities. They furthermore assume that political forums 
aggregate citizen preferences effectively and that they transfer these preferences effi-
ciently into public policy. Only city governments of limited size can function in this 
way, and public choice theory advocates therefore the decentralization of state authority 
and fiscal federalism (Peterson, 1981). In such a situation, citizens and businesses can 
‘vote with their feet’ (Tiebout, 1956) in the search for the most favorable package of 
welfare services and taxes within the metropolitan area. The growth machine thesis is a 
departure also from earlier structuralist accounts, which see urban politics merely as 
instrumental to the social reproduction of national welfare state policies (Cochrane, 
1999) through the promotion of localized forms of collective consumption. The concept 
of the growth machine is in its essence a localized, agency-centered approach aimed at 
understanding urban governance as a means of local economic development. 
The concept of the growth machine has however its analytical shortcomings, which can 
be attributed to the concept’s epistemological origins and North American ethnocentric 
propositions (MacLeod & Goodwin 1999).  First of all, it places too much emphasis on 
the availability and quality of real estate and land as the primary conditions for local 
economic development (cf. Cox & Mair 1989).  Secondly, the concept draws too much 
explanatory power from the assumed dichotomy between the use-values of residents and 
the exchange-values of the ‘rentier class’ in the contemporary city. A third major short-
coming of the approach is that it gives little help in explaining urban governance under 
national political economic conditions other than the United States. So, although we 
might observe an American style of entrepreneurial urban politics, with public-private 
partnerships as the way to manage development processes, emerging in cities across the 
globe (Harvey, 1989), national institutional contexts still play a prominent role in the 
particularities of the local political economy and in consequent physical development 
outcomes. For instance, in fiscally centralized states such as the Netherlands or Sweden, 
property taxes play a less dominant role in urban politics. In addition, the political influ-
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ence of private property owners is reduced. For instance, 70% of the housing stock in 
Amsterdam is social housing controlled by quango-like housing-corporations. Strong 
central state involvement in the property market and land use is furthermore exemplified 
by Dutch national spatial planning policy.  
Moreover, a growth machine is just one constellation which an urban governance struc-
ture can take. Local governments and their business partners can also align themselves 
around local economic deficiencies or structural weaknesses in order to receive grants 
from higher levels of the state for restructuring and, as such, could be labeled as an ‘ur-
ban grant machine’. In fact, the degree to which we can distinguish a true ‘growth ma-
chine’ remains an empirical question, even in the United States. To what degree do the 
alleged growth machines of Houston and Phoenix differ? The point to make here is that, 
whatever constitutes a growth machine is highly dependent on particular local and na-
tional (institutional) conditions, as well as the propositions of the researcher. This makes 
the concept of limited analytical value, in spite of Molotch’s (1999) own plea for an 
international research agenda. A rival intellectual concept to the growth machine has in 
that respect been more successful. 
2.5.2 Urban Regime Theory
Another variant of the New Urban Politics is urban regime theory (URT). In short, ur-
ban regime theory asks how and under what conditions different types of governing 
coalitions emerge locally, consolidate and become hegemonic or devolve and transform 
(Lauria, 1997, p2). Regime theory starts from the proposition that the process of gov-
ernance in complex industrial capitalist societies is about much more than government. 
According to Fainstein and Fainstein (1982), the character of urban regimes derives 
from two structural features of the political economy. First, local government depends 
on property taxes for its fiscal solvency. So municipalities must maintain their revenues 
by enhancing existing property investments and attracting more such investment. At the 
same time, low income populations are a drain on local revenues. Second, central to the 
capitalist economy is the private control of production which makes the population 
largely dependent for employment on private investment and profit. The local state 
therefore must facilitate capital accumulation in order to advance the material interests 
of its citizens. This explains the dominant position of business in American urban poli-
tics. The central question which URT then poses is: “How in a world of limited and 
dispersed authority do actors work together across institutional lines to produce a capac-
ity to govern and to bring about publicly significant results” (Stone, 1989, pp 8-9) 
An urban regime is not solely a coalition with business: labor union officials, church 
leaders, professionals and party functionaries may also be involved in urban governance 
(Stone, 1989, p7). Typically, the agents that are involved in the urban regime are charac-
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terized by their ‘local dependency’ (Cox, 1995; Cox & Mair 1988). Local dependency 
refers to more-or-less territorialized social relations upon which actors depend for the 
realization of their material interests. This dependency on a certain location is the result 
of the spatial fix of capital (cf. Harvey, 1985, also see 2.3.1). Investments in the built 
environment (factories, offices, terminals) for example commit firms to a particular 
location. Firms can also be dependent on a place because the (local) state is one of its 
main shareholders. Labor in its turn is dependent on a certain place because of the loca-
tion of particular types of firms where they can earn wages. Another way in which labor 
becomes dependent is through homeownership or the sheer physical limits to mobility 
and commuting. Likewise, local governments are dependent on the fiscal base to carry 
out major capital investments (e.g. infrastructure) within their jurisdiction. Therefore 
Cox (1998, p.4) states: “[d]iverse forms of spatial fixity commit agents- capitalist firms, 
workers, state agencies, landowners- to securing those conditions in particular places 
that will allow them to go on (e.g.) making a profit, earning a wage, appropriating a rent, 
saving for a retirement, appropriating tax revenues, etc.” 
The degree of local dependency of agents, firms in particular, can however be reduced. 
One common way for a firm is to externalize the risks of investing in the buildings by 
renting factories, offices, stores or terminals. Other risk-reducing strategies of firms are 
for example franchising or outsourcing. Another way for firms to reduce their depend-
ency on one particular location is to spread risks geographically over multiple locations. 
However, such strategies may not make an agent completely place-independent, as they 
reconstitute local dependence at some broader geographical scale. Alternatively, firms 
might confront their dependency by intervening directly in the local development proc-
ess.
It is argued that because of the mutual dependency of firms on the economic growth of a 
particular location, they form coalitions with other agents to address their interests. 
These include local and metropolitan governments, chambers of commerce, infrastruc-
ture providers, local banks, utilities, local media and property owners. An urban regime 
can then be defined, following Painter (1997, p.129) as “a coalition of interests at the 
urban scale, including, but not limited to, elected local government officials, that coor-
dinates resources and thus generates governing capacity”. Governing capacity, or the 
power to act, is produced through coalition building with stakeholders. The degree to 
which these public-private coalitions can maintain their capacity to govern and remain 
hegemonic for a long period of time is the focus of URT. In order to qualify as a regime, 
the coalition must be durable: a coalition that comes together to pursue a particular pro-
ject and then dissipates again is not a regime.  
The concept of urban regimes was not limited to empirical studies of North American 
cities (as was the concept of the growth machine), as it was increasingly transferred to 
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European contexts (Britain in particular) during the 1990s (Basset 1996, Harding 1997, 
Kantor et al 1997, Wood 2004). At first glance, this transfer seemed promising since 
cities within European countries were confronted with serious institutional restructuring 
that included a more influential role for the private sector and the installment of the 
European Single Market in 1992. However, it quickly became clear that such an uncriti-
cal transfer to other, national contexts was not unproblematic.
Indeed, urban regime theory has it shortcomings (cf. Lauria, 1997). It inadequately theo-
rizes the connections between local agents (economic and political) and their wider in-
stitutional context. Consequently, regime theory usually ignores the metropolitan or 
larger spatial scales, devoting itself completely to the local level, as if a locality can 
function and govern itself in a completely autonomous institutional setting. It is exactly 
the methodological localism which forms the main critique on URT and its studies of 
urban politics. This can be attributed to the fact that URT originates from the U.S. where 
(a) local governments have taxation powers (mainly through property taxes), depend on 
the local tax revenue and have primary responsibility for land use control; (b) there is 
relatively weak integration between tiers of government; and (c) there is weak party 
organization (Jessop, Peck & Tickell, 1999). The transfer of URT to other contexts such 
as Europe or Asia is therefore not unproblematic (Wood, 2004; Mossberger & Stoker, 
2001; Harding, 1997) since European and Asian cities and urban regions operate in dif-
ferent historically developed governance structures and institutional settings. Moreover, 
even in the U.S. it is recognized that the politics and policies of higher levels of the state 
have their influence on the development and economic performance of urban territories 
(Lauria, 1997) and can exercise, whether deliberately or unintentionally, some degree of 
political favoritism (Leitner & Sheppard, 1999) for which individual cities must strug-
gle.
Besides its neglect of the wider institutional architecture, the application of the urban 
regime concept, especially when used for comparison, is also strewn with pitfalls 
(Mossberger & Stoker, 2001, p.814-818). These are called parochialism, misclassifica-
tion, degreeism, and concept stretching. The first pitfall, parochialism, refers to the ten-
dency of scholars to use the term ‘urban regime’ to describe any public-private coalition 
or urban policy agenda, without using the original connotation of what exactly consti-
tutes a regime. If for example a private-public coalition is formed on an ad hoc basis, it 
lacks the durability to go for a true regime. Misclassification occurs when scholars ne-
glect or ignore important differences between the units of comparison. Based upon the 
notion that in modern capitalist societies there must be some sort of division of labor 
between the state and the market, they for example assume that there is a regime every-
where, although this in fact remains an empirical question. The third pitfall, degreeism, 
refers to the attempt to catch major differences between two units of comparison in 
quantitative terms. It remains ambiguous, for example, if we can talk about an ’emerg-
ing regime’ or ‘radical regime’ without  setting up a list of criteria for assessment. Fi-
nally, concept-stretching manifests itself when some aspects of the original meaning of 
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regime are removed in order to accommodate more cases. To classify local-central rela-
tionships between state administrations as a regime, without including representatives of 
the private sector is an example of concept-stretching. According to Mossberger & 
Stoker (2001), one way out of these methodological problems is to ‘rise on the ladder of 
abstraction’, by using for example the concept of ‘networks’ or ‘modes of governance’.  
What is required is therefore is a multi-scalar perspective that conceives urban govern-
ance as part of a wider system of political-economic interdependencies. Following 
Brenner (1998), McGuirk (2003, p. 204) argues that such a perspective “would under-
stand social processes and political economic relations as intrinsically related across 
spatial scales -global, national and local- and as constitutive of co-evolving layers of the 
territorial organization of governance”. We therefore need to understand the social pro-
duction of governance and the formation of ‘local’ regimes in relational terms, that is we 
can not reduce our analysis to one specific type of agent (or group of agents) operating 
at one specific spatial scale. Rather, we must be sensitive to how regime formation and 
action are shaped by relationships and strategic interests at other spatial scales and 
within other institutional environments. Governance contexts at any given scale should 
therefore be viewed as conceptualized in figure 2.2 (cf. Dicken, 2004). For that manner 
we should be sensitive to the role of the state and its own scalar structure in the territo-
rial organization of economic governance (Macleod, 2001; Painter, 2000; Brenner 
1998).That is why we in this study speak about territorial regimes, understood as a terri-
torial governance structure, and we look at how it relates to the development of GPNs 
and the structure of the capitalist economy. 
The contribution of Cox (1998) is most interesting in that respect. In his effort to over-
come the problems of spatial scale in the politics of local economic development, he 
introduces the concept of space of engagement as opposed to spaces of dependence. In 
order for place dependent agents to secure the continued existence of their spaces of 
dependency, they have to engage with other centers and networks of ‘social power’ in 
order to gain leverage, mobilize agents and resources, or build strategic coalitions. As 
Cox (1998, p.7) puts it: “[t]his in turn requires the construction of a network of associa-
tions either incorporating state agencies directly or incorporating those who can exercise 
some indirect influence through (e.g.) their command of resources critical to them”. 
These centers of social power and spaces of engagement do not necessarily correspond 
with the spatial scale (local, regional, national, global) of the space of dependence of the 
agent. For example, a local government can lobby the national government for the sub-
sidy of major development projects. Likewise, place dependent firms can organize 
themselves in clubs or national branch-associations to further their interests. Nor do 
these spaces of engagement have to correspond with the formal administrative-territorial 
structure of the state. For example, in order to prevent a plant closure at certain location, 
the space of engagement of locally based firms or suppliers, and in particular of the 
unionized workers, can be targeted directly to the corporate headquarters of the parent-
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firm (which might be in a different country) or to the nation-state in the search for socio-
economic security.  
The rise on the ladder of abstraction can also overcome a third major shortcoming of 
URT in its original North American connotation: the lack of sector specificities. With its 
strong territorial orientation, URT is not really equipped to account for the differences 
between, for instance, the division of labor per sector (e.g. agriculture vs. finance), the 
form and nature of inter-firm competition, and technological conditions. Moreover, 
sectors have specific forms of co-ordination in which organizations like business asso-
ciations and labor unions play a prominent role, from the local to the global level 
(Hollingsworth et al 1994, Henderson et al 2002). When a regime acts to attract a par-
ticular type of business activity (e.g. sector-based: maritime trade), to construct some-
thing (e.g. container terminal) or to attract particular firms (e.g. companies involved in 
distribution and value added logistics), such sectoral specificities may play a significant 
role. Facilitating and promoting a city as a logistical node, for instance, may require 
specific competencies in nurturing public-private partnerships for infrastructure provi-
sion and management, while building dedicated business parks will require specific 
skills and institutional conditions (property rights, leasing policies, planning regulations 
etc) for attracting and liaising with specific types of firms. So the success of specific 
urban (territorial) strategies will depend on the way they respond to the challenges and 
requirements of the type of sectoral activity involved, issues that can be covered by the 
structure-of-provision-approach.  
2.6 The Structure of Provision (SoP) 
Major improvements have been made in defining and conceptualizing what constitutes 
and shapes a regime, as the subject which makes urban or local strategy. However, what 
has received less attention is the instrument of regimes. Originally, the focus was pri-
marily on property-led developments, with emphasis on major physical investments and 
flagship projects (Fainstein 1994), and how these were used in city-marketing. Now 
there is a tendency to broaden the scope to other types of strategies, such as attracting 
external firms, business support, cluster development, and regulatory issues with envi-
ronmental and social dimensions (Jonas and Gibbs 2003;  MacLeod and Goodwin 1999;  
Oinas 2000). These involve the more institutional dimension of providing the conditions 
for investments and development, as distinct from physical and symbolic aspects of 
local economic development. The question then becomes: how do private and public 
actors act jointly to modify institutional arrangements for the provision of local assets 
and infrastructure and for negotiating with economic actors? This involves issues like: 
what kind of governance structures are developed, what are the incentives for private 
investments and public-private partnerships, and how are property rights organized? 
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In order to investigate the institutional dimension of local economic development, we 
turn to the structure of provision approach (SoP). The SoP was initially developed by 
Michael Ball (1983) to investigate the political economy of home ownership in the Brit-
ish housing market. According to Ball (1998), a structure of provision refers to the net-
work of social relationships, institutions and organizations, associated with the provision 
of particular types of buildings or services at specific points in time and space. ‘Provi-
sion’ encompasses the whole range: development, construction, ownership and use of 
land and buildings. The network of social and institutional relationships in which a par-
ticular form of building provision takes place is the ‘structure’ of that provision. An 
advantage of the structure of provision approach is that it connects the physical aspects 
of local economic development with both the institutional arrangements and the in-
volved agents at a given place. As such, the SoP approach goes beyond the dichotomy 
between structure and agency (Ball, 1998, p.1513): both structure and agency are part of 
a ‘structure of provision’ (compare in that respect: Healey’s work on structure-agency 
institutionalism, 1992).  
The SoP-approach is not limited to the housing market (Gore & Nicholson, 1991, Ball 
1998). It can be applied to virtually every building provision, ranging from office space 
to parking lots, as well as less tangible provisions such as health care and education. 
Each type of SoP is therefore directly related to a type of economic activity with its 
specific group of agents. It is in another words sector-specific. Each type of economic 
activity, and each type of agent, has its own specific demands regarding the physical 
(e.g. design, plot size, accessibility) and institutional (e.g. property rights, taxation, 
planning procedures) aspects of the building provision. Therefore, for empirical re-
search, the SoP, in Ball’s view, is more a perspective than a concept or theory. By 
zooming in on a specific sector or type of economic activity, a more defined and de-
tailed notion of a SoP can be created, that can be applied in territorial case study work. 
In that respect, different places have distinct ‘structures of provision’ at specific points 
in time. This is due to the path dependent and place specific nature of institutions. Thus, 
a particular SoP is sector-specific, both in time and space.
Regardless of the type of activity or place in time under investigation, three inter-related 
dimensions of a particular SoP can be distinguished. First of all, there is a physical di-
mension. The existing physical quality and quantity of the built environment is crucial 
for the development potential of a particular location for a particular (economic) activ-
ity. The durability of investments in the built environment dictates that much of the 
existing occupation of space must be regarded as given, reflecting development deci-
sions taken in the past under completely different economic and political circumstances 
(Keogh & D’Arcy, 1999). As a result, physical mismatches can be expected at any given 
place, which in turn affect the economic development potential and the attraction of 
specific types of firms or economic activity. Nevertheless, it is through investments in 
the built environment that firms become more or less dependent on that location, which 
translates itself in institutional and social relationships. 
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Secondly, there is a clear institutional dimension to the SoP. Land and buildings resem-
ble a pattern of property rights, which serve a variety of use and investment interests and 
objectives. These interests do not necessarily have to match the economic development 
agenda of the local government, and, as such, the legal rights in property might either 
facilitate or restrict the development process (D’Arcy & Keogh, 1998). The state does 
however exercise considerable control over the use of these property rights, for example 
through building codes, zoning and planning regulation. On the one hand, the lack of 
these controls might result in undesirable and/ or inefficient use of space. On the other 
hand, too complex (time-consuming) and bureaucratic procedures might result in lack of 
investments or even in the departure of firms to another location (‘vote with their feet’). 
In addition, the state is also responsible for the appropriation of taxes over land and real 
estate, which can be used to finance public goods (e.g. infrastructure, garbage disposal 
or policing) or, more strategically, as incentives to attract particular types of firms and 
economic activity.  
Thirdly, there is a political dimension to the SoP. A structure of provision implicates a 
particular division of labor, and of formal responsibilities and tasks between the public 
and private sector. Conflicts over the use and development of the built environment, the 
allocation and distribution of resources and/or the rules of the game themselves, inevita-
bly arise (cf. Terhorst & Van de Ven, 1997). In order to deal with, and preferably pre-
vent, such conflicts there is a need for coordination among these public and private 
stakeholders. In some cases a stronger coordinating role for the government is required 
(e.g. to safeguard the public interest), whereas in other cases a less hierarchical, more 
horizontal approach is more appropriate (e.g. to build trust among stakeholders and mo-
bilize private resources). The way governance is structured plays therefore a key role in 
the (economic) development process of places. However, the role of the government is 
subjected to political upheavals (because of popular voting systems in a democracy, or 
because of the personal upheavals of the leadership in non-democratic states), that might 
lead to a political reconsideration of the governance structure in place. Likewise, the 
behavior of firms within the governance process is affected by changes in shareholding 
and firm-ownership, corporate strategies, technology and new market opportunities, 
which might result in the retreat from commitments made to the state and from particu-
lar investment programs at a certain location.  
As such, structures of provision are not static; they are subject to continual, path-
dependent change arising from factors like market pressures, technological innovations, 
tastes, policies and other strategies of the organizations involved (Ball, 1998, p.1515). 
Though the SoP presupposes an interaction between institutions and organizations, it 
does not say anything about how this interaction unfolds, nor does it recognize the wider 
institutional environment and the factors of change (Jacobs, 2007). In that respect the 
SoP is not a theoretical ‘rich’ framework. It is not supported by theories that explain its 
historically developed constitution and its development, something which is recognized 
by Ball (1998) himself. The SoP-approach therefore needs to be supported by other 
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theoretical contributions that provide insights to the processes of constitution and insti-
tutional change. For that reason, the study integrates the SoP with insights from regula-
tion theory, GPNs and urban regimes. What we consequently are interested in is to con-
ceptualize the interrelationships between localized and sector specific forms of SoPs 
with globally organized networks of production and the intermediary role territorial 
regimes play in their quest for economic growth. In this study we do exactly this. It pro-
vides theoretical foundation to the constitution and evolution of SoPs by positioning this 
in relation with the growth agenda formulation of regimes and the embeddedness of 
GPNs. As such, the SoP can act as a strategic instrument of the territorial regime, by 
politically providing the material and institutional conditions through which (firms em-
bedded within) GPNs can become territorially embedded, and, in this way, become de-
pendent on the future economic development of the territory. 
2.7 The Conceptual Model
In our quest to conceptualize the complex relationships between institutional structures 
and the strategic behavior of agency in a globally organized maritime sector, this chap-
ter presented a wide range of theoretical approaches. The neo-Marxist Regulation The-
ory highlighted the macro-structural shift in the functional organization of the capitalist 
economy from Fordism to post-Fordism since the 1970s. This has been accompanied by 
a changing spatial regulatory environment across space, as conceptualized by the transi-
tion from national institutional embeddedness to a multi-scaled nestedness of institu-
tions. The Global Production Network perspective was introduced to provide a multi-
scalar account of how to understand the interrelationships between structure and agency 
and how that gives rise to particular constellations in the worldwide production of goods 
that ultimately lead to particular economic development trajectories of places and sec-
tors. We do not see the ‘global’ as a set of imperative forces that impose themselves 
onto the local, as implied in certain accounts of globalization; rather, what we are inter-
ested in is how local agents manage to play along with the global ‘rules of the game’. 
In order to understand the politics of economic development and the way public-private 
coalitions are formed to boost the competitiveness of places, we turned to the New Ur-
ban Politics, in particular Urban Regime Theory. It highlighted how, under given institu-
tional conditions, locally dependent agents generate ‘capacity to act’ in order to safe-
guard their interests as a rational response to changing economic geographies and the 
mobility of capital. Finally, the ‘structure-of-provision’-approach was introduced to help 
us identify the material, institutional and political dimensions of local dependency as the 
objects of strategic action of territorial regimes. We have integrated these insights into 
one conceptual model (cf. figure 2.3)  
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The crux of our conceptual model is formed by the interrelationship between ‘spaces of 
dependencies’ and ‘spaces of engagements’ as developed by Kevin Cox (1998). A space
of dependence refers to more-or-less territorialized social relations and place-specific 
conditions upon which actors depend for the realization of essential interests. These 
essential interests can take the form of profits, jobs and wages, taxes and the personal 
well-being. The space of dependence of actors is the result of a combination of physical, 
institutional and political factors. Physically, actors are dependent, through the invest-
ments in the built environment (e.g. homeownership), on the availability of resources or 
the limitations to labor mobility. Institutionally, actors are dependent on a set of formal 
rules and social relations that exist at a certain place and which enables and constrains 
them in their actions. The role of a state agency, for example, is restricted to its defined 
jurisdiction. At the same time, firms are dependent on states for the regulation of their 
markets. Politically, a space of dependence is expressed in the form of an arena or gov-
ernance structure in which decisions over the allocation of resources and distribution of 
wealth are contested and negotiated. This dependency of particular actors on a certain 
place also implies that there is only a limited number of substitutes elsewhere to realize 
their interests, whereby the more substitutes, the less dependency. Finally, spaces of 
dependence can occur at different scales and for some actors there is more than one 
scale. For example, a shipping line might be dependent on the location of a port with a 
deepwater-entrance, but even more on the quality of the port’s hinterland infrastructure, 
on national legislation regarding market competition and on international prices for oil 
and steel.
However, these spaces of dependence are embedded within broader sets of relationships 
and institutions of a more ‘global’ character and are constantly threatened with being 
undermined or dissolved by changing economic geographies and the mobility of capital. 
In order for place dependent agents to secure the continued existence of their spaces of 
dependency, they have to engage with other centers and networks of ‘social power’ (e.g. 
the port authority, national government, labor union, the European Commission, the 
WTO or the NGO) and gain leverage, mobilize agents or build strategic coalitions. In 
other words, they construct spaces of engagement or ‘networks of association’. These 
centers of social power and spaces of engagement do not necessarily correspond with 
the same spatial scale (local, regional, national, global) as the space of dependence of 
the agent, nor do they have to correspond with the formal administrative-territorial 
structure of the state. The relationship between the space of dependence and space of 
engagement is therefore a contingent matter. We summarize our theoretical exercise in 
the following conceptual model: 
At the local level, there are the port-dependent agents that contribute to, and are depend-
ent on, the dynamics of the globally organized system of production and consumption. 
Globalization is not seen as a single omni-present force which determines the fate and 
fortunes of places and established social relationships. Rather, globalization must be 
understood as a process: it is the outcome of the strategic behavior of agents, the oppor-
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tunities offered by new technology, patterns of uneven economic development and insti-
tutional restructuring at various spatial scales. Our interest therefore is how these locally 
dependent agents manage to play along with the global rules of the game.  
Fig. 2.3: The Institutional Embeddedness of Ports and GPNs. 
Therefore, on the top level we have the Global Production Network that refers to the 
post-Fordist geographical organization of the capitalist economy in the form of globally 
organized and integrated networks of production. GPNs are constructed and transformed 
over time by agents with asymmetrical positions of influence and power. They include a 
set of inter-firm relationships within a particular economic sector, a division of labor 
and certain technological standards. Firms embedded within the GPN have an interna-
tional, if not global, space of engagement and are linked together through corporate ties 
and contractual agreements. However, these firms also become territorially embedded as 
they invest in particular locations, or take over other firms which are located in a spe-
cific territory, or sign contracts with suppliers that are scattered across a number of 
countries. Once the investments are made, the firm contributes to economic develop-
ment of that location. At the same time, it becomes to some degree dependent on the 
location for economic growth, e.g. through fiscal policies of the state, labor conditions 
and the development of physical infrastructure. It becomes in other words embedded 
within a territorial regime and dependent on a specific location.  
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One level below we have the territorial regime, understood as a constellation of public, 
collective and private agents, as well as a set of territory-specific and historically devel-
oped regulatory frameworks and institutions. The territorial regime depends to a large 
degree on the structure of the state and its political system and therefore varies from 
country to country. For example, some countries have a federal structure which grants 
lower levels of government considerable freedom in the formulation of laws or (eco-
nomic) policies and the appropriation of taxes, whereas unitary states are characterized 
by more uniformity and central coordination. Similarly, some countries have a democ-
ratic system in which the government’s actions are accountable to an electorate, whereas 
others are run by autocratic elite. The territorial regime must furthermore be understood 
as multi-scalar, ranging from the local to the national. Some rules and strategic agendas 
are formulated at the (inter) national level, whereas others might be at the urban-
regional level, depending on what is at stake and for whom. The way that GPNs become 
territorially embedded and the way in which place dependent agents construct their net-
works of engagement is strongly influenced by the territorial regimes, and in turn influ-
ence that regime. The rational attempt of (coalitions of) port dependent agents to secure 
their space of dependence by creating the institutional conditions for them to engage in 
the GPN is part of regime politics.
At the lowest level we find the Structure of Port Provision, through which agents are, 
and become, dependent on the port. It refers to the network of social relationships, insti-
tutions and organizations, associated with the provision of particular types of buildings 
and other structures at specific points in time and space. ‘Provision’ encompasses the 
whole range: development, construction, ownership and use of land and buildings. The 
network of social and institutional relationships in which a particular form of building 
provision takes place is the ‘structure’ of that provision. We identified three inter-related 
categories: the port’s physical conditions, institutional arrangements, and governance 
structure. First, there is the actual condition of the physical infrastructure, including 
superstructure i.e. berthing and docking space, wharf and terminal space, quay walls 
plus all the equipment for handling cargoes (cranes, chassis etc) and ship services (such 
as tugs, pilotage, fresh water, bunkers, waste disposal), and the inland transport system 
(e.g. waterways, road and rail). In addition to this 'hardware', the physical infrastructure 
includes Information Technology (IT) systems that allow for more efficient co-
ordination of the flow of traffic in the port and optimize terminal operations. The second 
category is the complex of institutional arrangements such as property rights, land use 
stipulations, tariffs and other regulations and associated practices that regulate the use of 
the physical infrastructure (including environmental and safety stipulation, work and 
payment conditions). The third category is the governance structure of the port that 
steers both infrastructure investment and maintenance, and the set of institutions under-
pinning service provision. In this way, the SoP is both a structural framework which 
enables and constrains particular port dependent agents in their actions, while at the 
same time it can function as a strategic instrument of territorial regimes to strengthen the 
competitiveness of their assets. 
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The relationship between GPNs, territorial regimes and the SoP is that they are mutually 
constituting and co-evolving. It is through the SoP that agents operating within a GPN 
become dependent on the port’s development. For example, a shipping line acquires a 
dedicated container terminal arrangement within a port for a period of 25 years in which 
it makes considerable capital investment in the superstructure of the port. At the same 
time GPNs become embedded within a broader set of social relationships, that is the 
territorial regime, responsible for setting the broader conditions of economic growth, for 
example, through the state’s fiscal and trade policies or the political willingness to in-
vest in the port’s hinterland infrastructure. The territorial regime in its turn sets the con-
ditions for GPNs to become embedded and materialized through a port SoP, while at the 
same time providing the opportunities for port dependent agents to become embedded 
within a GPN.
This research is into the impact of competition on the process of institutional change. 
Evolutionary economists (cf. Alchian, 1950) argue that competition eventually will lead 
into a convergence of institutions to the ‘best standard’ or ‘best practice’. This implies 
that over time ports would develop identical SoPs.  However, although we accept that 
competition between ports provides pressures for institutional convergence, we expect 
that its ultimate resolution is contingent on the path dependent and territorially rooted 
structures of power (Jacobs, 2007) and interests or, as Hall (2003, p.350) puts it: a port 
is a local ‘community of practice’, which constitutes a relatively strong countervailing 
force against convergent institutional change and for persistent institutional variation. 
Indeed, issues with less emphasis on growth and economic performance, such as com-
munity and environmental concerns, might be a reason for agents to organize them-
selves in coalitions in order to further their non-economic interest. Finally, institutional 
change, in terms of adaptation of the SoP by the regime, induced by competition will not 
necessarily lead to better economic performance (North, 1990). Hence, our focus is not 
on the question whether changes in the SoP do in fact lead to better economic perform-
ance of the port-in-question, but to what degree port competition and regime politics 
lead to SoP-change. Port competition can now be defined, in a political economy fash-
ion, as a territorial governance process in which port dependent agents (both public and 
private and at various scales) engage in strategic action to strengthen the competitive 
position of the port. 
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Chapter III 
Methodology
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter dealt with theories that help to understand the way port stake-
holders engage in materially and institutionally oriented strategies within a global mari-
time sector in order to boost the competitiveness of the port. This chapter will develop 
and operationalize the conceptual model (cf. fig. 2.3), so that these actions can be inves-
tigated empirically. This chapter is structured as followed. First, we look at how we can 
asses the competitive position of ports. Next, we take into account the factors that influ-
ence the maritime sector of which ports are part of, by making use of the global produc-
tion network perspective. Third, we zoom in on the structure-of-provision approach and 
apply it to container ports. Fourth, we will look at territorial regimes and the role they 
play in both the processes of embeddedness. The chapter ends with a section in which 
the choices for the empirical research are set out and explained. 
3.2 Port Competition 
The first step in the empirical research is to assess the competitive position of the ports 
under investigation. Port competition can be simply understood as the competition be-
tween different ports (Cullinane et al, 2005). Ports compete for geographical market 
shares, for attracting customers and their cargo, for attracting capital investments and 
knowledge, and for attracting value-adding activities. The competition between ports is 
played out regionally, given the fact that cargo is bound for a certain hinterland which 
can be serviced by different ports (Kreukels & Wever, 1998). So, a port in Northwest 
Europe is competing with other ports in the region but not with ports in Southeast Asia. 
A common way to look at the competitive performance of ports is by looking at their 
market shares in the total annual cargo throughput in the region. The cargo throughput is 
often measured in million metric tons and includes container volumes. However, annual 
container throughput is also measured separately in the dimensions of Twenty-foot 
Equivalent Unit (TEU) per year. This information is relatively easy to acquire since 
most ports publish their results annually. In this research, we looked at the shifts in re-
gional market shares of ports in the container sector over the last decade. 
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This information is about the outcome of the competitive landscape of ports in attracting 
business, but we do not know what factors influence that outcome. In order to do so we 
need to turn to the structure and dynamics of the international maritime transport sector, 
as well as to look at the way ports themselves are organized and territorially embedded 
within a path dependent institutional framework. 
3.3 Global Production Networks and the Maritime Sector
The first step in our empirical research is to analyze the structure and development of 
the port-maritime sector, by making use of the GPN-perspective. According to its 
founding fathers (Henderson et al, 2002, p447), the GPN-perspective directs methodo-
logical attention to the following issues: 
1. The networks of firms involved in R&D, design, production and marketing of a 
given product, and how these are organized globally and regionally; 
2. The distribution of corporate power within those networks, and changes therein; 
3. The significance of labor and the processes of value creation and transfer; and 
4. The institutions –particularly government agencies, but also in some cases trade 
unions, business associations and NGO’s- that influence firm strategy in the particu-
lar locations absorbed into the production chain; 
5. The implications of all of these for technological upgrading, value adding and cap-
turing, economic prosperity etc. for the various firms and places into the chains. 
The relative importance of these issues is sector-specific and can be discovered only by 
empirical investigation. This study looks at the structure and development of the interna-
tional maritime transport sector and the implications for port competition. Based upon 
the GPN-perspective and the Regulation Theory’s approach to economic sectors we 
distinguish the following dimensions which will help us to investigate the dynamic of 
the sector:
Industrial Organization. The first step is to list the firms involved in the international 
transport of containers, their inter-firm relationships and the strategies they develop. 
These firms are most notably the shipping lines, terminal operators, freight forwarders, 
hinterland transporters and the shippers or cargo-owners. We need to be aware of the 
relationships between these firms: what is the level of competition and cooperation? 
How is power distributed among them?  
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Industrial Setting. We can not look at this sector in complete isolation, since transport is 
a derived demand. This demand is dependent on the geographical distances between 
centers of production and consumption. Indeed, the sector is an integral part of the 
global production networks for specific goods, may they be automobiles, textiles, toys, 
electronics, waste paper etc. The demand for transport is dependent in the way industrial 
production and manufacturing is organized and also signals a particular spatial division 
of labor in the manufacturing of goods. 
International Regulation. International transport and shipping do not occur in an institu-
tional vacuum, but are regulated by all kinds of bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements 
and institutional arrangements between states. Most significant are trade-agreements 
between nations under the supervision of the World Trade Organization and the regula-
tion of the use of international waters under the jurisdiction of the United Nations. The 
case of the European Union is somewhat special, since it monitors the Common Market 
and the imposed EU-wide legislation regarding competition, state-aid and the environ-
ment with clear implications for the sector. After the terrorist attacks of ‘9/11’, the secu-
rity of ports and supply chains have also become subjected to international regulation.
Technology. We need to look at the role new technology plays in the development of the 
sector. In the maritime sector this is first and foremost the standardization and mass-
application of the container. Containerization can be regarded as the revolution in trans-
port as it has made shipping more efficient and safer. The mass use of containers and 
scale-enlargement of ships also generates new demands for handling equipment. In ad-
dition to the ‘box’, the use of Information Technology applications has made it possible 
to integrate and streamline complex services, plan logistical operations and flexibly 
match supply with demand. 
These GPN-variables will be investigated through literature review, interviews and the 
scanning of websites and corporate reports of the involved firms. These developments 
within the container sector and the consequences for ports will be dealt with in much 
more detail in chapter four.  
3.4 Structure of Container Port Provision 
We should recognize that within individual seaports, multi-purpose ports especially, 
several Structures of Provisions might be distinguished depending on the variety and 
type of economic activity. For example, ports like Rotterdam and Singapore host exten-
sive petro-chemical refineries while at the same time specializing in containers. These 
are completely different sectors, with their own dynamics and with different players, 
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interests, physical requirements and regulations. The two sectors might even compete 
within the port for space and political influence over regulatory bodies. Therefore, the 
SoP of petro-chemical refineries within a port will be different than that of containers, as 
it will also differ from the bulk sector.  
The 'deliverables' of a SoP for the container activities of a seaport can be divided into 
three broad categories: physical infrastructure, institutional provisions and port govern-
ance. First, there is the actual provision of physical infrastructure, including superstruc-
ture i.e. berthing and docking space, wharf and terminal space, quay walls plus all the 
equipment for handling cargoes (cranes, chassis etc) and ship services (such as tugs, 
pilotage, fresh water, bunkers, waste disposal), and the inland transport system (e.g. 
waterways, road and rail). In addition to this 'hardware', the physical infrastructure in-
cludes Information Technology (IT) systems that allow for more efficient co-ordination 
of the flow of traffic in the port in order to optimize terminal operations. A highly criti-
cal variable for port performance is the scale of the infrastructure (length of quays, depth 
of berths and waterways) and of the superstructure (the size and capability of cranes, 
fork trucks and storage). This determines the size of single vessels and the number of 
ships, containers, etc. which the port can cope with.  Since the introduction of the con-
tainer in the early 1960s, the size and capacity of ships and vessels have increased dra-
matically to over 8,000 TEU (Twenty Equivalent Unit), also known as post-Panamax. 
The consequence is that only a few ports have the capacity and the infrastructure to 
handle these ships and the cargo they carry.  
The second category is the set of property rights, land use stipulations, tariffs and other 
regulations and associated practices that regulate the use of the physical infrastructure 
(including environmental and safety stipulation, work and payment conditions). This set 
of factors is at the centre of what Hall (2003) calls the ‘complex of institutions’ defining 
a port’s overall service profile. As already explained, given the increased demand for 
dedicated terminals notably for container handling, a critical issue is the extent to which 
the port grants leases for single-use or dedicated terminals and under what conditions, or 
whether the port holds on to common-use facilities. In the latter case, the level and 
structure of tariffs is of great significance, including the possibilities for discounts and 
customer-specific deals. Environmental legislation and labor conditions (e.g. safety 
stipulations such as the number of containers stacked on each other) are of importance 
as well, and can constrain terminal operations and port development considerably.  
The third category is the system of governance that steers both infrastructure investment 
and maintenance, and the set of institutions underpinning service provision. What is the 
balance between public and private interests and involvement when decisions about 
infrastructure development are made? What are the procedures for setting tariffs, pro-
viding leasing schemes and deciding on regulatory issues (work conditions, environ-
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ment, and safety)? The classification of governance arrangements which is most com-
monly made in the literature is a fourfold distinction according to the types of service 
provision, with a corresponding division of the responsibilities between public and pri-
vate agents (Cullinane et al, 2005; PMR 2000; Stevens 1997; World Bank 2001, Liu 
1992):  
1. The first type, found most in central planned economies and in the former British 
colonies, is the Public Service Port. Public service means that management, land 
use planning and development control, nautical services and transshipment are all in 
the hands of one public body such as a port authority or ministry. The public sector 
provides all the investments in infrastructure, superstructure (cranes, silos, and 
warehouses), hinterland connections and maritime accessibility. Labor is state-
employed. Such an arrangement still exists in, for example, Israel. The strength of 
this model, it is argued, is the potential for streamlined and coherent approach to 
growth. On the other hand, due to limited competition this model might lead to inef-
ficient port administration, lack of innovation and dependency on government fund-
ing (Brooks & Cullinane, 2006, p. 408).  
2. A close variant is the Tool port also known as Operating port, found primarily in 
the Mediterranean ports. Here, labor is employed by small private stevedores. All 
the land, infra and superstructure is in the hands of the state, and since the steve-
dores do not own any real estate or other assets, it is generally difficult for them to 
acquire financial resources for development. The private stevedores can never de-
velop into full-grown commercial firms, nor are there sufficient incentives for them 
to optimize their operations. This model is becoming increasingly out-of-date and is 
being replaced by the ‘landlord port’. 
3. The third type is called the Landlord port. In the Landlord port, the public port 
management restricts itself to nautical management, infrastructure, land use plan-
ning and the promotion of the port in general. The private sector is responsible for 
transshipment, industrial functions and requirements and the entire superstructure. 
Land is available only for long term lease and remains in freehold ownership with 
the appropriate state agency, but provides private terminal operators with the means 
to acquire financial resources for development. Since this model is increasingly used 
world-wide, it is good to pay attention to the relationship between the port-manager 
and the private sector. The port manager represents the general interests of the entire 
port-industrial complex and stimulates internal competition within the complex. The 
port manager tries to prevent monopoly-positions by private firms. The port man-
ager remains therefore neutral and does not compete against the private sector, e.g. 
by operating terminals. A potential disadvantage of this model is the risk of excess 
capacity since competing private operators may press for expansion.  
4. The last type is the Private Service port, in which all activities and functions (own-
ership, regulation and operations) are the responsibility of the private sector. Land is 
in ownership of private firms and labor is employed by private firms. In England, 
for instance the ports of Felixstowe, Thamesport and Harwich are in the hands of 
the firm HPH. Port privatization has occurred to some degree in a number of other 
countries and is advocated on the grounds of optimizing efficiency and profitability 
by international organizations such as the World Bank. Yet, in most cases the state 
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has privatized port operations only, with regulation and land ownership (but avail-
able on long term lease) still remaining in public hands.  
This characterization of port governance is admittedly rather stylized and static (see for 
a slightly different approach Baird 1995). The distinction is mainly based upon a rather 
rough division along the different factors of production (land, labor, capital) and does 
not explain why the different roles of public and private agents are as they are (Stevens 
1997, p.70). According to Brooks & Cullinane (2006, p.410), this typology is too sim-
plistic as it fails to  provide a more complete understanding of the strategic intentions of 
the port, its role in the economy as seen by the government and the responsibility for 
regulatory monitoring of environmental and safety issues. Yet, it serves as a first step in 
identifying the major strategic powers that are employed by core public and private 
agents engaged in the development of ports and their territorial settings. It should how-
ever be viewed in relation to the other two main categories (institutional arrangements 
and physical conditions) of the SoP. In doing so, a more complete picture can be ob-
tained.
Using this analysis, we see two trends in public-private interaction. One is the push for 
major physical investments supported by public-private partnerships; the other is a fur-
ther shift in port governance towards intricate mixes of public and private involvement 
in decision making, notably through elaboration of the Landlord model, sometimes go-
ing so far as ‘market’ dominated models in line with the Private Service port model 
(Brooks 2004; Brooks & Cullinane 2006). However, this is not to say that these shifts to 
more private sector involvement will lead to some institutional convergence among 
ports, even though competition and ‘survival of fittest’ might provide sufficient reasons 
to do so. The outcome of this process is in fact highly contingent on place specific fac-
tors:
“[t]he choice of model by government is influenced by the socio-economic structure of a 
country, the historical development of the ports, the location of the port (urban area or 
isolated region) and the types of cargo typically handled (liquid or dry bulk, containers). 
Decisions about the balance of public sector and private sector participation are also a 
product of the strength of the capital markets in the country and the philosophy of the 
country with respect to alternative service delivery” (Brooks & Cullinane, 2006, p. 407). 
In order to understand the drivers behind such shifts in the Structure of Provision of 
ports, we need to go back one step in our conceptual model (cf. Fig 2.3), and focus on 
the role of the territorial regime and the interaction of port-dependent agents with the 
state. Attention now shifts to the urban, regional and (inter)national governance levels of 
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the territorial regime. This includes local authorities, the broader business community, 
civil society and organizations such as labor unions and trade associations. It is the level 
where core decisions are taken about the development, upkeep and use of infrastructure, 
in physical as well as institutional terms, and also where the overall governance struc-
ture of the port may come under scrutiny, leading for instance to a change in the basic 
port governance model, e.g. from Public Service to Landlord Port. 
3.5 Territorial Regimes
Since ports are fixed to the ground, they are territorially embedded within a path de-
pendent and place specific institutional framework as set up by the state. In order to 
investigate this territorial embeddedness we turned to the regime framework. The appeal 
of the regime framework is its ability to apply a political economy approach to synthe-
size structure and agency (Harding, 1996; Mossberger & Stoker 2001). However, as 
clarified in our theoretical chapter, the problem with the classical regime-approach is its 
focus on the urban level in the United States. A related problem is that it is essentially 
an agency-centered approach in which much of the institutional context is taken as 
given. In order for the regime-approach to be applicable in contexts outside the U.S., we 
need to overcome this methodological localism. This implies that we need to take into 
account the way local governance (including port governance) is institutionally embed-
ded within higher levels of the state.
Here we make use of a slightly modified typology developed by Terhorst & Van de Ven 
(1997), which they have used to investigate the urban development trajectories in two 
different countries. They discerned four interrelated variables, which together form a 
basic structure of the state and are therefore ‘neither just national nor local but both’:  
1. Political rules: that is the way in which and by whom political decisions over port 
development issues are made. It depends on a certain ideology fixed in a constitu-
tion or it develops through common law. It furthermore depends on the degree of 
representation of a constituency. It can vary in theory from direct democracy to ab-
solute despotism. 
2. Fiscal Rules: that is the way in which taxes are levied by the state in order to finance 
its own bureaucracy as well as to redistribute wealth among society and to produce 
public goods. Taxes can be levied according in different ways (e.g. property, in-
come, value added) and can vary from highly centralized (like in the Netherlands) to 
federalized (like in the U.S. or UAE).  
3. Property Rights: that is the way the legal control over and access to economic re-
sources is distributed among the members of society. Property can be held in private 
(creating rival and exclusive goods), by the state (creating public and non-exclusive 
goods) or in common (creating exclusive public goods).  
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4. Jurisdictional Boundaries: the geographical scope of state agency authority, law 
enforcement and public policy implementation. These boundaries can vary from 
consolidated (e.g. on issues such as national security or customs) to highly frag-
mented (e.g. on issues of land use or welfare service provision). 
These variables are specific for a country and influence port development and manage-
ment in a number ways either directly or indirectly. Critical to the performance of a port 
is for example the quality of its hinterland connections. This infrastructure largely re-
sides outside the jurisdiction of the port authority, which implies that the port is depend-
ent on political decision-making and financial possibilities from other levels of the state. 
Political decision-making regarding infrastructure or the development of ports can in 
some countries be highly centralized and done in a rather autocratic fashion, whereas in 
other countries local and regional authorities might enjoy more political freedom and 
financial possibilities. The way the state itself is structured is therefore crucial for un-
derstanding the role of the government in setting the (institutional) conditions for port 
development, policy and management.  
In addition, the state structure allows us to identify at what level (urban, regional, na-
tional) and by whom (public, private or partnerships) strategic agenda’s are formulated, 
resources (institutional and material) are mobilized and governing decisions regarding 
port issues are made. By taking into account the structure of the state we are able to 
overcome the methodological localism of the classical urban regime theory. It has also 
brought us more in line with understanding a regime as a historically developed territo-
rial governance structure or as a set of formal and informal institutional arrangements 
that enable strategic cooperation and coordination among public and private agents 
across spatial scales. These formal and informal arrangements can take the form of in-
ter-governmental platforms, national legislation, public policy, collective agreements, 
public-private partnerships, business associations, lobby clubs etc. This is in turn largely 
dependent on the structure of the state. We therefore need to identify the port dependent 
agents and how they strategically join forces along these institutional arrangements and 
across spatial scales to boost the competitive position of the port-in-question, and how 
this results in changes of the structure of provision.
We have used the variables of the state structure when selecting the case studies, in ad-
dition to the fact that the selected ports are market-leaders within three different regional 
markets. We decided to select ports that resemble three considerably different territorial 
regimes with different roles for the state. In doing so, a wider variety can be obtained of 
the possible roles that the state and its institutions might have in the development of 
ports. We decided to include a case study in which a stronger role of the national gov-
ernment could be expected (i.c. Netherlands) in comparison to a case study in which the 
formal responsibilities largely reside at lower levels of the territorial regime (i.c. United 
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States). In addition, we included a case study in which a non-democratic or autocratic 
state plays a very prominent role in port development and management (i.c. Dubai). A 
summary of the relevant variables of this research is provided in table 3.1.  
Unit of Analysis Variables 
Industrial Organization
Industrial Setting
International Regulation
Global Production Network: Maritime Sector
Technology 
Structure of State: 
Decisional rules (federal- unitary, democ-
ratic- autocratic)
Fiscal Rules (centralized-decentralized) 
Property Rights (public, private, common) 
Jurisdictional boundaries (fragmented- 
consolidated) 
Territorial Governance Structure: 
Territorial Regime
Formal and informal institutional arrange-
ments across spatial scales through which 
coordination and cooperation between 
public and private agents takes place.  
Physical Conditions: 
Total land size (in ha or acre)
Number and size of container terminals (in 
ha or acre) 
Number of berths 
Depth of port channels (meters or foot) 
Number of (post-) Panamax cranes 
IT- applications 
Hinterland connections (road, rail, barge, 
feeders) 
Institutional Arrangements:
Structure and heights of Tariffs
Length and type of contracts 
Safety and Security Stipulations 
Environmental regulation 
Planning regulation 
Labor laws and  organization 
Customs procedures 
Ownership of land, infrastructure, super-
structure
Port Governance Structure:
Division of responsibilities between public 
and private sector in terms of: ownership, 
operations, regulation, labor
Structure of Port Provision 
Management structure and legal position  
port authority 
Table 3.1: Variables to study the institutional embeddedness of ports and GPNs. 
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3.6 International Case Studies
International and empirical comparative research on ports is scarce (but see: Stevens, 
1997; De Langen, 2003). The qualitative nature of the research objectives means that a 
case-study approach is appropriate. Three case studies have been selected, that include 
four ports: Rotterdam, Dubai, Los Angeles and Long Beach. These four ports operate in 
three specific (trade) regions of the world: U.S. West Coast, Middle East and Northwest 
Europe. The ports have been selected for the following three reasons. First, the ports 
included in the case studies are market-leaders in their specific regions and all are spe-
cialized in containerized traffic. All four ports belong to the top ten busiest container 
ports in the world. Though these ports, with the exception of the two ports in Southern 
California, are not competing with each other (exactly because they are located in three 
different regions), they all are confronted with the same competitive dynamics and 
structural developments that have been taking place in the maritime sector over the last 
decade. The second reason for the selection of these ports is that they are embedded 
within three completely different territorial regimes in terms of the state-structure. All 
this will allow us to analyze more broadly the (institutional) possibilities of strategic 
action in relation to port development, as well as to provide a more detailed account of 
the globalized nature of the sector as a whole. A third reason is more pragmatic and 
relates to the issue of language and proximity. In all the three cases the author was capa-
ble to communicate in Dutch or English. The case study of Rotterdam provided the ad-
ditional benefit of proximity. 
In order to carry out the case studies, the author will undertake for each case in-depth 
interviews with key-agents, strategic document analysis (e.g. policy documents, internal 
strategic reports), on-site observations in the port areas and desk-top analysis of histori-
cal archives. Through the method of triangulation, the collected data has been checked. 
In addition, the research has been presented on several occasions to peers, both in aca-
demia and in praxis (Rotterdam Maritime Group, Global Logistics Roundtable). In order 
to carry out the fieldwork for the cases of Dubai and Southern California, the author 
spent three months in 2005 as a visiting scholar at the American University of Sharjah 
(United Arab Emirates) and at the University of California Los Angeles. This allowed 
the author to make use of the academic facilities, in-house expertise and critical peer 
reflection.
The structure of each case study is similar. First we look at the long-term (institutional) 
history of the ports. Here we report on the ports’ physical development, as well as its 
path dependent institutional evolution. The historical role of agency, in particular the 
state, within these developments is also highlighted. These historical analyses are neces-
sary in order to understand the ports’ contemporary institutional and competitive posi-
tions, as well as their historical relationships with the territorial regime. In order to do 
this historical analysis, we have made use of existing literature, historical archives and 
peer reflection. 
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Next we look at the ports’ regional competitive landscape and assess its competitive 
position, by giving information about annual container throughputs and regional market 
shares of the port-in-question and its direct competitors. As mentioned, this information 
is relatively easy to require since most ports publish their results, and if not, this data 
can be provided by the port authority on request.  In addition, there are other reliable 
sources that collect these data, such as UNCTAD, the American Association of Port 
Authorities or Drewry Shipping Consultants. For the analysis of the data on annual con-
tainer throughputs and regional market shares, we take into account a period of ten 
years, so that we can trace any significant fluctuations. Any fluctuations need to be ex-
plained. It might be the case that a rival port has opened a new terminal in times of 
overall increased demand, which accounts for its relative growth vis-à-vis the port-in-
question. This is why we also take into account, though briefly, what kind of port devel-
opments are taking place in rival ports. However, it might also be the case that the rival 
port has successfully siphoned traffic away from the port-in-question, or the other way 
around, for reasons related to the ‘structure of provision’ of the port-in-question. This 
requires further, in-depth, research.
Therefore, the third section of each case study covers a detailed analysis of the structure 
of provision of the ports, by using the categories and variables indicated above, (where 
possible) comparing these with regional competitors. This information has been ac-
quired through face-to-face interviews with port representatives and other stakeholders, 
on-site observation and strategic document analysis (e.g. policy documents, internal 
strategic reports). Though this information provides a good explanation for the ports 
contemporary material and institutional structure, and how it is related to the competi-
tive position of the port, this still provides a rather static and insulated picture. We are 
also interested in the strategic responses to the competitive pressures by port dependent 
agents (including the state), which have or will result in changes in the structure-of-
provision.
The final section of each case study looks at how regime politics and port competition 
has led to institutional change, in terms of the port’s structure of provision, over the last 
decade. This implies we need to take into account the strategic behavior of port depend-
ent agents within the territorial governance process. We need to be aware of the (con-
flicting) strategic interests of these agents, their motives for action, to what degree they 
have formed coalitions and at what level they have addressed their interests. Our focus 
is not on the question whether changes in the SoP do in fact lead to better economic 
performance of the port-in-question, but to what degree port competition and regime 
politics has led to SoP-change. This has been done by reconstructing the process that has 
led to SoP-change, primarily by means of interviews and document analyses.  
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Chapter IV
Global Dynamics in the Container Sector 
“A modern containerport is a factory whose scale strains the limits of imagination” 
M. Levinson (2006, p.4)
4.1 Introduction 
Ports and harbors have historically played key-roles in the space economy. They have 
always been the starting point for the exploration of new worlds, centers of international 
trade and commerce and a safe haven for ships and peoples. The economic development 
of ports and their host cities follow the structural dynamic of the capitalist world econ-
omy. Already in the fifteenth century, the Hanseatic League connected different port 
cities commercially and politically with each other along a trans-national network of 
trade flows in Northwest Europe. During this same period, Renaissance city-states such 
as Genoa and Venice became centers of international excellence, mainly because of 
their ports and the merchant community they harbored. Later on, from the 17th till 19th
century, port-cities such as London, Amsterdam, Bruges, Seville and Lisbon became the 
commercial centers of their empires and colonial enterprises. During the Industrial 
Revolution of the 19th century, ports started to thrive on their strategic location nearby 
centers of production such as Rotterdam, Liverpool, New York and Hamburg. At the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, ports are still the nodal points in vast logistical 
and supply chains, but now in a global integrating economy. This is a development as-
sociated with the mass-application and transport-reducing effects of containerization, 
the rise of Asian economies and ports, and the strategic re-organization of the sector. 
The port maritime sector has changed considerably the last decade of global economic 
restructuring and integration. The ongoing process of containerization completely 
changed the nature of the game since the early 1960s, when a few shipping lines, port 
authorities and terminal operators first understood the logistical possibilities of ‘the 
box’. Container shipping started in April 1956 when the tanker Ideal X owned by Sea-
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Land made its initial voyage between the ports of New York/New Jersey and Houston, 
carrying 58 containers (World Bank, 2001). The sector would never be the same: the 
port throughput of containers increased worldwide from 36 million TEU in 1980 to 266 
million TEU in 2002 and forecasts point to between 432 million and 468 million TEU in 
2010 (Notteboom, 2004). The last decade or so, containerization has been accompanied 
by developments associated with globalization, economic restructuring and integration, 
deregulation and privatization. These developments have considerable impacts on indi-
vidual ports’ operations, management, ownership and growth potential. This chapter 
will be devoted to the analysis of these structural developments in the container sector 
and their impact on individual ports.  
The chapter is structured as follows. First look at the structural developments in indus-
trial organization known as the shift from Fordism towards post-Fordism (cf. Chapter II) 
which, in combination with the globally deregulated environment for international trade, 
produced a new spatial division of labor, which in turn increased the demand for (inte-
grated) efficient transport. Next, our attention moves to a closely related issue, namely 
the way the international maritime transport industry itself has re-organized its inter-
firm relationships and how this corresponds with the developments mentioned above. In 
the fourth section, we take into account the more technical issues, in particular the scale 
enlargement in container trades and handling. In the fifth section, we look at new forms 
of regulation set up in order to secure global supply chains and ports against interna-
tional terrorism. Finally, we look at the implications for port competition.  In all these 
issues, new technological standards, in particular the container and Information Tech-
nology need to be understood as one of the main driving forces.  
4.2 Industrial Setting: Beyond Atlantic Fordism 
The port-maritime sector both facilitates, as well as being subjected to the forces of 
globalization (Pinder & Slack, 2005). The latter element becomes most obvious when 
taking into account the simple understanding that transport is a derived demand with the 
sector dependent on the geographical distance between production centers and consumer 
markets. These are nowadays world’s apart. The capitalist economy has undergone a 
major structural shift since the late 1970s in what is known as the transition from Ford-
ism to post-Fordism (Storper & Walker, 1989; cf. chapter II). We examine what the 
consequences of this shift are for the maritime transport sector.  
In the Fordist era, the major manufacturers had internalized the entire production proc-
ess aimed at mass-production and economies of scale. This resulted in enormous inven-
tory costs. In order to reduce these costs, manufacturers started to re- organize their 
production process into flexible multi-firm organization structures. The development of 
just-in-time delivery systems was first introduced by the Toyota Motor Company in Ja-
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pan, but was quickly adopted by most manufacturers in the industrialized world. Since 
the early 1980s, manufacturers started to outsource many of their production compo-
nents to a number of specialized suppliers. These specialized suppliers are then required 
to deliver these components to the manufacturer’s assembly lines just in time for imme-
diate production, reducing the inventory to a minimum (Notteboom & Winkelmans, 
2001, Levinson 2006). New communication technology allowed for the flexible match-
ing between supply and demand and containerization had reduced to a minimum the 
transport costs of supplying the production components. The outsourcing of production 
components was accompanied by the outsourcing of logistical manipulations to semi-
finished products, towards the distribution centers located near the consumer markets.  
This type of outsourcing is known as value added logistics and implies that a large part 
of the value creation in the global supply chain is transferred to the logistics service 
providers.
The reliance of port users and shippers on value-adding activity in or near the port is 
especially relevant in that respect. Value-adding services can in theory be offered any-
where, but the key factors of success are efficient port operations, availability of trans-
port services, and attractive prices for land, labor and energy (World Bank, 2001). These 
issues are highly location specific, and once a value-adding logistical centre has been 
successfully established, it becomes increasingly difficult and costly to replicate else-
where in the region. Therefore, providing the material and institutional conditions for 
firms to engage in value-adding services is a good example of a strategy which enables 
ports to become embedded into global supply chains, as well as enabling ‘footloose’ 
firms to capture value from territorial embeddedness. 
These developments were further fostered by a series of international agreements, the 
Global Agreements on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) during the 1980s, culminating in the 
foundation of the World Trade Organization. These agreements eliminated national 
trade barriers, effectively opening up new markets across the globe. This allowed the 
manufacturers and their suppliers to re-locate their plants and assembly lines to places 
and countries were they could enjoy a comparative advantage, in the form of low labor 
costs and a favorable regulatory regime in terms of environmental legislation, import 
and export duties, and taxes. This generated a new spatial division of labor, in which 
most of the world’s production today is taking place in Southeast Asia and the Peoples 
Republic of China. 
In that respect, the port-maritime sector can be considered as a major facilitator of glob-
alization. The transport-cost reducing effects of the container have stimulated the re-
location of manufacturing plants from the industrialized countries to the low wage coun-
tries, in particular to those in Asia. The value of containerization, reducing transport 
costs for manufacturers, could however not been captured without appropriate invest-
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ments in port infrastructure, and superstructure in combination with favorable industrial 
and trade policies by the respective national governments. During the late 1960s, Japan 
was the first to capitalize on this interdependency between developments in maritime 
transport sector and industrial politics, quickly followed by the city-states of Hong Kong 
and Singapore. These countries were able to set up many internationally competitive 
industrial branches through national industrial protectionism and major investments in 
their national infrastructure. New shipping lines were set up in these countries, e.g. NOL 
from Singapore, OOCL from Hong Kong and MOL, K-Line, NYK-Lines from Japan: 
these offered competitive services from their home countries to the United States and 
Europe. Later on, the governments of Taiwan, Malaysia, Korea, and the Peoples Repub-
lic of China followed a similar strategy. It has facilitated a new spatial division of labor 
that is truly global in scope.  
Port (country) 2005 Port (country) 1996 
1. Singapore (Singapore) 23,19 1. Hong Kong (UK-China) 13,46 
2. Hong Kong (PR China) 22,43 2. Singapore (Singapore) 12,94 
3. Shanghai (PR China) 18,08 3. Kaohsiung (Taiwan) 5,06 
4. Shenzhen (PR China) 16,19   4. Rotterdam (Netherlands) 4,97 
5. Pusan (Korea) 11,84 5. Pusan (Korea) 4,76 
6. Kaohsiung (Taiwan) 9,47 6. Long Beach (US) 3,06 
7. Rotterdam (Netherlands) 9,29 7. Hamburg (Germany) 3,05 
8. Hamburg (Germany) 8,09 8. Los Angeles (US) 2,97 
9. Dubai (UAE) 7,62 9. Antwerp (Belgium) 2,65 
10. Los Angeles (US) 7,48 10. Yokohama (Japan) 2,33 
11. Long Beach (US) 6,71 11. Tokyo (Japan) 2,31 
12. Antwerp (Belgium) 6,49 12. New York-New Jersey (US) 2,27 
13. Qingdao (PR China) 6,31 13. Dubai (UAE) 2,25 
14. Port Klang (Malaysia) 5,54 14. Kobe (Japan) 2,23 
15. Ningbo (PR China) 5,21 15. Felixstowe (UK)  2,06 
16. Tianjin (PR China) 4,80 16. Shanghai (PR China) 1,97 
17. New York-New Jersey (US) 4,79 17. Bremen (Germany)  1,53 
18. Guangzhou (PR China) 4,68  18. Oakland (US) 1,51 
19. Tanjung Pelepas (Malaysia) 4,17 19. Seattle (US) 1,47 
20. Laem Chabang (Thailand) 3,77 20. Nagoya (Japan) 1,46 
Table 4.1: Top 20 busiest container ports of the world in 2005 and 1996 (Dimension: 
million TEU/ year. Source: Derived from website Port of Hamburg Authority).  
At the dawn of the 21st century, these interrelationships of the global economy become 
most clear when we look at the hierarchy of the busiest container ports (see table 4.1). In 
2005, most of the top 20 container ports are found in Asia, with 7 ports from the Peoples 
Republic of China. The growth of the Chinese ports over the last decade is really explo-
sive:  the port of Shanghai handled ‘only’ 2 million TEU in 1996, whereas in 2005 this 
has risen to some 18 million! Illustrative is also the enormous fall in the list of the Japa-
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nese ports, an indication of Japan’s economic recession of the 1990s in combination 
with the move of manufacturing plants to China. An additional explanation is, according 
to the World Bank (2001, p.7), the lack of competition within Japanese ports which still 
solely rely on small localized stevedore companies. But major European and American 
ports also have been outgrown by the Asian seaports. This is not problematic for Europe 
and the United States, for their ports are not competing with ports in Asia. The emer-
gence of efficient mega-terminals near major production centers in Asia is to some de-
gree beneficial to the ports in Europe and United States, because it will generate more 
cargo bound for their hinterlands. 
If we locate these ports on a map (figure 4.1), the new spatial division of labor, in which 
most of the world’s production and manufacturing takes place in the exporting nations 
of Asia (in particular the Peoples Republic of China), becomes even clearer. The 
world’s major ports are all connected through the world’s major trade link, which run 
from east to west or the other way around. However, very few shipping lines have 
across-the-world services; partly because of the physical limitations of the Panama Ca-
nal (see 4.4). The East-West trade link is subdivided in three major routes. This is first 
of all the Transatlantic between the eastern seaboard of the U.S. and Northwest Europe. 
The Transatlantic used to be the busiest route in the world, bridging the close economic 
(and geopolitical ties) between the United States and Western Europe during a large part 
of the second half of the twentieth century, with the ports of New York-New Jersey and 
Rotterdam acting as regional market leaders. However, this important route has been 
outgrown during the last twenty years by the traffic on the Transpacific between Pacific 
Asia and the western seaboard of the United States, not coincidentally at the time that 
‘Atlantic Fordism’ was considered to be in the midst of a structural crisis. The third  
major transoceanic shipping route is the Europe-Far East that connects the major ports 
of Northwest Europe with those in East Asia and typically include ports-of-call in the 
Mediterranean (e.g. Algeciras, Gioa Tauro) and the Middle East (e.g. Dubai, Khor Fak-
kan, Jeddah) that act as hubs for intra-regional trade.
It is through these trans-oceanic trade lanes that the majority of the world’s goods are 
transported in containers. The East-West trade link is supplemented with minor trade 
routes and intra-regional (feeder) services that run typically from North to South and 
which are connected with each other through the world’s major ports. These minor trade 
routes link Latin America with the United States, Africa with Europe and Australia with 
Southeast Asia and as such with the world-economy. In that respect, the intra-Asian
container traffic is definitely not be under-estimated, since it is actually the world’s sec-
ond-busiest trade route for containers (in terms TEU-volumes) after the Transpacific 
(Comtois, 1999). This latter example clearly signifies the shift in the spatial organization 
of the capitalist modes of production. Returning to the insights of Regulation Theory as 
presented in Chapter II, this focus on oceanic trade routes, and the overall throughput of 
containers of individual ports, clearly indicates how the spatial fix under capitalism is no 
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longer ‘structurally coherent’ with ‘Atlantic Fordism’, invoking the announcement of 
the ‘Pacific Century’ (Jessop, 1997). 
Fig 4.1: Location of the top 20 busiest container ports and east-west trade link.  
4.3 Industrial Organization: Integration of Global Supply Chains
The new spatial division of labor, as well as the introduction of the just-in-time business 
approach by the manufacturers and cargo-owners, generated new demands for the mari-
time transport sector. While the new spatial division of labor increases the demand for 
international transport, the principle of just-in-time manufacturing demands increased 
efficiency and flexibility along the entire supply chain and the optimization of logistical 
services along different modalities. The logistical service providers responded to this in 
a number of ways during the 1990s. Through the horizontal integration of their services, 
they have been able to create economies of scale, to spread risks and to reduce opera-
tional costs. Due to their low profit margins shipping lines in particular have been pursu-
ing this strategy in combination with enlarging their fleet. But other logistical service 
providers also, such as stevedores, freight forwarders and hinterland transporters, have 
been integrating their operations horizontally through mergers, alliances, joint-ventures 
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and takeovers. At the same time, the logistical service providers have pursued the strat-
egy of vertical integration along the transport chain, in order to expand their scope of 
action, to reduce transaction costs and to offer ‘door-to-door’ transport, in such a way to 
meet the demand of their customers for ‘one stop-one shop’ and just-in-time delivery. 
This integration of global supply chains as conceptualized in figure 4.2 (cf. Robinson, 
2002) has resulted in changed inter-firm relationships and power structures in the sector. 
Let us have a closer look at these developments. 
Fig. 4.2: Port-oriented value-driven chain systems (Robinson, 2002, p. 249).
4.3.1 Horizontal Integration in the Maritime Transport Sector  
Strategic cooperation among shipping lines is not a new phenomenon. From its early 
beginnings, the international liner shipping market has been an oligopoly with only a 
limited number of players participating, often united in cartels (Heaver et al, 2000). The 
most common form of strategic cooperation has been the shipping conference, in which 
carriers have agreed on fixed prices for their services (and in some cases cargo volume 
ceilings) on certain international trade routes such as the Trans-Atlantic. These cartels 
were formed to secure profitability and prevent strategic pricing and cut throat competi-
tion (Brooks, 2000). Besides the price fixing there is no further organizational interde-
pendence among the shipping conference’s members, with the individual conference 
members still competing for customers.  
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Up till the 1980s these shipping conferences were exempted from national anti-trust 
legislation, and in many cases non-conference members were prohibited by national 
governments from competing on trade routes (Levinson, 2006). Where non-conference 
members were allowed to offer competitive services, there was often not enough freight, 
since shippers often pledged all their freight to conference members in return for ‘loy-
alty’ discounts. Due to lack of competition on major trade routes the losers were in fact 
the shippers who had no choice than to pay the prices as set by the conferences. How-
ever, under pressure from complaints of the shippers, regulatory bodies in both U.S. and 
the European Union started to take action against the conferences.  In the United States, 
the Federal Shipping Act was passed in 1984 and was updated by the Ocean Shipping 
Reform Act of 1998 which limited the market power of conferences. In Europe, the 
TAA (or Transatlantic Agreement) was banned by the European Commission in 1994 
on the grounds of rate manipulation, and that same year the EC imposed fines on 14 
members of the Far Eastern Freight Conference for illegal price fixing (cf. Brooks, 
2000). The result is that the total market shares of conferences on most trade routes have 
dropped considerably. 
However, since the 1990s shipping lines started to consolidate their market power once 
again, this time by takeovers, by mergers and by the formation of strategic alliances. 
This process of horizontal integration has resulted in a number of developments: trans-
formation of service networks, vessel size and numbers, and a changing pattern of port 
selection (Slack et al 2002). The growth in world trade and the consequent increased 
demand for containerized shipping put considerable financial pressure on the shipping 
lines to acquire more and bigger ships and to provide new services in more markets. At 
the same time, the established shipping lines were confronted with new companies, 
mainly from Asia. New carriers, such as COSCO and China Shipping Line from China 
and Hanjin from South-Korea, have been making full use of the trade opportunities pro-
vided by the explosive growth of regional production and consumption in Asia. So, in 
spite of the overall growth of international trade, the shipping lines have become faced 
with greater competitive pressures. These developments, in turn, have set in motion 
further processes of consolidation and strategic cooperation among the shipping lines. 
Those who were weakened by competition, or with insufficient financial means to invest 
in their fleets, became the target of takeovers. Others sought to enter new markets by 
acquiring firms or entering strategic alignments with firms already present there.  
A prominent example of takeovers is that of P&O Nedlloyd- itself a merger between 
British carrier P&O and the Dutch carrier Nedlloyd (1997) – by the industry leader 
Maersk-Sealand in 2005. Maersk Line, part of the Danish based A.P.Möller-Maersk 
Group, in its turn had already merged with the American-based SeaLand in 1999 after 
almost a decade of cooperation. This merger became possible after CSX (the parent 
company of Sea-Land) hived off its shipping assets in order to concentrate on its core 
business of railroads (Brooks, 2000). Another example is the acquisition of American 
President Lines (APL) by the national shipping line of Singapore NOL in 1997. APL 
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was the major U.S.-based company operating on the Transpacific trade link, but had 
been experiencing financial difficulties in the 1990s and was acquired by the much 
smaller Neptune Orient Line. The takeover of Canadian based CP Ships (which had 
been aggressively acquiring smaller lines since 1995) by Hapag Lloyd from Germany in 
December 2005 is just the latest example of the ongoing dynamics in the sector. 
Besides the mergers and acquisitions, the shipping lines have also increasingly organ-
ized themselves in strategic alliances. Through these strategic alliances, shipping lines 
remain independent companies but with opportunity to share resources (e.g. vessel ca-
pacity) and to operate jointly in some markets (Slack, 2004, p27). So, in 1995 the Global 
Alliance (APL, OOCL, MOL, and Nedlloyd) was formed, quickly followed by the 
Grand Alliance (NYK, P&O, Hapag Lloyd and NOL) and the United Alliance (Cho 
Yang, Hanjin, DSR-Senator and UASC). However, because of the mentioned mergers 
and takeovers, the composition of these alliances has changed considerably over the 
years.  The main strategic alliances are now the New World Alliance (APL-NOL, MOL, 
and Hyundai), the Grand Alliance (Hapag Lloyd, NYK, OOCL, P&O Nedlloyd, MISC) 
and the Hanjin-CYK Group (Hanjin, K-Line, Yang Ming, COSCO). The main outsider 
not involved in some degree of consolidation is Evergreen from Taiwan. 
This restructuring of container shipping has resulted in a spatial transformation of the 
industry in a very short period of time. Slack (2004) identifies three developments.  
First, the consolidation of the shipping lines has resulted in a reconfiguration of con-
tainer network services. In particular, the services have become more extensive. Indeed, 
the consolidation allowed previously regionalized carriers to enter new geographical 
markets. So, APL used to be solely devoted to the Asia-US West Coast services, but 
through its acquisition by NOL now provides services to Europe. Similarly, Hyundai 
was able to enter the U.S. East Coast market through its participation in the New World 
Alliance. As a consequence, the services provided by shipping lines also became more 
diversified, that is multi-ranged instead of a simple range-to-range (e.g. US East Coast- 
Northwest Europe) service. A second development (Slack 2004), related to the consoli-
dation has been the increase of vessel capacity. Even though the role of the alliances in 
the increased size of vessels is debatable- the introduction of post-Panamax vessels pre-
dates the consolidation of shipping lines- the individual shipping lines have devoted 
their largest vessels to alliance services: “a pooling of assets that ensures a service ca-
pacity that few would be able to justify as separate operators” (Slack, 2004, p. 32). The 
third development resulting from horizontal integration among shipping lines is the 
changing patterns of port selection. Through these alliances and takeovers, shipping 
companies have gained strong bargaining powers vis-à-vis the port authorities and other 
port service providers. For example, Maersk-Sealand used its power to get concessions 
from the Port Authority of New York/New Jersey, as a condition for using that port as 
the main load centre on the U.S. East Coast (Hall, 2003).
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1994 1996 1998 2003 2006 
Nedlloyd 
CGM
MISC
Global Alliance 
APL
MOL
Nedlloyd 
MISC
OOCL
New World Alliance 
APL-NOL 
MOL
Hyundai
New World 
Alliance
APL-NOL 
MOL
Hyundai
New World 
Alliance
APL-NOL 
MOL
Hyundai
MOL
Hapag-
Lloyd
NYK-Lines
Grand Alliance 
Hapag-Lloyd 
NYK-Line
NOL
P&OCL
Grand Alliance 
Hapag-Lloyd 
NYK-Line
P&O Nedlloyd 
OOCL
MISC
Grand Alli-
ance
Hapag-Lloyd 
NYK-Line
P&O Nedlloyd 
OOCL
MISC
Grand Alli-
ance
Hapag-Lloyd 
NYK-Line
OOCL
MISC
Maersk
P&OCL
Maersk
Sea-Land 
Maersk
Sea-Land 
Maersk-
Sealand
Maersk-
Sealand
Hyundai
Sea-Land 
Norasia
Hyundai
MSC
Norasia
MSC
Norasia
MSC
Norasia
MSC
Norasia
K-line
NOL
OOCL
K-Line 
Yang-Ming 
United Alliance 
Hanjin
Cho Yang 
UASC
Hanjin-CYK
Hanjin
K-Line 
Yang Ming 
COSCO
Hanjin-CYK
Hanjin
K-Line 
Yang Ming 
COSCO
DSR-Senator 
ChoYang Hanjin 
CYK Alliance 
K-Line 
Yang Ming 
COSCO
Main Outsi-
ders:
Evergreen
UASC
Main Outsi-
ders:
Evergreen
Main Out-
siders:
Evergreen
UASC
COSCO
Main Outsid-
ers:
Evergreen
UASC
COSCO
Main Outsiders: 
Evergreen
Table 4.2: Development of strategic alliances of carriers. (Source: Derived from Notte-
boom, 2004) 
It must be noted that horizontal integration also took place in the transport sector on the 
land side. Freight forwarders in particular have been actively consolidating over the last 
years with the Deutsche Post World Net acquisitions of the Swiss-based Danzas in 
2000, American-based DHL in 2002 and British-based Exel in 2005 as the most out-
standing examples. Under the European liberalization of national railway markets, rail 
operators also are looking for increased cooperation, e.g. the merger of the freight divi-
sions of the German railway company Deutsche Bahn (DB) with the Dutch Nederlandse 
Spoorwegen (NS) into Railion in 1999. In the United States, the Burlington Northern 
railroad company merged with the Santa Fe Pacific in 1995, in the same year that 
United Pacific merged with the Southern Pacific. On the east coast, CSX and Norfolk 
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Southern jointly acquired Conrail in 1998, providing them with the exclusive access to 
the New York-New Jersey port complex (Brooks, 2000). Most significant for ports and 
port operations, however, has been the horizontal integration and market concentration 
in the stevedore business, in which a few companies have managed to develop into 
trans-national terminal operators that have become truly global in scope.  
4.3.2 The Rise of the Trans-national Terminal Operator 
In response to the consolidation trends in containerized shipping, terminal operators also 
are operating, and competing, globally by taking over local stevedores or by joint-
ventures. The result is increased market-concentration in the stevedore business. This 
trend has intensified because of privatization of port activities. Port authorities lease out 
terminal space to private stevedore firms, to build and operate the terminal on the basis 
of a long term concession agreement. As observed by Notteboom (2004, p. 98), open 
concession agreements provide local stevedores with little shelter for survival, because 
the concessions allowed global players with sufficient capital and specific know-how, to 
enter local markets (Slack & Frémont, 2005).  
Recent examples are the takeovers of ECT in Rotterdam by the Hong Kong-based 
Hutchison Ports Holding (HPH) in 2001, and of Antwerp’s Hesse Noord Natie by 
HPH’s major competitor PSA from Singapore the next year. These terminal operators 
have truly become ‘global’. The PSA is present in 19 ports in 11 countries. Besides its 
home-port Singapore, PSA’s portfolio includes HNN’s operations in Antwerp and Zee-
bruges in Belgium as well numerous ports in Southeast Asia (including Hong Kong) and 
Latin America. It handled over 30 million TEU’s worldwide in 2004 (PSA, Annual 
Report 2004, p26-27). The world’s biggest terminal operator is Hutchison Port Holdings 
from Hong Kong, which handled world wide 47.8 million TEUs in 2004. Its portfolio 
includes operations in Hong Kong, Shanghai and the ECT terminals in Rotterdam. It 
furthermore entirely owns the ports of Felixstowe, Harwich and Thamesport in England. 
The other international major terminal operators are APM Terminals (20.6 million TEU 
in 2004) and P&O Ports from the UK. The latter however has been taken over for 6.8 
billion US dollar in February 2006 by Dubai Ports World (cf. chapter I and chapter V), 
which outbid its rival PSA. Shortly afterwards PSA acquired 20% of the shares in the 
other major rival, HPH.  
Regionally, there are some stevedore companies which have managed to expand their 
business in a number of ports. In Europe there is Eurogate, which expanded its activities 
from the ports of Bremen and Hamburg to include operations in the Mediterranean. In 
the United States, the family-owned Stevedore Services of America (SSA) managed to 
operate terminals in most ports along the U.S. West Coast and was contracted by the 
U.S. military in 2003 to operate the terminal in Iraq’s Umm Qasr port. Burgeoning on 
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the explosive growth of markets in China over the last decade, the China Merchant 
Group has developed into a major regional player with operations in most Chinese ports 
including Hong Kong, Ningbo, Shenzhen and Tianjin.  
4.3.3 Vertical Integration in the Maritime Transport Sector 
Besides the strategy of horizontal integration, firms in the maritime transport sector have 
increasingly been looking for vertical integration as means of strengthening their com-
petitive positions: “There appears to be a strong economic incentive to acquire direct 
control over an ever-larger part of the logistics chain” (Heaver et al, 2000, p. 364).. This 
strategy is the result of changing demands of the shippers (see section 4.2), who want to 
deal with just one logistical service provider that can offer fully integrated door-to-door 
transport across the globe. 
The big shipping companies want to operate their own terminals -the dedicated con-
tainer terminals- since terminal operations are much more profitable than their tradi-
tional business (cf. Table 4.3 and 4.4). Shipping companies are therefore increasingly 
setting up joint ventures with local stevedores or setting up their own terminal divisions 
(such as Maersk-Sealand’s APM Terminals). These dedicated terminal arrangements 
give the shipping company the right (typically for around 20 years) to operate the termi-
nal exclusively for its own fleet as well as for invitees whenever there is capacity. How-
ever, dedicated terminals tend to reduce the efficiency - and hence shipping and income 
capacity - of the overall port as a whole (Haralambides et al, 2002, Turner 2000), al-
though they do reduce the need to invest in infrastructure and/ or superstructure (Hall, 
2003). Port authorities thus face the difficult choice between, on the one hand providing 
shipping companies with concessions to operate their dedicated terminals (which entail 
accepting lower yields for the port authorities) and on the other hand accepting the risk 
that holding on to common-use terminals may put off (potential) customers.  
Therefore, ports where terminal operators have a monopoly, such as Singapore (PSA), 
Rotterdam (HPH) and Dubai (DPA) are currently facing new demands and strong bar-
gaining powers of the shipping lines. The port of Singapore for example lost its contract 
with Maersk-Sealand in 2000, which moved to the Malaysian port of Tanjung Pelepas 
instead. The move resulted in a 10% loss of Singapore’s total container trade. Although 
no official reason was provided for the relocation, it is significant that Maersk-Sealand 
was allowed to operate a dedicated terminal in Tanjung Pelepas in return for 30% equity 
in the port, whereas in Singapore PSA remained the port’s only operator (The Logistics 
Institute, 2002). However, in 2003 PSA agreed to set up a joint venture company with 
the Chinese shipping line COSCO. The joint venture company, in which PSA still has 
51% majority share, operates the Pasir Panjang Terminal in Singapore. In this way the 
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global terminal operating firm has become a prime agent of port change (Hall & Rob-
bins, 2007, Oliver & Slack, 2006). 
Carrier Total Assets 
(US$1000s)
Revenue 
(US$1000s)
Profit 
(US$1000s)
Profit 
margin 
(%) 
Return 
on As-
sets (%) 
Evergreen
Marine Corp. 
1,751,984 527,369 30,844 5.39 1.761 
Maersk-
Sealand
8,790,058 8,936,306 517,962 5.80 5.893 
Neptune 
Orient Lines 
4,359,880 4,672,893 207,574 4.44 4.761 
NYK Line 10,313,862 4,712,964 259,582 5.51 2.517 
Table 4.3: Profitability of container carriers in 2000 (Source: The Logistics Institute 
2002, p.8).
Terminal Opera-
tor
Total As-
sets
(US$1000s)
Revenue 
(US$1000s)
Profit 
(US$1000s)
Profit margin 
(%) 
Return 
on
Assets
(%) 
Hutchison Port 
Holdings 
56,619,117 1,823,963 684,787 37.54 19.208 
Int’l Container 
Terminal Services
525,686 185,808 25,575 13.76 4.87 
PSA Corporation 
Ltd.
3,069,282 1,348,217 640,346 47.50 20.863 
Table 4.4: Profitability of container terminal operators in 2000 (Source: The Logistics 
Institute 2002, p.8). 
The internationalization of container terminal operations does in fact exhibit some re-
gional differences (Slack & Frémont 2005). The practice of dedicated terminals has 
been typical for ports at the U.S. West Coast or in the world’s most expensive port Hong 
Kong. At the other hand, non-carrier based global terminal operators have been unsuc-
cessful in penetrating the North American stevedoring market due to a lack of liberaliza-
tion in the port sector and dock labor problems (Notteboom, 2004, p. 100, Slack & Fré-
mont 2005). In Europe, the role of trans-national terminal operating companies has been 
much stronger. The overall result of this process of market concentration is that in 2001 
the shipping lines controlled 19% of world container port handling (compared with 11% 
in 1991), and the transnational terminal operating companies controlled 35% (compared 
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with 20% in 1991). Thus, at the dawn of the 21st century over half the world’s container 
handling business is controlled by international operating firms.  
4.4 Size does Matter!
Over the years the size of container vessels has increased considerably. This trend 
started during the late 1980s when the first Panamax-vessels were put in operation. 
Panamax1 refers to the maximum size of a ship that would be able to pass through the 
Panama-Canal, one of world trade’s most essential infrastructures. However, it was 
during the 1990s when the size of containers vessels grew to giant proportions (see table 
4.4). The post-Panamax generation was introduced in the mid 1990s, resulting in con-
siderable changes in the global trade links. Ships on the Europe- Far East trade link in-
creasingly made use of the Suez-Canal instead of the Panama-Canal. At the same time, 
cargo from Asia bound for the United States concentrated on the U.S. West Coast, with 
a continental land bridge transporting it to the markets in the U.S. Midwest. Nowadays 
there are even super-post-Panamax vessels in operation, but a number of them are used 
mainly by the Asian shipping lines to service the Europe-Far East link. But the end is 
not in sight as the industry is already talking about the next generation, the so called 
Malaccamax: the maximum size for a vessel to pass through the busy, but narrow Straits 
of Malacca between Singapore and Sumatra.  
1st Genera-
tion 1972 
2nd Gene-
ration 
1980 
3rd Genera-
tion- Pa-
namax 
1987
4th Genera-
tion
1997 
5th Genera-
tion
Present
6th Genera-
tion
near futu-
re
Depth 9 meters 10 meters 11.5 meters 14.3 meters 14.5 meters 16-18 me-
ters
Width 24.5 meters 27.5 meters 32 meters 40 meters 42.5 meters 46-55 me-
ters
TEU < 1,500 < 3,000 < 4,500 < 6,600 < 9,000 >10,000 
Table 4.5: Growth of Containerships (Source: provided by Port of Rotterdam, 2006)  
Besides re-arranging trade links, the ongoing enlargement of ships also challenged ports 
and terminals operators to provide the right infra- and superstructure. The extraordinary 
dimensions of container vessels dictates that ports need to invest considerably in deep-
ening and widening their channels, if they still want to be used by trans-oceanic carriers. 
                                                          
1 The critical maximum vessel dimensions on the Panama Canal are 32.31 m  wide and 294.13m length 
overall and a draft of 12.04m (Notteboom, 2004).  After a referendum-approval in October 2006, the Pana-
manian government is going to expand the Canal in such a way to make it accessible for the next generation 
ocean-going vessels.
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Besides deeper and wider channels, ports need to invest in longer quays, and in the hin-
terland transportation systems in order to move efficiently and cost-effectively the grow-
ing number of containers out of the port. On the latter aspect, ports are highly dependent 
on the (political) willingness and (financial) possibilities of other actors, particularly 
railroad companies and government departments, since ports do not have jurisdiction 
over infrastructure outside the port area nor the capital to upgrade it. The (private) ter-
minal operators also are confronted with the scale enlargement of the vessels. They need 
to invest in higher cranes and in handling equipment to ensure the more rapid handling 
of containers.  The larger and more fuel-economic vessels created substantial reductions 
in cost per TEU of capacity provided (Notteboom, 2004, p.88). 
Shipping Company/ Country of 
Origin
Ships TEU-capacity 
x 1,000 
Ships orde-
red
TEU-capacity 
ordered x 1,000 
1 Maersk-Sealand, Denmark 389 1.047 95 502 
2 Mediterranean Shipping 
Company (MSC), Switzerland 
256 680 45 337 
3 P&O Nedlloyd, UK-NL (part 
of Maersk since July 2005) 
159 456 42 221 
4 Evergreen, Taiwan 152 439 38 215 
5 CMA-CMG, France 185 412 69 289 
6 American President Lines 
(APL) – Neptune Orient Line 
(NOL), US - Singapore 
99 316 23 86
7 Hanjin, South Korea 80 298 13 90
8 China Shipping Lines, PR 
China
111 290 29 184 
9 COSCO, PR China 117 287 26 191 
10 NYK, Japan 105 282 25 152 
11 OOCL, Hong Kong 68 238 17 89
12 CSAV, Chili 83 216 18 90 
13 Hapag-Lloyd, Germany 56 215 8 69
14 “K”-Line, Japan 74 214 15 111 
15 ZIM, Israel 93 211 13 66
16 Mitsiu OSK Lines (MOL),
Japan 
67 205 18 114 
17 CP Ships, Canada (part of 
Hapag Lloyd since dec. 2005) 
80 194 10 40
18 Yang Ming, Taiwan 63 182 30 128 
19 Hamburg Süd, Germany 82 164 19 64
20 Hyundai Merchant Marine,
South Korea 
39 149 20 126 
Table 4.6: Top 20 container carriers in the world (Source: Mainport News, no5, 2005, 
p5)
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4.5 ‘Post 9/11’: Security and Regulation. 
The security of seaports and logistical chains has been a major political concern since 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York and 
the Pentagon in Washington. Though the terrorists made use of airplanes to launch their 
attacks, policy-makers and specialists quickly became aware of the vulnerabilities of the 
maritime sector for acts of terrorism. Already in 2000, the American battleship USS 
Cole was attacked by terrorists in little boats in the port of Aden (Yemen), leaving 17 
American marines dead. Two years later the oil-tanker ‘Limburg” was attacked, again 
before the coast of Yemen, destroying 90,000 barrels of crude oil. During a suicide at-
tack in March 2004 in the Israeli port of Ashdod, 10 persons were killed, when terrorists 
entered the port through a container.  
Seaports are potential targets for terrorists, since they are located near large urban cen-
ters and major industrial complexes such as petro-chemical refineries. A successful at-
tacked launched in a port with a Weapon of Mass Destruction could make numerous 
victims. Secondly, ports and containerized traffic are crucial for the world-economy, 
and a successful attack would have enormous economic costs, e.g. increased fuel prizes 
and insurance rates or delays in supplies. Containers can furthermore be used to smug-
gle terrorists and weapons into the country, or be used as a weapon itself: less than 10% 
of containers are actually opened and carefully checked by the appropriate authorities. 
According to the American think-tank Brookings Institution (2002), a successful terror-
ist attack with a WMD hidden in a container has the potential to make as many as 1 
million casualties and would have an economic cost of nearly a billion dollars per day. 
This is the worst-case scenario, but the threat is serious enough for the international 
community led by the United States to pose new forms of regulation to improve the 
security of ports and logistical chains.  
The American Department of Homeland Security (formed after ‘9-11’ and includes the 
US Coast Guard and the Customs Department) has taken the lead in imposing new regu-
lation in the form of the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). The first regulation encompasses a range of 
measurements, most notably ‘pre-screening’ of cargo before it reaches U.S. seaports. In 
order to do this, the Department of Homeland Security approached a number of foreign 
ports to participate, which implied that they must allow American inspectors into their 
jurisdictions. Participating ports are furthermore obliged to map and submit their exist-
ing security situation to the U.S. Customs. Not participating will have serious conse-
quences, since the port would then not be allowed to handle ships and cargo bound for 
the United States. This is why the European Commission initially expressed its concerns 
about the bi-lateral agreements between the United States and some European seaports. 
The issue was resolved in April 2004 when the EU and the American government 
agreed on the implementation and coordination of port security instruments and initia-
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tives such as CSI.  In 2005 some 37 ports worldwide were participating in CSI, includ-
ing the major ports such as Rotterdam, Antwerp, Dubai, Singapore and Hong Kong.  
The Customs Trade- Partnership Against Terrorism is another anti-terrorist initiative 
taken by the American Department of Homeland Security. Whereas CSI is directed 
towards foreign ports, C-TPAT is aimed at the security of the entire global supply chain. 
It involves a voluntary cooperation between all kinds of private parties involved in the 
international transport of goods (e.g. shipping lines, importers and exporters, terminal 
operators, truck companies, shippers and their agents) and U.S. Customs through the 
exchange of information. Firms participating in C-TPAT need to submit the physical 
(e.g. gated storage) and procedural (e.g. the registration of personnel and cargo owners) 
security measures, which they have implemented to the US Customs, who can grant the 
firms certificates. The certificates provide firms with some incentives such as less in-
spection at the American border. In 2005 some 7400 companies are associated with C-
TPAT.
The United Nations’ International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has also taken action 
to improve supply chain security, in addition to the rather one-sided initiatives taken by 
the American government. The International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code
(ISPS) has been created in December 2002 as an additional regulation (XI-2) under the 
1980 International Convention for the Safety of the Seas (SOLAS). The ISPS has been 
adopted by the member states of IMO in 2004. The code forms a standard set of security 
measures to which individual ports and shipping lines need to comply if they want to be 
internationally recognized as responsible agents.  This was followed by actions of the 
World Customs Organisation, an intergovernmental organization of custom departments 
from 166 countries. In June 2005 it launched the “Framework of Standards to Secure 
and Facilitate Global Trade”, a list of 17 actions that national custom departments at a 
minimum can do to secure the global supply chains and ports, while taking into account 
the interests of international trade.  We witness an increased global political concern for 
the security of ports and supply chains, resulting in new forms of international regula-
tion.
Addressing an international agenda is one thing, implementing it is another. Even in the 
United States, where the federal government has taken the lead in mobilizing agents and 
coordinating appropriate actions, and where the political momentum for investments in 
port security was most evident, there are still conflicts between state agencies about 
financing and implementing the security agenda. For example, in 2004 the port of Los 
Angeles addressed the lack of financial support for port security measures to the state 
and federal governments (UNCTAD, 2004). Also outside the U.S. there remain ques-
tions about effectiveness of the measures. We can seriously question the capacity to 
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secure appropriate security actions in some vulnerable regions such as the Middle East, 
India, the Caribbean and Southeast Asia (Jacobs, 2006). 
4.6 Implications for Port Competition 
The main conclusion analysis of the sector presented above is, that the business envi-
ronment of ports has changed considerably during the last decade of the 20th century. 
What has become clear is that over time ports have become increasingly subjected to 
market forces that are largely outside their control and jurisdiction. What are the impli-
cations of these developments for ports and port competition? How do ports respond to 
these developments?
In the period directly after World War II, ports were relatively insulated from competi-
tion due to national borders and regulations regarding international trade. Ports and 
other forms of infrastructure were generally regarded as public goods, therefore fi-
nanced by the taxpayer. They served the national (or at least sub-national) economic 
interests by facilitating trade, generating production and accommodating labor intensive 
activities. Port development was often used as an instrument for macro-economic plan-
ning by the state. Port authorities and port land in most countries were firmly in the 
hands of the local or national government. At the operational level, port authorities 
sometimes provided and invested in cargo-handling services and equipment themselves, 
employed dock labor directly. In other ports, terminal management and stevedoring 
operations were contracted to third parties, often to firms that were locally based. Over-
all, the lack of competition provided port authorities and operators little incentives to 
improve efficiency: “[M]ost ports were badly run, disorganized, bureaucratic, inefficient 
and expensive; a shipowner’s nightmare and worst enemy!” (Haralambides, 2002, 
p326). Ports were in other words considered to be the ‘pawns of the game’ (Slack, 1993) 
in the international transport of cargo. 
As presented above, the market environment of ports has changed considerably over the 
last two decades or so, in which competitive pressures force ports to improve their effi-
ciency, lower cargo handling costs and integrate services with other components of the 
global distribution network (cf. World Bank, 2001). During the same period, ports (like 
many other sectors under neo-liberal reforms) have been the object of government devo-
lution programs (Brooks 2004; Brooks & Cullinane 2006) in which the state has trans-
ferred responsibilities and functions to the private sector. As a result of both develop-
ments, the competitive performance of ports and, in particular, of port-dependent agents 
has become crucial. 
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There are number of factors which influence the level of port competition within a re-
gion (cf. World Bank). First and foremost is the potential of ports to provide suitable 
access to regional hinterland markets. In some regions or large countries, there are only 
one or two ports that can provide exclusive access, as a result of geographical features 
or the lack of adequate infrastructure. In other regions, e.g. Northwest Europe or South-
east Asia, there are many more competitors for the access to large markets. Related to 
this factor is the regional port capacity and demand. Competition for market shares will 
intensify when there is overcapacity within the region or when there is insufficient de-
mand for trade. This can have considerable negative effect on prices and cost recovery: 
“[C]ompetition and excess capacity mix an ‘explosive cocktail’” (Haralambides, 2002, 
p332).  
A third influential factor is the degree of intra-port competition among operators. Intra-
port competition is in general regarded as beneficial (cf. De Langen & Pallis, 2006), as 
it will prevent monopolistic rent-seeking behavior by one dominant player within the 
port. This argument is only relevant when inter-port competition is imperfect (Goss, 
1999), since the level of monopoly rents is related to price differences between compet-
ing ports in the region. Nevertheless, in some cases the ability to create intra-port com-
petition is limited because of ongoing contractual agreements that have been made in the 
past. The geographical layout of the port or the limited size of terminal facilities can 
also prevent the segmentation into competing terminal operations. Other important fac-
tors that influence competition among ports are the ability to absorb losses or cross-
subsidize operations, and the ability to control operations. The first issue refers to cases 
where terminal operators with a global portfolio are able to compensate losses in one 
particular region with profits they make in another in order to eliminate the competition. 
Similarly, port operations can also be cross-subsidized by revenues from non-port re-
lated activities. The ability to control and internalize operations, e.g. custom procedures, 
has an effect on the overall efficiency of port operations and services. Last but not least, 
there is the political willingness of governments to subsidize operations, which to some 
degree depends on the contribution of a port to the local and national economy. For 
example, the dredging of the port’s channels is financed in Rotterdam by the port au-
thority whereas in rival port Antwerp this is done by the Flemish regional government. 
State support can influence regional market conditions and port competition. 
Another important factor in the regional competition between ports is the provision of 
leases, concessions and other contractual agreements offered to operators. Some termi-
nal operators are offered, for example, 20-year lease concessions that give them the 
exclusive rights to handle the containers within the port. In other cases, shipping lines 
are offered a dedicated terminal agreement, which provides exclusive access for the 
carriers’ fleet. In some cases the port authority can exercise considerable control over 
the contract with the operator, (e.g. by including performance standards such as a mini-
mum annual guaranteed amount of containers or by including the obligation to use 
‘green energy’) whereas in other cases the port authority has limited control. These in-
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stitutional provisions, including tariffs, provide a port manager with a strategic instru-
ment to attract cargo, customers and private investments, and create long-term commit-
ments. Private investments made in the port can be substantial (e.g. post-Panamax 
cranes), will commit the player to the port and will to some degree make him dependent 
on the port. As such, these institutional provisions are considered to be of vital impor-
tance in port competition: “[A] port management strategy solely based on the provision 
of terminal infrastructure does not provide all the necessary conditions for capturing 
important footloose clients on a more sustainable basis” (Notteboom & Winkelmans, 
2001, pp 80). 
Moreover, it is argued that, in order for ports to remain competitive, they become em-
bedded in the global supply chain: “[P]orts will compete not simply on the basis of op-
erational efficiency or location, for example, but on the basis that they are embedded in 
chains (or supply chains) that offer shippers greater value” Robinson (2002, p. 250). The 
way in which individual ports can successfully embed themselves into these global sup-
ply chains or production networks is an empirical question. It has been argued in the 
first two chapters that a port’s capacity to act, that is to become successfully embedded 
within these networks, is strongly influenced by the path and place dependent nature of 
institutions or rules of engagements. We do not assume that competition between ports 
will lead to some sort of optimum competitive equilibrium, since institutions matter in a 
spatially discriminatory way (Martin, 2000). Nor do we assume that the regional compe-
tition between ports will lead to similar ways in which ports are institutionally and op-
erationally arranged: “while there are significant economic and operational conse-
quences for one mode of global management system over another, these differences are 
nuanced by other factors embedded in regionally grounded institutional processes. There 
is a need to explore more fully the spatial dimensions of the differences” (Slack & Fré-
mont, 2005, p127). We therefore need to take into account the role of politics and, more 
particularly, the role of the state in setting the institutional conditions for ports and their 
stakeholders to compete and engage in the global production network. In the next chap-
ter we are going to look at four ports located in three different regions in more detail.  
77
Krips
Chapter V 
Institutional Analyses:
Rotterdam, Southern California and Dubai.
5.1 Introduction 
How do local port-dependent agents adapt the structure of provision of their port in the 
attempt to maintain or improve the competitive position of that port in the international 
transport of containers? This is the subject of this book: we investigate it empirically in 
this chapter. Four ports will be dealt with in detail using the conceptual model, by which 
we look at how these ports are institutionally structured and to what degree regime poli-
tics and competitive pressures have led to institutional change. The selected ports have 
all developed over the last twenty or thirty years into the leading container hubs of their 
regions, in casu Northwest Europe, the Middle East and the United States’ West Coast. 
They are however territorially embedded within different, historically developed, insti-
tutional frameworks, with different positions and roles of the (nation-) state and private 
actors in the management, ownership and strategic decision-making regarding the port’s 
development. In other words, the ports and their stakeholders are embedded within dif-
ferent territorial regimes. This leads to different local responses to the developments in 
the maritime sector at a globally. These case studies provide interesting insights into the 
institutional dynamics of ports. Besides the empirical contributions, the case studies 
contribute also to more theoretical questions such as: What is the role of history on place 
dependent institutional structures? How do Global Production Networks materialize in 
Structures-of port Provision? What is the outcome of territorial competition and regime 
politics for institutional change?
Each case study is structured similarly, with the exception that the ports of Los Angeles 
and Long Beach are dealt with together since they are located in the same region. First 
we take into account the port’s historical development.  This is a necessary step in order 
to understand the port’s present institutional and competitive positions. Next, the com-
petitive position in containerized transport of each port within its respective region is 
highlighted. The third section of each case study focuses on the port’s structure of provi-
sion in container handling. We use the classification as set out in the third chapter, 
namely physical conditions, institutional arrangements and the governance structure. 
Fourthly, we look at how and to what degree regime politics, aimed at strengthening the 
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port’s competitive position, has led to modifications in the port’s structure of provision 
during the last five to 10 years. Each case study ends with some preliminary conclu-
sions.
5.2 Rotterdam: Repositioning a Giant 
“Fokker, KLM, DAF, foreign companies can buy these Dutch companies. But the port, 
our location at Europe’s main river delta, is ours…. It’s our national asset in a world of 
increasing demand for transport. The responsibility for development is at the national 
level. Not Football Club Rotterdam, but Football Club Netherlands plays ball”  
(Mr. H. Vervat, former director of the Uniport/ Hanno container terminals in Rotterdam 
and former Harbor Entrepreneur of the Year, 2004, p.2, translation by author).  
Located in Europe’s main river delta and with a hinterland consisting of Europe’s larg-
est consumer market, the port of Rotterdam has a very favorable position for interna-
tional trade. It is therefore not a surprise that the port of Rotterdam is the largest in the 
European Union in terms of cargo and container throughput. Yet, its success is not only 
the result of some geographical advantages. On the contrary, active (spatial) economic 
policy and major investments in port-related infrastructures, expanding the port ever-
more westwards to the open sea, have ensured Rotterdam’s growth during the twentieth 
century. The foundations of this were set in the latter part of the nineteenth century. 
5.2.1 From Fishermen Village to European Gateway 
Rotterdam was established in the second half of the thirteenth century along the river 
Rotte. The construction of a dam in this river ensured permanent settlement, with its 
first inhabitants mainly devoted to fishery. Rotterdam received city rights in 1328, pro-
viding favorable conditions for inter-regional trade. During the next centuries, Rotter-
dam gradually developed into a merchant city with the first true harbors being con-
structed at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Around that time, staple markets 
started to locate in the city and, with the establishment of the United East India Com-
pany, the city and its port started to flourish. Yet, other port cities such as Amsterdam 
and Antwerp were much larger and more important in the Dutch Golden Age. This was 
partly the result of more favorable entrances towards the open sea. At that time, Rotter-
dam lacked a direct connection with the open sea and vessels bound for Rotterdam had 
to make considerable detours. 
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At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the city and its port came into difficulties as 
the entrance to the port silted up and, under French occupation, international trade had 
virtually disappeared. In order to keep the port accessible from open sea, the Dutch lead-
ing water-engineer Pieter Caland launched a plan in 1852 to cut through the ridge of 
dunes at Hoek van Holland so as to give the river Rhine an artificial estuary and the port 
a direct connection with the North Sea. With the opening of this ‘New Waterway’ in 
1872, the future of Rotterdam and its seaport seemed secured. Especially the Act of 
Mannheim (1886), which liberalized the traffic on the river Rhine, was important for 
Rotterdam (Van Klink, 2003, p. 148). Indeed, with the Industrial Revolution in full mo-
tion, Rotterdam’s competitive position improved considerably as the demand for raw 
materials in the German industrial hinterland grew enormously. Rotterdam soon became 
Germany’s most important transit port. Leading German industrialists located in the 
Ruhr-area, such as Krupp and Mannesmann, were very interested in the port since it 
would guarantee the easy and speedy (and thus cheap) passage of coal, ore and other 
raw materials. Strategic alliances between German industrialists, the port business 
community led by the ‘harbor barons’ (the most powerful entrepreneurs in the port) and 
the municipality of Rotterdam date back to that time:  
“The Harbor Barons, the men who first resisted the changes necessary for Rotterdam’s 
development, then hesitantly and tentatively began to test the new waters, and finally 
mustered the drive and energy to push Rotterdam headlong into the twentieth century, 
were members of an elite embodied in the city’s most restrictive institutions, the Mu-
nicipal Council and the Chambers of Commerce” (Callahan ,1981, p12) 
Textbox 1: Lodewijk Pincoffs: A Notorious Harbour Baron.  
Lodewijk Pincoffs was a ‘member’ of the Harbour Barons, the political and economic elite 
that ran the port-city of Rotterdam during the late nineteenth century. Pincoffs was a well-
respected entrepreneur who had co-invested in the Nieuwe Waterweg. He is furthermore 
considered to be the architect of the first port and urban expansions on the South-bank of the 
river Maas. He had made a fortune with his African Trade Organization (ATO) and also 
founded the Rotterdam Handelsch Vereeniging (RHV).  The RHV was in a sense the private 
predecessor of the public port authority since it had the exclusive rights to develop and 
exploit the newly constructed port-industrial areas on the south bank. The municipality, as 
did many other ‘barons’, had invested in the RHV. But while the RHV flourished, Pincoff’s 
ATO came in financial troubles. In order to overcome problems with ATO’s shareholders, 
the wily Pincoffs illegally transferred capital from the RHV to the ATO, financially ruining 
both companies and the port business community. Pincoffs fled to New York City in 1879 
and escaped prosecution (cf. Gemeentearchief Rotterdam, 1987) 
Up till the Second World War, the port and the city expanded rapidly. On the north-bank 
over the river the limits of growth were reached after neighboring Delfshaven (literally: 
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the port of Delft) had been annexed in the year 1886. Yet the port expanded on the 
south-bank of the river with the construction of the Rhine- and Maasharbors aimed at 
mass-cargo. Around these latter harbors the city developed southwards, reaching a 
population of almost 1 million inhabitants (from 53,000 inhabitants in 1795 to 220,000 
in 1895 and to 418,000 inhabitants in 1910) at the end of the 1930s. During 1934-1938 
new petroleum-harbors were constructed in Pernis, a small village on the south-bank 
that was annexed as well by Rotterdam. The seaport expanded even more during that 
time with the largest constructed basin in the world: the Waalharbor. The constructions 
were carefully coordinated by the municipal government’s port authority in the form of 
the Rotterdam Municipal Port Manager (RMPM), founded in 1932. 
With the German bombardments in 1940, the port and the city were heavily damaged 
and Rotterdam faced an enormous challenge of reconstruction in the period after 1945. 
Nevertheless, the port of Rotterdam grew to be the largest European seaport by far, with 
only Antwerp and Hamburg as serious competitors. Stevens (1997, p. 111) distinguishes 
four phases in the development of the port since the Second World War:
1945-1950: reconstruction and modernization of the port 
1950-1960: construction of the Botlek  
1960-1970: construction of the Europoort and Maasvlakte 
1970-1990s: introduction of the container, environmental pressures, limits to expansion 
and enhanced cooperation with others.  
In the period immediately after the war, the nation’s main concern was to rebuild the 
country and boost the economy as quickly as possible. The reconstruction of Rotter-
dam’s seaport was seen as crucial for this. Before the war, the port mainly fulfilled a 
transshipment function, which resulted in a strong dependency on its German hinterland. 
Such dependency on German industries was perceived as economically risky and politi-
cally undesirable just after the war. Bigger demand for foreign raw materials in the 
Netherlands itself had to be accommodated by port-related industries in the Rotterdam-
area. In order to realize this, huge industrial sites were realized in combination with 
major investments in infrastructure. A strong pro-growth coalition between the munici-
pality under leadership of the socialist mayor Thomassen and the port authority under 
leadership of Posthuma, backed by political and financial support from central govern-
ment, successfully secured the development of the port. With the construction of first 
the Botlek industrial area and later Europoort and the Maasvlakte, the port-industrial 
complex grew enormously, expanding ever more westwards to the North Sea. 
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Fig. 5.1: The port-industrial complex of Rotterdam.
The plan to develop the Botlek (1250 ha. or 3088 acres gross surface) already existed in 
1947 but it took more than eight years to realize the plan. This was mainly due the fact 
that the appropriation of farmland proved to be difficult and, unlike in the past, the Prov-
ince of South Holland and central government were not that keen on annexations by the 
city of Rotterdam and its port to satisfy their hunger for land. The relationship between 
the port and the municipality on the one hand and higher levels of the state on the other 
came more and more under pressure in 1970s, with the rise of environmentalism and 
anti-growth coalitions. Nevertheless, the first company located in the Botlek-area in 
1955. The second plan for major expansion was the Europoort, realized in 1960. The 
Europoort, with an area three times as large as Botlek, was realized comparatively 
quickly in spite of the fact that small villages such as Nieuwsluis and Blankenberg and 
the nature reserve ‘de Beer’ had to be completely removed. The wish of the port author-
ity to remove the village of Rozenburg also was rejected by central government. In con-
trast to the Botlek, which was a typical plan developed by the port authority, the Euro-
poort-plan involved more actors. National spatial planning goals also started to play an 
important role, in which the port of Rotterdam was perceived as a perfect macro-
economic instrument. Even before the Europoort was completed, plans for further ex-
pansion existed in the form of the Maasvlakte. Unlike the Botlek and Europoort, the 
Maasvlakte was a land area which was completely reclaimed from the North Sea. The 
Maasvlakte increased the port-industrial complex from 3,000 ha. (7413 acres) to 10,500 
ha. or 24710 acres. It was realized in combination with the Euro-channel, a 3 km wide 
and 24 meters (72 feet) deep entrance into the port starting from the Dutch coast in the 
North Sea. The Euro-channel allowed the biggest tankers in the business to harbor in 
82
Krips
Rotterdam, and as such improved the seaport’s competitive position. In order to antici-
pate containerization, the port authority stimulated several local stevedore companies to 
join forces and to take a leading role in terminal operations. In 1966 these stevedores 
formed the Europe Combined Terminus (ECT), later to be renamed as Europe Container 
Terminals. By that time, the port’s rapid modernization and the allocation of the indus-
trial plants and petro-chemical refineries had already paid off. In 1962 Rotterdam had 
become the busiest port in the world in terms of total throughput tonnage, surpassing the 
port of New York-New Jersey. This is a position Rotterdam maintained for over 40 
years.  
The 1970s marked a turning point in the development and growth of the port of Rotter-
dam. The intimate relationship between the port authority and the municipality started to 
form cracks. Like elsewhere in the Western world, a new political generation gained 
power at that time and it placed social and environmental issues high on the agenda. The 
economic interests of the port were no longer a priority for local politicians. Instead, 
good living conditions, adequate social housing, welfare provisions and a healthy envi-
ronment were now the main political objectives. The distance between the port authority 
and the ‘Coolsingel’ (bureaucratic jargon for the city-hall of Rotterdam) grew, and the 
latter strengthened its position. The portfolio of the port went from the mayor to a sepa-
rate alderman, and the special commission for port-development was reorganized in 
such a way that only democratically elected members could take place in the commis-
sion. Even though the emotional relationship between the port and the municipality 
remained, the days in which the city-mayor and the chairman of the port authority could 
decide on what should be done were over (see Kreukels & Wever, 1996). Also, the rela-
tionship between the municipality and the business community started to erode at that 
time:
“The old method of doing business in closed circuits became increasingly criticized. The 
carefully formed post-war network of both formal and informal relationships between 
the local government and the businesses community was being dissolved” (De Goey, 
1990, p.259, own translation). 
The municipality became less keen on attracting new businesses and industries into the 
port-area. Also, on the central level attitudes started to shift. New environmental legisla-
tion was introduced that constrained the growth of the port-industrial complex. As a 
result, the relationship between the Province of South Holland, responsible for enforcing 
these new laws, and the port came under pressure. Also the focus of regional-economic 
and national spatial policy shifted to favor the peripheral areas in the Netherlands, in 
order to create some sort of territorial equity. This form of ‘spatial Keynesianism’ 
(Brenner, 2004) as regards port policy was formulated in the first National Report on 
Seaports by the Ministry of Transport of 1966 (see Stevens, 1997, p.77) in which major 
83
Krips
investments by the central government in port development were targeted on peripheral 
places such as Delfzijl and Terneuzen, at the expense of Rotterdam. The rather anti-
growth atmosphere resulted in the relationship between the port authority and the busi-
ness sector deteriorating. Another aspect which further weakened the link between the 
port and the municipality was the development of the labor market. Up till the 1970s, 
the port-industrial complex generated a lot of jobs for the city and its metropolitan area. 
But, because of high wages and through mechanization, automatization and the intro-
duction of the container, labor became obsolete and the number of jobs decreased, while 
at the same time the production could be raised (Kreukels and Wever, 1996). This proc-
ess of economic rationalization made the city of Rotterdam less reliant on the port-
industrial complex for economic growth, while at the same time new jobs had to be 
created, most notably in the service sector. The economic (oil) crisis of 1983 worsened 
the competitive position of Rotterdam and its seaport, now dealing with huge unem-
ployment rates and financial difficulties. 
The weakened links and relationships did not mean that the informal networks between 
the harbor-barons and the captains of industry disappeared. In fact, these networks be-
came the driving force in the successful revitalization of strategic planning of the city 
and its seaport during the late 1980s. At the national level also, the port of Rotterdam 
received much attention again with the Mainport-agenda. The port of Rotterdam, to-
gether with Schiphol Amsterdam International Airport, were designated by the national 
government as mainports: the gateway to European and global markets, and the national 
engines for economic growth. As such, they have to be actively supported through spa-
tial, economic and transport policies. This resulted in new strategic investments in the 
port’s hinterland links and the city. The Mainport-coalition of the Dutch transport-sector 
successfully lobbied the government during the late 1980s and early 1990s to improve 
the port of Rotterdam’s hinterland connections and the further expansion of the port-
industrial complex with a major land fill project. In 1989 the port authority rallied sup-
port for the construction of a 120 km direct freight-only rail connection (the Betuweline) 
between the port’s main terminals and Germany. In 1993, the port authority and the 
Mainport-coalition managed to place the port-expansion with the Second Maasvlakte on 
the national agenda.
In spite of the initial favorable conditions under the Mainport-agenda during the 1990s, 
the port’s competitive position became critical after the mid-1990s. The port lost market 
shares to its direct competitors, partly because of its own managerial failures to accom-
modate demand in response to structural developments in the sector, partly because of 
regional competition. In response, the port authority claimed that it needed an entrepre-
neurial role with more freedom of action and less bureaucratic control from the munici-
pality. At the same time, political support within the territorial regime for port develop-
ment fragmented. The construction of the Betuweline, started in 1996, met severe socie-
tal resistance as the costs of the project increased (cf. Pestman, 2001, Boom & Metze 
1997). The project soon became controversial and subject of a parliamentary enquiry. 
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5.2.2 The Regional Competitive Landscape 
The port of Rotterdam can be seen as one of the pioneers in Europe: it started to devote 
itself to containers in the 1960s. It quickly developed into Europe’s busiest container 
hub. At that time, Rotterdam was already the worlds’ busiest port in terms of total ton-
nage throughput. It managed to hold this position till 2005, when Rotterdam finally was 
surpassed by the ports of Singapore and Hong Kong. The position of the world’s busiest 
port, Rotterdam will probably never retain again, given the explosive growth of Asian 
economies and ports. However, the port’s leading position in Europe as well has come 
under pressure, especially in the container sector.  
The port’s main competitors are arch-rival Antwerp, the German ports of Bremen and 
Hamburg and, to a lesser extent, Zeebruges and Le Havre. Together, these ports have 
been identified as the ‘Hamburg- Le Havre range’ (see figure 5.2), and are grouped 
together since they compete for the same hinterland. The ports in Southeast England 
such as Thamesport, Tilbury, Southampton and Felixstowe stand somewhat apart, since 
they exclusively service the niche-market of the British island and not compete for ves-
sels with containers bound for the European mainland. The ability of these ports to at-
tract direct calls from the trans-oceanic services does, however, reduce their dependency 
on feeder services from Rotterdam in particular. Though Rotterdam remains market 
leader in Northwest Europe, it has been losing terrain since the late 1990s, particularly 
to Antwerp and Hamburg (see Table 5.1). Whereas Rotterdam had a market share of 
31.4 % in 1996, this has dropped as low as 26.1% in 2003.  
The loss of Rotterdam’s market share over the last decade can be attributed to a number 
of factors. First and foremost is that the main shipping lines re-arranged their trans-
oceanic services to include more ports-of-call. This multi-porting strategy allowed the 
shipping lines to reduce their dependency on one hub port in Europe, while at the same 
time justifying the increased volumes of containers they were carrying. This became 
possible as ports in the region upgraded their facilities. But in the Mediterranean as well, 
ports such as Algeciras and Gioa Tauro were able to modernize and in that way man-
aged to insert themselves into the global containerized networks during that period. This 
development within the sector weakened the exclusive position of the port of Rotterdam, 
but is largely outside its control and possibilities. There were other factors as well, 
which will be explained in more detail later on. These include the privileged (monopoly) 
position that the local terminal operator ECT enjoyed from the port authority and the 
municipal council, the poor customs procedures that were not in line with the demands 
from the industry for one-stop-one-shop, and the politicized governance structure of the 
port in general, which led to unrealistic pricing policy and neglect of the customer.  
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1996 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Rotterdam 
Market 
share
4,972,872 
31.4% 
6,119,511 
26.4% 
6,533,805 
26.1% 
7,143,918 
26.1% 
8,291,994 
26.9% 
9,286,756 
27.5% 
Antwerp 
Market 
share
2,653,909 
16.8%  
4,218,176 
18.2% 
4,777,151 
19.1% 
5,445,437 
19.9% 
6,063,746 
19.7% 
6,482,029 
19.2% 
Hamburg 
Market 
share
3,054,320  
19.3% 
4,688,669 
20.2% 
5,373,999 
21.4% 
6,137,926 
22.4% 
7,003,479 
22.7% 
8,087545 
23.9% 
Bremen 
Market 
share
1,531,907  
9.7% 
2,972,882 
12.8% 
3,031,587 
12.1% 
3,189,853 
11.6% 
 3,469,253 
11.2%  
3,743,969 
11.1% 
Le Havre 
Market 
share
1,020,040 
6.4% 
1,523,493 
6.6% 
1,720,459 
6.9% 
1,984,542 
7.2% 
2,131,833 
6.9% 
2,105,422  
6.3% 
Felixstowe
Market 
share
2,064,947 
13.0% 
2,800,000 
12.1% 
2,684,000 
10.7%  
2,482,000 
9.1% 
2,717,000 
8.8% 
2,700,000 
8.0% 
Zeebrugge
Market 
share
549,429 
3.5% 
875,926 
3.8% 
958,942 
3.8% 
1,012,674 
3.7% 
1,196,755 
3.9% 
1,407,933 
4.2% 
Table 5.1: Market position of container ports in Northwest Europe 1996-2005 (Source: 
website Port of Hamburg, 2006).  
Though Rotterdam has somewhat recovered the last two years, the competition is bound 
to intensify. Archrival Antwerp opened the first phase of the Deurganckdok container 
terminal in July 2005. The total capacity of the Deurganckdok will be 6.5 million TEU, 
doubling Antwerp’s current capacity. Rotterdam furthermore faces the challenge of new 
entrants in the region. In Wilhelmshaven, a new deepwater container hub is currently 
being developed, the JadeWeser port, by the German Länder of Bremen and Lower 
Saxony. The JadeWeser Port is projected to start operations in 2009/ 2010. Closer to 
home Rotterdam, is faced with small scale competitors. Already in 2002, the port of 
Amsterdam together with Ceres opened an ultra-modern container terminal. Though the 
Ceres Paragon Terminal was without any customers for some years, it has finally come 
on steam and managed to lure valuable container traffic away from Rotterdam. In early 
2006, NYK- Lines took over Ceres and its terminals and has moved two Grand Alliance 
services, (some 100,000 TEU) from Rotterdam to Amsterdam. In Flushing, plans by the 
local port authority to develop the Westerschelde Container Terminal (WCT) with a 
capacity of around 2 million TEU are in an advanced stage. The port authority of Rot-
terdam is however participating in this through the Exploitatiemaatschappij Schelde 
Maas (ESM). This cooperation is however not running smoothly and, as expressed in 
interviews, it can be regarded as a defensive step from the port of Rotterdam. An inter-
esting fact is that the main terminal operator in Antwerp, HNN-PSA, has been con-
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tracted for the operation of WCT. At the same time, the opening-up of the Central and 
Eastern European economies might provide Rotterdam with an extended hinterland. 
However, the German ports provide serious competitive conditions for hinterland trans-
port and, in the Black Sea, Baltic Sea and the south coast of Turkey the modernization 
of ports and the restructuring of their management structures, will probably only siphon 
more traffic away from Rotterdam.  
Fig. 5.2: Major ports in Northwest Europe. 
5.2.3 Structure of Port Provision
(1) Physical Conditions: The first aspect, the provision of physical infrastructure, is 
greatly to the advantage of the port of Rotterdam. Its strong position can be ascribed 
largely to the fact that its infrastructure and hinterland connections are superior by far to 
its main competitors. The port’s direct deep-sea access is, with a depth of some 24 me-
ters, unmatched in the region. The port of Antwerp is for instance dependent on tidal 
changes in the river Scheldt, which means that it can take a vessel up to 5 hours longer 
to reach the port from the open sea. The port of Rotterdam’s connection with the main 
rivers flowing through Europe’s economic heartland gives it a strategic advantage over 
its German competitors in terms of transport to the hinterland. With the construction of a 
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separate freight railway to Germany, the Betuweline, the port’s hinterland connection by 
rail is being expanded considerably and will be more reliable than the congested roads 
or, in times of low tides, the rivers. 
The territory of the port is roughly 10,500 ha. (25945 acres) of which 7,500 ha (18533) 
acres) is land and 3,000 ha. (7413 acres) water. The land is owned by the municipality; 
the port authority has it in leasehold and subleases it to tenants. Since the 1940s, land in 
the port-area has not been for sale (De Goey, 2003) and can only be leased (for a maxi-
mum period of 99 years). The port authority has currently around 2,000 lease contracts 
with tenants. After the Second World War, the port of Rotterdam expanded enormously, 
from some 1400 ha in 1950 to the current 10,500 ha, away from the city centre and 
westwards to the North Sea. The latest port expansion project was agreed upon in June 
2004, the Second Maasvlakte (1,000 ha landfill project), and uses an interesting finan-
cial construction which is directly linked to the institutional reform of the port authority, 
to be described later.
The private sector is dominant in the port’s ‘superstructure’. The major container termi-
nal operator in Rotterdam is ECT, Europe Container Terminals, a 98% subsidiary of 
Hutchison Port Holdings2 (HPH). ECT operates the Delta Terminals at the Maasvlakte 
and the ECT Home Terminal at the Waalhaven (see fig. 5.1). In 2004, ECT took over its 
local competitor Hanno and its terminal at the Waalhaven. ECT furthermore participates 
together with Steinweg in the Rotterdam Shortsea Terminal (RST), specialized in con-
tainer feeder services. Steinweg also operates the Uniport container terminal. Rotterdam 
has, as of yet (2006), only one dedicated terminal that is operated by Maersk-Sealand’s 
APM Terminals at the Maasvlakte. In 1993, the American container carrier SeaLand 
acquired a dedicated terminal at the Maasvlakte through a joint venture with ECT. The 
takeover of SeaLand by Maersk in 1999 resulted in a legal conflict between ECT and 
Maersk about the ownership of the facility. ECT accused Maersk-Sealand of a breach of 
contract since SeaLand had a 20-year concession with ECT. The Rotterdam-based ste-
vedore company won the case and acquired full ownership of the facility, to the great 
dislike of Maersk-Sealand.  
The monopoly of ECT within the port of Rotterdam has not been unproblematic, espe-
cially when the port authority acquired itself 35% of the shares in ECT in 1999. The 
former shareholders were selling their shares in ECT, and both Hutchison Ports Hold-
ings and the port authority were willing to takeover the stevedore company3. This step 
was justified by the director of the port authority and the municipal council as being 
                                                          
2 The remaining 2% of the shares are in the hands of the employees in the form of a trust.
3 Both the port authority and HPH acquired a 35% share in ECT. The remaining shareholders were the 
private bank ABN-Amro (28%), who indicated that it was willing to sell its shares as quickly as possible, 
and a trust fund of the ECT-employees (2%).  
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necessary to protect earlier investments in the land used by ECT, as well as to prevent 
the eventual loss of jobs and container flows. This was a rather controversial step within 
the port community, since the interests of the port authority as a public body became 
intertwined with one of the major port users. The initial takeover by the Hong Kong 
giant and the port authority was however objected by the European Commission’s Di-
rectorate-General on Competition in June 1999, because the new concentration would 
have a dominant market-position Northern Europe. On July 1999 both parties dropped 
their notification of a concentration (Case No. IV/M.1412), but directly filed a new one 
(Case no. JV.55) in December 1999. This time the takeover was under new market con-
ditions.
In response to the objections made by the European Commission, the port authority of 
Rotterdam granted a terminal lease concession to Maersk in 2000 (the Maersk Delta 
Terminal), however only in the form of a joint venture between Maersk and ECT, with 
the latter still having 33.3% equity. In addition, the Maersk Delta Terminal was not 
allowed to compete with ECT for third party containers up till 2005. The port authority 
furthermore granted the user rights of the planned Euromax terminal to a 50-50 joint 
venture between ECT and P&O Nedlloyd. Even though the port authority stated that it 
was in the best interests of both ECT and the port authority (RMPM) to tie the two ship-
ping lines to Rotterdam through joint venture agreements, Maersk and P&O Nedlloyd 
actually preferred to have complete ownership of ‘their’ terminals. As the European 
Commission stated (2001, p4): “[T]he fact that ECT was awarded a substantial stake in 
both joint ventures….can be directly attributed to the RMPM using its influence and 
leverage as port manager (allocating sites and leases) to obtain the best possible out-
come for ECT”. 
Already in 2000 there was a conflict between Maersk-Sealand and ECT about further 
expansion. ECT did not want to cede capacity to Maersk-Sealand whose own terminal 
was immediately operating at a maximum, and which had contributed to the move of 
container flows to Bremerhaven and Antwerp (see NMa 2005, p.19). In the 2004 survey 
by CRA, shipping lines have complained about the presumed preferential treatment of 
ECT compared to other terminals and have indicated that a lack of competition within 
the port has not only led to high prices and inefficiency, but also to arrogance and ne-
glect of the customer (CRA 2004, p43, see also Raad voor Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2003; 
Berenschot 2001).
In July 2001, the European Commission resolved the case (CEC 2001, p.25). ECT had 
to divest its interest in the joint venture with Maersk-Sealand to an independent buyer, 
which turned out to be Maersk-Sealand’s APM Terminals. The port authority further-
more had to make capacity available to Maersk-Sealand’s terminal. Finally, the port 
authority had to confirm that land and necessary facilities at the planned Second 
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Maasvlakte will be allocated according to an open, transparent and non-discriminatory 
way. The situation has been ‘normalized’, in the sense that the port authority sold the 
remaining shares of ECT to HPH in 2003. Moreover, both Maersk-Sealand and P&O 
Nedlloyd had acquired their own dedicated terminal. However, the situation of the Eu-
romax-contract changed as Maersk-Sealand purchased P&O Nedlloyd in 2005. This 
time the issue was resolved rather smoothly. In July 2006 it was decided that ECT-HPH 
will acquire 100% ownership over the Euromax-terminal: in compensation, Maersk-
Sealand’s APM was granted a 176 hectare plot on the Second Maasvlakte. Be that as it 
may, ECT thus provides an interesting case of how conflicting interests and responsibili-
ties of the port authority result in a rather ambiguous position with regard to ownership 
and control of key port assets. 
(2) Institutional arrangements: In terms of the typology presented in the third chapter, 
the port of Rotterdam can be defined as a ‘Landlord port’, in which the construction and 
maintenance of the port’s infrastructure are the responsibility of the port authority. The
total revenues of the port were 403 million Euros (approximately 495 million US $) in 
2003, of which harbor dues and leases are the port’s main sources of income. There is a 
strong relationship between the dues and the leases, since port users have to buy at least 
two services when using a port. First, port users need access to the infrastructure, and 
this is paid to the port authority through the harbor dues. Second, port users need steve-
doring services which are paid directly to the terminal operators, who in turn pay the 
port authority for the use of the land through lease prices. A port authority which owns 
both the land and the access rights can substitute between the two and, in theory, extract 
locational rents by setting a high lease price and/ or harbor dues (CRA 2004). The port 
authority in Rotterdam is aware of this, since it tends to charge higher lease prices for 
tenants who do not generate harbor dues. 
The port of Rotterdam is the most expensive port in the region, both in terms of harbor 
dues and ground lease. In terms of harbor dues, container carriers on the Trans-Atlantic 
trade link pay lower harbor dues in Antwerp (-38%) and Hamburg (-51%) compared 
with Rotterdam. On the Far East trade link, the differences are similar with the harbor 
dues being 50% less in both Antwerp and Hamburg. Only for ro-ro vessels and con-
tainer feeder vessels do the harbor dues in Antwerp exceed those of Rotterdam (respec-
tively 99% and 10% higher). In terms of lease prices, the port of Rotterdam is (accord-
ing to a number of studies, see for overview: CRA, 2004) also more expensive than its 
regional competitors, with price differences up to 40%. Typically, the lease contract 
term in Rotterdam is 25 years and includes an option to extend for a multiple of 25 
years. The lease price depends on the type of land (wet or dry parcel, behind a quay-
wall, direct access to water) and the activity of the tenant. Since these contracts are 
made on an individual basis, potential tenants can negotiate some discounts depending 
on their bargaining power, which in turn depends on the competition from other possible 
sites of location. The port authority applies a maximum negotiable margin of –30% on 
the list price, with average discount on the list price of 10%. Besides discounts on 
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ground leases, the port authority also provides reductions on harbor dues: “In 2004 a 
total of about 16 million Euro is offered given as incentives to almost all shipping lines. 
Some are lump sum, others partly dependent on the amount of cargo. The incentives are 
in most cases between 20-30%” (CRA 2004, 26). This system gives the authority con-
siderable scope for individual targeting and strategic action.  
The impact of the EU is being increasingly felt. Most significant are the regulations 
regarding state subsidies to port infrastructure, and the different directives for environ-
mental protection. The big ports frequently accuse each other of being subsidized by 
their (national) governments. Interviewees from the port authority of Rotterdam and the 
port’s business community Deltalinqs named Hamburg and Zeebrugge as being subsi-
dized, which they say is not in accordance with the concept of ‘level playing field’ or 
equal market conditions. In terms of the environment, the EU’s Birds & Habitat Direc-
tives and the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive are quite relevant for port 
developments and expansion projects. The construction of the Second Maasvlakte has 
been delayed because of the Bird & Habitat Guideline. The guidelines can also be stra-
tegically and politically used to prevent the growth of nearby competitors, as happened 
when the Dutch government delayed the dredging the Westerscheldt that would ulti-
mately benefit the port of Antwerp (cf. Meijerink 1998). Port security has also become a 
major issue since ‘9/11’, with international standards set up by the United Nations’ In-
ternational Maritime Organisation (IMO) being compulsory in the EU ports. The Con-
tainer Security Initiative or CSI set up by the American Department of Homeland Secu-
rity is a special case, since EU ports which are not participating in CSI are not allowed 
to handle ships and their cargo bound for the US. Not surprisingly, all the major ports in 
the Hamburg-Le Havre range are participating. 
(3) Governance Structure: In Rotterdam, the management of the port has been since 
1932 the responsibility of the port authority (RMPM, Rotterdam Municipal Port Man-
agement), which was founded in that year as a municipal service provider. Before then, 
developments in the port were primarily in the hands of the private sector (the Harbor 
Barons), although with close affiliations to the public domain. Since its formation, the 
RMPM has been responsible for the development and maintenance of the port’s infra-
structure under the supervision of the municipal council and the alderman for port af-
fairs. The governance structure in which the port authority operates as a municipal ser-
vice provider came under pressure during the 1990s, resulting in the transformation of 
the port authority into a limited liability company in January 2004. This transformation 
will be discussed in the next section (5.2.4). Here we discuss the new governance struc-
ture. The port authority is now governed by a five-member Board of Commissioners, 
who appoints the Chief Executive Officer. The latter is in charge of the port authority’s 
daily affairs. All the members of the current Board of Commissioners have a long term 
management expertise in the private sector. For example, the current president of the 
Board of Commissioners is also the CEO of KPN, one of the leading Dutch providers of 
cable and telephony. At the moment of writing, one member has also a professional 
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background in one of the main labor unions (FNV), but there is nobody with a back-
ground in environmental organizations, or from the municipality. It was agreed that the 
municipal alderman of port affairs become a member of the Board of Commissioners for 
the period of two years after the corporatization of the port authority in 2004, as a sort of 
transition period. The alderman is now no longer a member of the Board of Commis-
sioners. The port authority’s main shareholders, the municipality and the central gov-
ernment in the form of the Ministry of Finance, appoint the members of the Board of 
Commissioners. 
5.2.4 Regime Politics and Institutional Change 
The 25th June 2004 marks an historical moment for the port of Rotterdam. On that day 
representatives of the Dutch state, Rotterdam, Stadsregio (regional association of local 
governments) and the port authority agreed on the construction of the Second 
Maasvlakte. Like the first Maasvlakte, an area of 1,000 ha (2471 acres) will be com-
pletely reclaimed from the North Sea in two phases, expanding the port-industrial area 
even more westwards. It will be provided with the cranes, quays, berths to harbor the 
next generation container vessels and it will have a capacity of more than 10,000 TEU. 
It will in addition accommodate a petro-chemical cluster and some distribution facilities. 
The Second Maasvlakte is part of the Project Mainport Development (PMD). This has 
three components. One is the Second Maasvlakte. The second component is a nature 
development project in which 750 ha. (1853 acres) of nature reserves will be created in 
the Rotterdam region as a compensation for the loss as a result of the Second 
Maasvlakte. The nature compensation as agreed upon in the agreement ‘Visie en Durf’ 
(‘Vision and Willingness’, 2000) secured the support of environmental pressure groups. 
The third component of the PMD is the redevelopment of the older harbors in the exist-
ing city-area, such as the Waalharbor and Eemsharbor into mixed-land use areas with 
housing, (water) recreation and small businesses. As soon as the first sites on the 
Maasvlakte II are ready, companies can be moved so that space becomes vacant in these 
older harbor areas. 
The ambition to develop the Second Maasvlakte already existed in the late 1970s when 
the first Maasvlakte was constructed, but there was at that time too much societal resis-
tance against further expansion. The issue came back on the political agenda in 1993, 
when the Rotterdam Municipal Port Management (RMPM) presented the Port Plan 
2010. This projected that the port would soon reach the limits of its handling capacity 
through a lack of space, as a result of the future growth of international trade. This was 
followed by the RMPM business plan of 1996 (see RMPM, 1996b), which was more 
strategic in nature and which emphasized a need for a more commercially orientated 
role for the RMPM. It was argued that, in a changing environment with increased com-
petition between seaports, the RMPM needed to be able to operate more independently 
from the municipality, in order for the RMPM to fulfill its mission: strengthening the 
competitiveness of the port-industrial complex. As a limited liability company, the 
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RMPM could operate more freely, more transparently, and more flexibly within a mar-
ket-context, but still guarantee its important public functions of nautical management, 
environment, safety and security. The political control and democratic accountability 
over the actions of the port authority by the municipal council were seen as unrealistic 
and as hampering the continuity of port policy and the development of entrepreneurial 
strategies. As the former director of the RMPM Willem Scholten (1996, p100) put it: 
“The battle to win customers is quite simply throat-cutting. You get nowhere these days 
by just offering a piece of land”.  
It did not take long before the entrepreneurs from the port of Rotterdam managed to 
place the business plan on the national political agenda. In preparation for national deci-
sion-making, in 1997 the Ministry of Transport issued a Planning Key Decision proce-
dure along with an Environmental Impact Assessment (Verkenning Ruimtetekort Main-
port Rotterdam) for the possible development of the Second Maasvlakte. Meanwhile, 
city-mayor Bram Peper organized a commission under the chair of the president of the 
national Social-Economic Council, Klaas de Vries, to investigate the future institutional 
position of the RMPM as well as the relationship between the central government and 
the port-industrial complex. The Commission De Vries included many stakeholders 
from the national and local level, such as representatives from VNO-NCW (the Dutch 
employers’ union), labor unions, Chambers of Commerce, the national railway com-
pany, the different responsible national ministries, the municipality of Rotterdam and 
the RMPM. The Commission De Vries recommended in its report ‘Naar een integraal 
en samenhangend beleid voor de Mainport Rotterdam’ (‘Towards integral and coherent 
policy for the Mainport Rotterdam’) of 1998, creating an inter-governmental platform 
‘Bestuurlijk Overleg Mainport’ (Intergovernmental Platform Mainport- BOM) to keep 
the development process on track. The Commission furthermore recommended that, in 
order to finance and construct the Second Maasvlakte, the national government should 
have a stake in the RMPM. Even though this ambition had already been expressed by 
the RMPM itself in its 1996 business plan, this remained a thorny political issue in Rot-
terdam, a traditional Left-wing stronghold. At that time, the Labor Party (PvdA) still 
dominated municipal politics and it was not keen on losing the political control over its 
so beloved port. 
Under the local political status quo, it was decided by the municipal council on 14 Oc-
tober 1999 to grant the RMPM more freedom from the municipality to engage in strate-
gic action, in what is known as the Package-Deal. However, this reform of the port au-
thority had more the form of ‘stretching of competencies’ within its existing legal struc-
ture as municipal service provider (Municipality of Rotterdam 2001). The decision in-
cluded a fixed payment of 30 million Euros per year by the RMPM to the municipality 
between 2000-2004, the formulation of Port Performance Indicators (to monitor and 
evaluate the performance of the port), more decision-making freedom for the director of 
the RMPM, and the formation of the ‘Mainport Holding Rotterdam Llc (MHR)’ in 
2000. The latter two elements are especially interesting as they increased the scope of 
93
Krips
action of the RMPM, but led to unclear responsibilities and eventually to a financial 
scandal (see box 2). The most important provisions of the mandate of the director of the 
port authority included the lease of lands smaller than 25 hectares, port tariffs, and stra-
tegic investments up to 22 million Euros. The formation of the MHR provided the port 
authority with an extra legal-financial instrument to engage in strategic cooperation, 
participation and development outside the port area. 
Textbox 2: Unclear Responsibilities and a Financial Scandal 
The year 2004 was not only a year of success for the port authority (RMPM). Under the 
1999 Package Deal between the RMPM and the municipality, the director of RMPM was 
given a far-reaching mandate to decide over strategic investments. Under this mandate, the 
director personally supplied bank guarantees worth in total 180 million Euros without in-
forming the municipal council. The main beneficiary of the loans was the financially trou-
bled shipbuilder Rotterdamsche Dokwerk Maatschappij (RDM-Group) of the notorious 
businessman Joep van den Nieuwenhuyzen. According to Van den Nieuwenhuyzen, the 
RDM-Group came into financial problems because a multi-million dollar order from Taiwan 
for the production of a number of submarines had been blocked under a threat of a boycott 
by the People’s Republic of China of the port of Rotterdam. The director of the port author-
ity agreed to compensate the RDM-Group by providing a bank guarantee worth 100 million 
Euros in December 2002. The issue became public at the end of August 2004, when some 
divisions of the RDM-Group finally went bankrupt, and the Commerzbank and Barclays 
Bank demanded the money from the port authority. The director of the port authority imme-
diately resigned and the whole issue became under investigation by both the port authority 
and the municipal council. According to the investigation led by Lemstra (2004, issued by 
the municipal council), the provided bank guarantees were an Alleingang by the director of 
the port authority and, despite the extra mandates of the director, were illegal. Furthermore, 
Lemstra concluded that this Alleingang was possible only because of the unclear responsi-
bilities of the package-deal. 
In spite of these changes, the issue of the port governance structure remained on the 
agenda. The national government had already expressed its preference for a corporatized 
port authority, and so did the port business community. Also at the administrative level 
within Rotterdam there was increasing awareness that corporatization was the only way 
forward. New reports were prepared, both internally and by some private consultants, to 
study the legal transformation of the port authority.  The Labor Party under the ‘motion 
van Middelkoop’ (2001) managed to include the possibility of further stretching the 
competencies within the existing structure, in the form of a ‘municipal service provider 
XXL’. The latter option, though studied, did not have much support It was concluded in 
both the internal (Municipality of Rotterdam 2001, 2002) and external reports  (Beren-
schot 2001) that this proposed structure would lead to the formation of a ‘state within a 
state’ and unclear political responsibilities. Corporatization with the state as major 
shareholder was perceived as the preferred model.  
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After the local elections of 2002, the Labor Party lost power and the new coalition of 
Pim Fortuyn4, the Liberals and Christian-Democrats seized the opportunity to reform 
the port authority. On the first of January 2004, the RMPM was finally and officially 
transformed into the ‘Port of Rotterdam Llc.’. Important in this case is that the parties 
deliberately chose for a limited liability company with the state as sole share-
holder, instead of all-out privatization as has happened in England. It was argued 
in interviews with Mr. van Kleef (Port of Rotterdam, 9-13-2004) and Mr. Bagchus 
(Deltalinqs, 9-15-2004) that privatization is not in the interest of the port-industrial 
complex, if it should result in other firms (e.g. Hutchison Port Holdings) gaining control 
over the port management and the lands in the port-industrial area, because that would 
allow for speculative behavior. Besides, made profits would not necessarily be re-
invested in the Rotterdam-area. 
Under the new structure, the municipality still has full ownership over 10,500 ha of land 
(and water) and infrastructure within the port-industrial area, over which the Port of 
Rotterdam retains the leasehold or ‘perpetual usufruct’. The port authority pays the mu-
nicipality an annual dividend of 40 million to 50 million Euros, as under the previous 
structure. In such a way, the municipality can still exercise a considerable degree of 
control and coordination in terms of land use and development. The municipality loses 
its control over important revenues from the port, the harbor and quay dues and the 
ground leases the Port of Rotterdam can levy, but still has control over the local prop-
erty taxes. The income of the Port of Rotterdam is determined by the harbor dues, quay 
dues and inland vessel dues. The first two have been de-fiscalized, so that they can be 
directly levied by the port authority. In such a way, harbor and quay dues can be and are 
in fact used as a marketing instrument, by providing some shipping companies with 
reductions. The inland vessel dues are levied by the municipal tax collector, but deter-
mined and appropriated by the port authority.  
The institutional reform of the port authority also ensured the construction of the so 
strongly desired Second Maasvlakte, since the central government could now become 
shareholder in the Port of Rotterdam. Under the ‘motion Van der Heijden’ of 11 July 
2002 (named after the Christian Democratic councilor Frans-Jozef van der Heijden), it 
was agreed by the municipal council that the central government should take shares in 
the newly formed Port of Rotterdam in order to co-finance the mega-project. Central 
government under the scrutiny of the Ministry of Finance will take an interest of 1/3 in 
the Port of Rotterdam at 1st January 2006. The other 2/3 of the shares remains in the 
hands of the municipality. The total value of the shares is 1.5 billion Euro (approxi-
mately 1.9 billion US$). The shares of the central government can be traded after the 
construction of Maasvlakte II and the finalization of the Project Mainport in 2020. 
Though this was initially not supported by the municipality and the port authority, it was 
                                                          
4 Pim Fortuyn shocked the national political status quo with his own Rotterdam-based right-wing popular 
party LPF in 2002. After winning the local elections, Fortuyn made good chance of winning the national 
elections as well before he was assassinated by a Left-wing extremist. 
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stated as a conditio sine qua non by the central government. This leaves open the option 
to privatize in the future, but this will not happen before the investments in Maasvlakte 
II made by the central government have returned to the Dutch Treasury somewhere in 
the 2030s. 
5.2.5 Conclusion: Repositioning a Giant 
After the destructions of World War II, Rotterdam managed to become the world’s 
busiest port, a. position it held for almost fifty years. This position can to a large degree 
be attributed to its favorable geographical location and excellent natural hinterland con-
nections. On the other hand, the leading position was not possible without major expan-
sion projects and modernization programs carried out till the early 1970s. During the 
first twenty years after the war, the port was considered of crucial importance by the 
central state in its attempt to revitalize the war-devastated national economy. A strong 
coalition between the port authority, the municipality, the (local) business community, 
the labor union and the national government ensured that the right institutional and 
physical conditions were met in order to capitalize on the rapid recovery of the world 
economy. 
Today, Rotterdam is still the busiest port in Europe. However its leading position has 
come under increasing pressure from its close-by competitors during the 1990s, espe-
cially in the container-sector. At the same time, the dependencies of the port have 
changed considerably. The port’s contribution to the local economy has declined rela-
tively to national economic interests, while at the same time the port has become more 
dependent on the economic development of its fore-and hinterlands. The latter is partly 
the result of the integration within the maritime transport sector, in which globally oper-
ating firms such as shipping lines, transnational terminal operators and freight forward-
ers have increased their control over the logistical chain. The last of the Rotterdam-
based ‘harbor barons’ disappeared with the takeover of ECT by the Hong Kong-based 
terminal operator HPH in 1999 and the merger of the remaining Rotterdam-based ship-
ping line Nedlloyd with the British liner P&O in 1997. In addition, more and more regu-
lation is formulated in ‘Brussels’ at the level of the European Union, in which process 
the national government plays a crucial intermediary role in securing the essential inter-
ests of the port’s agents.
However during the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the port dependent agents 
successfully rallied support from the national government to strengthen their competi-
tive positions. The port was assigned by the national government as mainport, a strategic 
competitive asset of the Dutch economy and the gateway to international markets. In 
this way, the national government strategically committed itself to the development of 
the port. The mainport-coalition between the national government and port dependent 
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agents managed to secure the construction of the Betuweline, the crucial rail link be-
tween the port and German hinterland. In such a way, the port of Rotterdam will im-
prove its rather poor position in rail transport, while at the same time it could offer logis-
tical service providers more reliability and value-for-money for integrating the port of 
Rotterdam in their networks. 
Two major strategic concerns of the port authority and the port dependent agents re-
mained: the ambition to realize the Second Maasvlakte, and to depoliticize its govern-
ance structure. These two ambitions became successfully coupled under the so-called 
‘motion van der Heijden’ (2002). Under this motion the municipal council decided to 
corporatize the port authority in January 2004, while allowing the national government 
to take an 1/3 equity in the corporatized port authority in January 2006. The capital in-
vestment of the national government, some 0.5 billion Euros, could then be invested in 
the construction of the Second Maasvlakte. The corporatization of the port authority also 
ensured more commercial freedom to engage in strategic action, as the bureaucratic 
control by the municipal council over strategic issues (lease policy, tariffs and strategic 
investments outside the port area) has been effectively removed. The corporatization as 
such allowed the port authority to increase its space of engagement, while at the same 
time it affirmed the dependency of the national state on the port for economic develop-
ment.
What to expect for the future? The port of Rotterdam will probably lose its leading posi-
tion in Europe in the container-sector to Antwerp within the next 5-10 years. Antwerp’s 
Deurganckdok has doubled the port’s current capacity, whereas the Second Maasvlakte 
is not only due to be operational until 2014. On the other hand, Rotterdam will provide 
the best accessibility in the region once the Second Maasvlakte is finally realized. Much 
depends on the overall growth of Europe’s economy, Germany in particular. Another 
issue for the port authority for the next decades is ownership and control. At this mo-
ment the shares of the port authority are in the hands of the municipality and the na-
tional government. The national government will probably not sell its 1/3 equity before 
the costs made in the Second Maasvlakte are recouped somewhere in the 2020s. Once 
the costs are recouped, however, the government will be able to sell its shares to a third 
party. Theoretically speaking the municipality can acquire these shares, regaining full 
ownership, but probably it will lack the financial means to do so. More presumable and 
in line with current trends, is that a major private company or a consortium of firms will 
acquire the shares. It will imply that the port authority, the pride of Rotterdam, will 
probably be at least partly owned by foreign-based companies in the year 2040. Whether 
this is a preferable situation remains a political question. In that case also institutional 
investors such as the Dutch national Pension Funds (e.g. ABP) might be possible candi-
dates to gain ownership, with the advantage that the port’s development remains a na-
tional economic concern. One thing is sure: during the late 1990s the port of Rotterdam 
strategically repositioned itself institutionally so as to be able to meet the demands of 
market players and the government.  
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5.3 Los Angeles and Long Beach: the Competitive Balance
“International trade has become the driving force of the Southern California economy, 
and timely infrastructure investments remain essential to regional development and to 
global competitiveness” 
(Erie, 2005, p.232).
The ports at Southern California’s San Pedro Bay are the United States’ leading gate-
ways to the ever growing markets of Pacific Asia and Mexico. It has been estimated that 
over 40% of the containers entering or leaving the U.S. move through the San Pedro 
Bay port complex (SCAG, 2005). When taken together, the ports of Los Angeles and 
Long Beach handled over 13 million TEU in 2004 and would be the fifth largest con-
tainer port complex in the world. Both ports are market leaders at the Pacific Coast and 
have consolidated their competitive positions over the last five years (see table 5.2). 
Though located right next to each other, each port is still administrated separately by the 
harbor departments of the cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach. While heavily de-
pendent on the same hinterlands, regional transportation system and labor pool, each 
port has historically been the others’ main competitor (Stevens, 1997). This makes for 
an interesting comparison: how do both ports evolve in relation to each other? What are 
the differences and how can we explain these?
5.3.1 Growing side-by-side to National Leadership 
The history of the two ports in Southern California’s San Pedro Bay is told together. 
One expanded to service the increasing demands of the fast growing metropolis of Los 
Angeles. The other port is a beach resort that initially depended on its neighbor across 
the San Pedro Bay, but where municipal growth, some oil, and determined leadership 
resulted in Long Beach developing into a major seaport as well (Queenan, 1986). Even 
though the two ports form one continuous harbor around the crest of the bay, they are in 
fact completely independent of each other in terms of ownership, management and op-
erations.
At the Frontier of the New World: an Uncertain Start San Pedro Bay was 'discovered' 
in 1542 by the Spanish employed Portuguese sailor Cabrillo who called it the Bahia de 
Los Fumos, the bay of smokes, named after the fires ignited by the native population. 
The area remained relatively untouched till the Spanish actively started to colonize Alta 
California by setting up missions in 1769 and using the bay, renamed as San Pedro, as 
one of their main load centers. In 1781 the Spaniards founded the village called El
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Pueblo de Nuestra Senora La Reina de Los Angeles de Porciuncula, some 20 miles land 
inwards from San Pedro at what is now Downtown Los Angeles. The Spanish Crown 
granted huge plots of land to three 1769-veterans in 1784. These Ranchos largely cov-
ered the current LA County area and became slowly but surely populated through land 
divisions, and were cultivated with crop and cattle fields. Its isolation from central Span-
ish command and the lack of logistical support made the area dependent on illegal trade 
and smuggling with foreign powers through the San Pedro Bay. The area came under 
Mexican rule in 1822, after it successfully declared itself independent from the Spanish 
Empire. The Mexicans rather neglected the area, and American adventurers and entre-
preneurs increasingly moved into the area. After the Mexican-American war, California 
was officially annexed by the United States in 1848 to fulfill its Manifest Destiny: 
America’s geopolitical ambitions to rule the country from coast to coast.  
The port at San Pedro in the beginning suffered from physical limitations. Ships still had 
to unload on the beach and in times of low tides the water depth in the natural inland 
channel lowered to an unacceptable two feet. At the same time, Los Angeles was grow-
ing rapidly and was in increasing need of raw materials and other supplies shipped 
through the bay. The main connection between the bay and Los Angeles at that time was 
a dangerous road subjected to thievery. It took the vision and persistency of one man to 
lead the development of the port. Phineas Banning, a fortune seeker from Delaware, 
built a new wharf some five miles up the bay at what is now Wilmington and started 
competitive transport services to Los Angeles. He became a state senator, introduced the 
first railroad bill in the State Legislature, and secured a Los Angeles bond issue to fi-
nance the first railroad in Southern California. In 1869 the Los Angeles & San Pedro 
Railroad started operations. In spite of its name, the railroad never went to San Pedro, 
but stopped and started at Banning’s wharf at Wilmington. He also pushed forward the 
desperately needed dredging of the San Pedro Channel by the U.S. Army Corps of En-
gineers, and he made the first proposals for the construction of a breakwater. Hence, he 
is commemorated as the Founding Father of the Los Angeles Harbor (Queenan, 1983). 
It did not take long before the established elites in the more developed and affluent San 
Francisco area to the north laid their eyes on the growing but unorganized Southern 
California. It was the Southern Pacific Railroad Company (SPRC), led by the notorious 
Collins P. Huntington, in particular which would make a major impact on the develop-
ment of the city of Los Angeles and the bay. The SPRC made plans to move south from 
San Francisco and soon acquired the reputation of the “Octopus”. Its political economic 
power, and the dependence of towns and villages on the railroad for survival, made the 
SPRC capable of strangling the towns’ local leadership during negotiations.  
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Fig 5.3: Major ports along the Pacific Coast 
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SPRC constructions were nearing Los Angeles, the SPRC demanded from the city 
$600,000 in cash, a right-of-way property, six acres of choice downtown land for its 
depot and the possession of the Los Angeles & San Pedro Railroad or they would by-
pass Los Angeles altogether. At that time, Los Angeles was facing competition in its 
aim to become the main center in Southern California. The more southern San Diego, 
with its natural deepwater harbor, had clear growth ambitions and was trying hard to get 
connected to the trans-American railway system, either through the SPRC or by partici-
pating in a separate railroad. San Diego became a threat to the political-economic estab-
lishment of San Francisco. The competition from San Diego made Los Angeles city 
leaders eventually decide accept the outrageous demands in 1872, and the SPRC soon 
started it to exploit its monopoly position. In such a way, the Railroad Barons from San 
Francisco successfully eliminated the threat from San Diego. Indeed, “San Diego’s su-
preme asset, the bay, was actually its fatal liability”. Whereas the disadvantage of Los 
Angeles- “its inadequate and unprotected port- was its saving grace” (Fogelson, 1967, 
p51-55; similar statement in Logan & Molotch, 1987, p.55). The SPRC extended the 
Los Angeles & San Pedro Railroad from Wilmington to San Pedro in 1882. At the same 
time, the San Francisco Chambers of Commerce were aggressively acquiring and selling 
lands east of the bay through the California Immigrant Union, and in such a way laid the 
foundations of the city of Long Beach, which became incorporated in 1888 and soon 
became a popular seaside resort.
Fig. 5.4: Location of the ports in South Central Los Angeles (Jacobs, 2007)
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The years that followed became ones of fierce dispute and political conflicts about the 
future development of the harbor of the growing city of Los Angeles, particularly about 
its exact location and its control, known as the Great Harbor Fight (Queenan, 1983, 
Erie 2004). The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad moved into the Los Angeles 
area from the east and decided to construct a pier at the beach town of Redondo. Mean-
while the dominant SPRC took over a failed competitor that ran operations from Santa 
Monica and was determined to make Santa Monica the principle port of Los Angeles by 
constructing the Long Wharf in 1893 and lobbying the federal government to build a 
breakwater there instead of San Pedro. The site at San Pedro was in its turn favored by a 
locally based growth coalition, consisting of political leaders of the City of Los Angeles 
and the newly founded Chambers of Commerce led by Harrison Gary Otis of the local 
newspaper L.A. Times. After intense debates and lobbying of the Senate Commerce 
Committee, it was finally decided in 1896 to build the breakwater at San Pedro, to the 
great delight of the communities of San Pedro, Wilmington, Los Angeles and Long 
Beach. It also marked the end of the monopoly of the SPRC in the region: "The eventual 
selection of San Pedro as the site for massive federal investment in harbor development 
signaled the beginning of the shift in balance of power to local business and away from 
outside corporate influence over the region's political economy" (Dear, 1996, p89).  
Into the Twentieth Century: Growing side-by-side to National Leadership. Now that 
San Pedro finally had the approval for the development of a deepwater port, the need for 
professional organization and management was increasingly felt. In 1907, the City of 
Los Angeles founded the municipal Harbor Department, led by a three-man Board of 
Commissioners (increased to five men in 1924) with the approval of City Ordinance 
No.19128. One of its first major challenges was to secure the consolidation of the towns 
at the bay, San Pedro and Wilmington, into the City of Los Angeles, which happened in 
1909. The conditions were already set in 1906 with the so-called “Shoestring Addition”:
a narrow sixteen-mile-long strip of land between Downtown Los Angeles and the bay 
(nowadays the location of the I-110 highway, cf. figure 5.4) was annexed by the City of 
Los Angeles. In the end, the harbor communities of San Pedro and Wilmington were 
annexed by the City of Los Angeles in return for considerable financial and service re-
lated compensations. Meanwhile at the other side of the bay, the newly founded City of 
Long Beach had its own aspirations for a deepwater port, and the city's political leaders 
started to try to acquire the private waterfront lands for harbor development, and started 
to dredge the much needed channels. Yet the odds were against them, as the harbor at 
the mouth of the Los Angeles River. This made dredging a financially unrealistic enter-
prise and the federal government was not willing to invest in yet another deepwater-port 
so close to San Pedro. Nevertheless, the government of Long Beach managed to con-
struct a dock in 1911, and in 1917 harbor matters became formally organized when the 
city created a five-man led Board of Harbor Commissioners and in that way: "With 
drive and leadership it had achieved in little more than a decade a stage of municipal 
and port development that had taken generations in San Pedro" (Queenan, 1986, p. 68). 
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This was the time of what is known in the United States as the Progressive Era, charac-
terized by civic initiatives and state led political reforms for the betterment of the de-
mocratic process and general welfare of the people. Likewise, “Los Angeles trans-
formed itself from a small entrepreneurial growth regime to a state-centered growth 
regime in which public infrastructure projects (most notably in water, power, and harbor 
development) and influential local bureaucracies shaped the region’s development” 
(Dear, 1996, p. 89). Within this context, the newly founded municipal Harbor Depart-
ments of both cities made quick use of their powers and favorable political climate by 
investing considerably in their port’s infrastructure and by attracting industrial users to 
the ports’ lands. The unstoppable urban and economic growth of the region- the City of 
Los Angeles grew from 10,000 inhabitants 1880 to 1.2 million in 1932- fuelled the 
whole process. In that respect, the California State Tidelands Act of 1911 gave the juris-
diction over ports lands to the local government’s harbor departments, as long as they 
only develop activities related to commerce, navigation and fisheries. The First World 
War meant slower growth rates, but soon after the war, growth went up again with the 
long anticipated reopening of the Panama Canal in 1921, which would concentrate the 
West Coast's European and Far East trade links in Southern California. Meanwhile, the 
discovery of considerable quantities of oil in Long Beach in 1921 ensured the city of 
considerable financial resources for future development. In 1924, the citizens of Long 
Beach voted in favor of a five-million-dollar bond issue for harbor improvement, includ-
ing the much needed 7,284 foot breakwater. The Roaring Twenties was in general a 
time of fast growth, with both ports investing in deepening and widening channels and 
in providing additional storage, docking and berthing space. Consequently, Los Angeles 
took over from San Francisco as the leading port at the U.S. West Coast. 
During the Great Depression of the 1930s, growth dropped considerably, but the advent 
of war brought in numerous contracts with the federal government for the construction 
of war ships. Besides, in 1936 more oil wells were discovered in Long Beach in areas 
now under port's land, ensuring the much needed revenues and jobs for the port. The 
U.S. Navy took control over the ports when the U.S. became actively involved in the 
Second World War after the Pearl Harbor-attack by Imperial Japan in 1941 and stayed 
so till the end of the war. After the war, international commerce and trade skyrocketed 
again, especially with Pacific Asia, and both ports kept improving their facilities. This 
was especially necessary in Long Beach which suffered from subsidence as a result of 
the uncontrolled extraction of oil under the port’s land. Ironically, one of the main 
sources of success of the port’s development now turned against it, and much of the 
revenues of the oil had to be reinvested in countering the dramatic effects of the subsi-
dence. The state of California was also laying claims on the revenues of the oil produc-
tion under the port’s land. In 1956, the California Supreme Court ruled a 50/50 split on 
the oil revenues between the state and the Long Beach Harbor Department, and in 1965 
both parties rewrote the Tidelands Trust so that 85 percent of oil revenues went to the 
state and the remaining part to the city’s general fund (Erie, 2004, p.85). The time that 
oil revenues could cover all the expenses for harbor development, as well as guarantee-
ing the most competitive tariffs, were over. On the other hand, these investments en-
abled Long Beach to construct the most modern facilities at the U.S. West Coast and to 
lure many customers and traffic away from its competitors. 
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But, dramatic change was on the way. In 1958, the Hawaiian Merchant of the Matson 
Navigation Co. sailed from Los Angeles with twenty containers on board. Things would 
never be the same again. Both Matson and American President Lines (APL) were al-
lowed to have their own container terminals constructed in Los Angeles in 1960, and 
that laid the early foundation for containerized shipping on the U.S. West Coast 
(Queenan 1983, Levinson 2006). It also indicates that dedicated container terminals 
were a phenomenon which started in Los Angeles. At this moment, APL still operates a 
container terminal at the port of Los Angeles, and the domestic liner Matson still has a 
dedicated terminal in Long Beach operated by Stevedoring Services of America. Long 
Beach reacted in 1962 with the construction of the 310-acre Piers J and F, at that time 
the world's largest landfill project, with container facilities. Containerization changed 
the business forever. Traditional ships became obsolete, cargo handling efficiency could 
be improved and labor costs reduced. It also required major improvements in the port 
infra- and superstructure. The use of heavy cranes and the storage of containers needed 
wharves and quays capable of carrying the weight. The increasing size of ships de-
manded deeper and wider channels. It is here where Long Beach actually gained from 
the subsidence, as it was almost automatically provided with appropriate depths of the 
channels. At the same time, concerns about the environment came high on the political 
agenda. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 required environmental impact 
reports on all projects in which the federal government was involved, in particular 
dredging activities. This was followed by the California Environmental Quality Act of 
1970, the California Conservation Act in 1972, and the Coastal Act in 1976 that put 
virtually all port development projects under environmental legislation and time con-
suming procedures. Nevertheless, in the following decades the two competitive ports 
succeeded in expanding and growing side-by-side to national leadership in which coop-
erative efforts became more commonplace and necessary.  
5.3.2 The Regional Competitive Landscape 
The ports in the San Pedro Bay are United States gateways to the huge and fast growing 
markets of Pacific Asia, and they are the key hubs for NAFTA trade with Mexico. The 
ports are the nation's two leading container hubs; some 43% of containers entering the 
U.S. are handled at San Pedro Bay (SCAG, 2005). The ports of Los Angeles and Long 
Beach are ranked number 8th and 13th respectively in the list of the world's busiest con-
tainer ports. The San Pedro Bay ports are also the nation's second busiest port complex 
in terms of total cargo tonnage, after the Houston-Southern Louisiana port complex. 
Though having a huge home market- Southern California has 16.5 million inhabitants 
and is the ninth largest economy in the world (Erie, 2004, p.4) - the ports in fact service 
the entire North American continent. For example, 60% of the goods consumed in Chi-
cago flow through the San Pedro Bay (CALMITSAC, 2003). In Long Beach, almost 
30,000 jobs are directly related to the port. The port of Los Angeles accounts for more 
than 250,000 jobs in Southern California and nationwide around 2 million jobs are 
linked to both the ports. 
The seaports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, due to their close proximity and shared 
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hinterlands, are each other's main competitors. The other rivals for containerized cargo 
on the US-Canadian West Coast are the port of Oakland in Northern California, the 
ports of Seattle and Tacoma in Washington, and Vancouver in Canada’s British Colum-
bia. A relative newcomer is the port of Portland along the Columbia River in the state of 
Oregon. These ports function also as the main hubs for the conventional non-
containerized cargo, with a few other specialized ports such as San Francisco (steel, 
cruise lines, ship repair), Huemene (agri-bulk), Stockton (agri-bulk and cement), Beni-
cia (a private port which is specialized in automobiles) and San Diego (automotive, 
military) completing the picture (see figure 5.2). Fact is that the San Pedro Bay Ports 
had the largest growth in the container throughput both in relative and in absolute terms 
over the last five years (see table 2).  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Long Beach, CA 
Market share 
4,600,787 
29.5% 
4,462,967 
29.1% 
4,526,365 
26.7% 
4,658,124 
24.7% 
5,779,852 
27.9% 
6,709,818 
29.8% 
Los Angeles, CA 
Market share 
4,879,428 
31.3% 
5,183,519 
33.8% 
6,105,863 
35.9% 
7,178,940 
38.1% 
7,321,440 
35.4% 
7,484,624 
33.2%  
Oakland, CA 
Market share 
1,776,922  
11.4% 
1,643,585 
10.7% 
1,707,827 
10.1% 
1,923,104 
10.2% 
2,044,594 
9.9% 
2,270,525 
10.1% 
Seattle, WA 
Market share 
1,488,267 
9.6% 
1,315,109 
8.6% 
1,438,872 
8.5% 
1,486,465 
7.9% 
1,775,858 
8.6% 
2,087,929 
9.3% 
Tacoma, WA 
Market share 
1,376,377 
8.8% 
1,320,273 
8.6% 
1,470,834 
8.7% 
1,738,067 
9.2% 
1,797,560 
8.7% 
2,066,447  
9.2% 
Vancouver, BC 
Market share 
1,163,178 
7.5% 
1,146,577 
7.5% 
1,458,218 
8.6% 
1,539,058 
8.2% 
1,664,906 
8.0% 
1,767,379 
7.8% 
Portland, OR 
Market share
290,943 
1.9% 
278,491 
1.8% 
255,745 
1.5% 
339,571 
1.8% 
274,609 
1.3% 
160,479 
0.7% 
Table 5.2: Market position of container ports along Pacific Coast 2000-2005 (Jacobs, 
2007).
The year 2001 was in general a bad year for international trade, with the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks accounting for the decline in growth experienced at all U.S. West Coast ports. 
The next year, in spite of growth, was a dramatic year for the industry at the U.S. West 
Coast. On the 27th September of 2002 the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA) issued a 
lockout for all West Coast ports. The reason was the ongoing negotiations between the 
International Longshore & Wharehouse Union (ILWU) and the PMA about new labor 
contracts (the old 3-year contract ended on the 1st July that same year), in which PMA 
accused the ILWU of intentional work slowages. The consequent 10 day lockout at the 
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U.S. West Coast increased the port congestion in general and created a 23 day backlog 
at the San Pedro Bay in particular, with over 100 vessels stranded. The economic dam-
age has been estimated on 1 billion dollars a day (CALMITSAC, 2003, p.7). The issue 
was resolved through federal intervention by President Bush, who requested an injunc-
tion under the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act on the 8th of October5. Under the injunction, the 
ports needed to be re-opened for 80 days, with workers obliged to return to normal work 
levels and with both sides obliged to work with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service to resolve the dispute. On 25th November 2002, both parties reached a six-year 
labor agreement in which the workers are guaranteed payment raises and increased pen-
sion benefits. The employers gained the right to deploy new technology to increase the 
efficiency at the terminals. Nevertheless, the back-log at the San Pedro Bay resulted in 
the diversion of traffic to the less congested ports in Northern California and the Pacific 
North West. 
The ports of Southern California will soon encounter more competition from south of 
the border. The delays in Southern California due to the 2002 lock-out, labor shortages 
in 2004, and congestion have made port development in Mexico an interesting alterna-
tive. In addition, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has made bilat-
eral trade and commercial border movements between the US and Mexico more inten-
sive. Already in Ensenada, 110km south of the US border in Baja California, Hutchison 
Port Holdings have developed a multi-purpose international terminal. Other port devel-
opments are taking place in Mexico further south in Manzanillo and Lazaro Cardena. 
Though still lacking the facilities and appropriate hinterland connections to the markets 
of the U.S. Southwest and Mexico City, facilities and connections necessary to become 
a serious threat to the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach in the next coming years, 
major port development in Mexico is on the cards and as such will become a serious 
alternative to be reckoned with. Especially developments in Ensenada are looked at with 
great interest by the San Pedro Bay stakeholders: "More companies are turning to the 
operator to provide relief from the congestion at the ports of Long Beach and Los Ange-
les. Mexican officials also are looking to Hutchison, an offshoot of the world's largest 
port operator and developer, to play a role in building a mega port elsewhere in Baja 
California." (D. Lindquist for the The San Diego Union Tribune, 14-8-2005). In April 
2005, a one billion US$ port development project in Punta Colonet, some miles south of 
Ensenada was announced by the L.A. Times. The project is to be developed by Marine 
Terminals Corp. and a holding company of shipping lines Yang Ming, Evergreen, Han-
jin and China Shipping Line (see C. Kraul & D. Schoch for the Los Angeles Times, 09-
4-2005). Furthermore, both ports at the San Pedro Bay are now encountering more com-
petition for the burgeoning Pacific Asia trade from Gulf Coast and East Coast ports such 
as Houston and New York/New Jersey. Though it takes a vessel almost 3 days longer to 
reach Houston through the Panama Canal than via the continental land bridge, it costs 
the shipping lines 400 US$ less per container, and port officials in Texas are taking full 
advantage of that. The ports on the East Coast are also trying to capture a piece of the 
gigantic Asian cake, and have dropped their cargo rates by as much as 30% to make the 
                                                          
5 The Taft-Hartley Act allows the federal government to intervene in labor disputes if the dispute affects the 
entire industry or imperils the nation's health and safety.
106
Krips
shipping lines consider sending their cargo through the Suez Canal and across the Atlan-
tic (Erie, 2005, p.143).  
5.3.3 Structure of Port Provision
It is time now to take a more systematic and analytic look at both the ports at San Pedro 
Bay, by making use of the structure-of-provision (SoP) approach. In the previous sec-
tions, the current dominant position of both ports on the U.S. West Coast has been 
placed within historical perspective: that allows us to understand why the ports have 
been so successful while keeping their administrative independence. At the same time, 
the two ports have become more and more dependent on each other in addressing supra-
jurisdictional externalities such as congestion, pollution and security.
(1) Physical Conditions: The first category of the SoP deals with the provision of the 
port’s infra-and superstructure. First of all, both ports are considered landlord ports: the 
Harbor Departments of the cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach are responsible for the 
entire infrastructure in the ports, as well as for the leasing of available land to port users, 
most notably terminal operators. As mentioned, State Tidelands Trust Act of 1911 
makes the harbor departments of the cities trustees of the state tidelands, and this is en-
forced by the State Lands Commission. Ultimately, the ports’ lands are thus in hands of 
the state. Furthermore, the California Coastal Act of 1979 requires the Harbor Depart-
ments to make land use plans which need to be approved by the state Coastal Commis-
sion. In spite of the increased focus on containerized cargo, both ports maintain facilities 
to handle other types of cargo such as agri-bulk, break-bulk, automobiles and liquid 
bulk. They are thus multi-purpose ports that in addition have lucrative cruise terminals. 
The port of Los Angeles covers 3035 ha (7,500 acres) of which 1649 ha (4,200 acres) 
land and 1335 ha (3,300 acres) water. In its turn, the port of Long Beach consists of 
roughly 3156 ha (7,800 acres) of which 1311 ha (3,240 acres) of land. As regards their 
infrastructure, the port of Long Beach has a competitive advantage over Los Angeles. 
The main channel in Long Beach is, with its 23 meter depth, capable of accommodating 
the biggest carriers (those of 8,000 TEUs) to berth. The main channel at the Los Angeles 
side is only 14 meters deep, but is currently being dredged to some 16 meters. Neverthe-
less, both ports have the deepest channels deeper than their West Coast rivals, with only 
Vancouver’s Deltaport terminal offering competitive depths. The ports suffer from 
enormous congestion problems, especially on the freeways, and both ports are acting as 
one voice to lobby for the much needed state investments and federal grants to upgrade 
the freeway system.  
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These congestion problems have resulted in movement of cargo to Oakland, Ensenada 
and the Pacific Northwest. They will become even more severe when taking into ac-
count that the growth of containerized traffic in Southern California's ports is expected 
to reach 36 million TEUs by 2020 (SCAG, 2005). Currently, over 34,000 truck-trips/day 
move to/from the ports via I-710 freeway and this is forecast to increase to about 92,000 
by 2020. Major investments in the ports hinterland infrastructure, such as separate truck 
lanes on the freeways, are therefore a central concern for all the stakeholders in the re-
gion.
The relatively underdeveloped rail-infrastructure from the ports into the hinterland has 
already been considerably improved, with the opening of the Intermodal Container 
Transfer Facility in 1987. This was followed by the opening of the Alameda Corridor in 
2002 after more than fifteen years of planning and at the cost 2.4 billion US$. The Ala-
meda Corridor is a single, uninterrupted twenty mile grade separated rail link from the 
ports to the Downtown LA transcontinental rail yards (see figure 5.3). The project origi-
nated in the early 1980s, and after the necessary feasibility studies by the regional plan-
ning agency SCAG, the cities of Long Beach and Los Angeles used their joint powers 
authority in 1989 to create the Alameda Corridor Transport Authority (ACTA). ACTA 
is the agency that runs the Alameda Corridor, and its governing board consists of repre-
sentatives of the two cities, the two ports (2 each) and the Los Angeles County Metro-
politan Transportation Authority. The Alameda Corridor is serviced for 60% by the 
Union Pacific and for 40% by BNSF railroad companies. The lion's share of the 2.4 
billion US$ construction costs, some 48.1%, is covered by revenue bonds which will be 
repaid through user fees imposed on cargo owners. Though it was designed to handle 
200 trains a day, it currently handles only 45 trains per day. But with the ongoing 
growth of containerized trade, this number will without doubt rise. The current strategic 
concern is to extend the Alameda Corridor further into Orange County and San Bernar-
dino County’s Inland Empire, where the region’s main distribution centers are located. 
The development of an inland container terminal there is currently being studied. 
The development and maintenance of common port infrastructure (quays, jetties, streets, 
lights) is financed out of own revenues from the tariffs and lease contracts. Major capital 
intensive projects such as terminal developments and land fills (Los Angeles Pier 400) 
are financed by issuing revenue bonds. Through these bonds, the Harbor Departments 
can borrow money on the capital market which is secured by future revenues (e.g. user 
fees) from these investments. Since the bonds are covered by future port revenues in-
stead of taxes, bond issues do not need voter approval. This arrangement has been in 
place through charter amendments in Los Angeles in 1959 and in Long Beach (which 
could rely on its oil revenues till 1965) in 1968. In the period 1994-2000, the ports spent 
together over 2 billion US$ on capital projects, by far the most of all the ports in the 
entire United States. Yet, it is estimated that nearly 4 billion US$ extra is needed to ac-
commodate growth the next ten to fifteen years at the ports and an additional 16.5 bil-
lion US$ to upgrade the regional transportation system (CALMITSAC, 2003, p13). User 
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fees or toll on the freeways might be one means to co-finance these mega-investments, 
but could also divert cargo elsewhere.  
Fig.5.5: The San Pedro Bay port complex and location of container terminals (Jacobs,
2007).
The superstructure is the responsibility of the private sector. There are a total of fifteen 
container-terminals in the San Pedro Bay area, eight of which are in Los Angeles (see 
fig.5.5). These terminals are available for long-term lease (typically 20 years) by private 
operators, and most of them are dedicated to the major shipping lines. In general ship-
ping lines have become increasingly involved in terminal operations through processes 
of vertical integration, by which they have secured more control over the supply chain 
and  have reduced transport costs (Slack et al 2002, Notteboom, 2004, see chapter IV). 
These dedicated terminal arrangements can take several forms, depending on ownership 
structures and contractual agreements between the shipping line and the operator (see 
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tables 5.3 and 5.4). For example, Total Terminals International in Long Beach is a joint-
venture between Hanjin and the domestic stevedore company Marine Terminal Corp., 
whereas TraPac in Los Angeles is a local subsidiary of Mitsiu O.S.K. Lines. Besides, as 
a result of the strategic alignments between the shipping lines most of the terminals are 
open to the cargo of alliance partners and- whenever there is capacity- to invitees. 
In fact, the phenomenon of dedicated container terminals started in North American 
ports (Haralambides et al 2002, Slack & Frémont 2005). Already in the early 1960s, 
both Matson and APL were allowed to construct and operate container terminals in Los 
Angeles (Queenan, 1983). According to Slack & Frémont (2005, p123), this can be 
explained by the fact that competition between ports at the U.S. West Coast is fierce, 
since there are only a few entry points for ocean carriers. This pressed the shipping lines 
early on to secure the limited space for berthing, while the port authorities have been 
prepared to sacrifice potential higher utilization rates for commitments and investments 
from the shipping lines. This contrasts with developments in Europe where so-called 
trans-national terminal operators have become the primary players in container han-
dling. However, the domestic stevedore company SSA has remained a strong position in 
the port of Long Beach, which might be the reason for the higher overall utilization rates 
of the port of Long Beach compared with Los Angeles (NRDC, 2004). The situation in 
Southern California is rather remarkable, compared with other major ports elsewhere in 
the world such as Rotterdam, Dubai and Singapore, where respectively HPH-ECT, DPA 
and PSA enjoy a monopoly. 
Terminal Operator Size Main Lines 
Served
West Basin Con-
tainer Terminal 
West Basin Container 
Terminal LLC 
75 acres China Shipping 
Line
West Basin Con-
tainer Terminal 
West Basin Container 
Terminal LLC
186 acres Yang Ming 
TRAPAC TraPac Inc. 173 acres Mitsiu OSK Lines 
(MOL)
Yusen  Terminal Yusen Terminals Inc.  185 acres NYK-Line
Seaside Terminal Seaside Transportation 
Services
205 acres Evergreen
APL Terminal/ 
Global Gateway 
South
Eagle Marine 292 acres APL-NOL
APM Terminal/ 
Pier 400 
APM Terminals 484 acres Maersk-Sealand
P&O Nedlloyd  To be assigned 86 acres To be assigned 
Table 5.3: Container terminals at the port of Los Angeles. (Source: Port of Los Angeles 
Facilities Guide 2005, Harbor Department of City of Los Angeles, cf. Jacobs, 2007). 
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Terminal Operator Size Main Lines  Served 
Pier A Stevedore Services of 
America (SSA) 
171 acres MSC, ZIM, CMA-
CGM
Pier C Stevedore Services of 
America (SSA)
70 acres Matson Navigation 
Company 
Pier E California United 
Terminals 
108 acres Hyundai Merchant 
Marine
Pier F Long Beach Con-
tainer Terminal, Inc.  
101 acres OOCL,
Hapag-Lloyd
Pier G/ J International Trans-
portation Services, 
Inc.
246 acres K-Line & Grand 
Alliance Partners 
Pier J/ Pacific 
Container Termi-
nal
Stevedore Services of 
America (SSA) 
237 acres COSCO, CP Ships 
Pier T Total Terminals In-
ternational LLC 
340 acres Hanjin
Table 5.4: Container terminals at the port of Long Beach.(Source: Annual Report & 
Facilities Guide 2003, Harbor Department of the City Long Beach, cf. Jacobs 2007). 
There is a slight difference between the two ports in approaching customers. In Los 
Angeles, the port authority deals directly with the shipping lines over the operation of 
terminals. When a terminal is under-utilized, the port authority furthermore stimulates 
the shipping lines/ dedicated terminal operators to handle containerized cargo from other 
shipping lines. In Long Beach, three terminals are operated by SSA, which approaches 
the shipping lines to make use of SSA’s terminal facilities. There are some pros and 
cons of doing it in a particular way. When shipping lines operate their own terminal, 
they want to protect their own space, meaning that when business is going better for 
them they do not want to talk with other customers or shipping lines. SSA’s interest is 
that it retains a solid customers' base and remains open to anybody with sufficient 
amount of cargo. 
(2) Institutional arrangements: The second category of the SoP is the set of property 
rights, land use plans, tariffs and other regulations and associated practices that regulate 
the use of the physical infrastructure (including environmental and safety stipulations, 
work and payment conditions). The Port of Long Beach has an estimated income of 
roughly 374 million US$ for the Fiscal Year 2005 (Harbor Department of the City of 
Long Beach, October 2005), of which 312 million US$ are revenues from port opera-
tions. Port operations include income from marine terminal leases as specified under 
Port of Long Beach Tariff No.4 (dockage, wharfage, storage, pilotage and demurrage) 
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with a total of 300 million US$, and land rentals with a total of 10 million US$. The 
other, non-operating, revenues consist of interest earnings on cash balances, income 
earned in joint ventures with the port of Los Angeles (Intermodal Container Transfer 
Facility), revenue from oil operations (still good for some 29 million US$) and from 
other agencies (e.g. federal security grants). The Port of Los Angeles has an estimated 
income of roughly 355 million US$ for the Fiscal Year of 2004 (Harbor Department of 
the City of Los Angeles, September 2004), of which 350 million US$ or 98.6% are 
revenues from port operations as specified under Port of Los Angeles Tariff No.4 
(dockage, wharfage, storage, pilotage and demurrage). The other revenues are the in-
come from the joint ventures with the port of Long Beach and interest and investment 
income. Shipping services provide, with some 89.1%, the bulk of the operating reve-
nues. The other operating revenues are 33.2 million US$ from land rentals and some 5 
million US$ from royalties and fees (e.g. fee from parking lots, utilities, production of 
oil). In both cases, wharfage is the most significant of the shipping services.  
Wharfage is the fee charged against merchandize for passage over wharf premises, be-
tween vessels onto or from barges: and it is here where the strategic bargaining between 
the ports and the shipping lines is the most critical. In other words, it is here where the 
strategic, customized deals, depending on the shipping line and the overall volume of its 
cargo, are made.  Since both ports are landlord ports, operating expenses are primarily 
administrative in nature. The difference in revenue is mainly due to the fact that the 
budgets are from two different years. The most obvious difference is the considerable 
income which the port of Long Beach still enjoys from oil production compared to Los 
Angeles, but these revenues automatically flow to the state and city's general fund. 
The tariffs of both ports are similar, aside from the customized deals. This is because the 
tariffs of ports in California are coordinated through the California Association of Port 
Authorities (CAPA). The changes in tariffs of the ports are therefore carefully coordi-
nated and adjusted to market conditions and trends. For example, the increased tariff 
rate for shipping containerized cargo of 5% at the Port of Los Angeles in June 2005 was 
in line with the other CAPA-ports. All the ports in California use the so-called MAG-
quotum or Minimum Annual Guarantee as a standard tariff arrangement. It implies that 
operators need to reach a minimum amount of (container) throughput at their terminals 
per year. If they succeed, they need to pay less and less for every extra container that 
moves through their terminals. As mentioned by Hall (2003, p358), this form of tariffs 
has been introduced by the Port of Oakland in 1982: "Concerned that shipping lines 
would stop calling, in 1982 the Port of Oakland offered terminal leases to stevedoring 
firms and volume discounts to carriers in exchange for guarantees that they would con-
tinue to visit the port for five years". This form of tariffs has since become standard in 
ports on the U.S. West Coast. The tariffs are arranged in such a way that the port au-
thorities’ operating revenue largely depend on the number of containers being handled 
rather than the number of vessels calling the port. This is an advantage to the ports in 
times of vessel-enlargement which will lead to fewer ships carrying more containers. 
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A considerable divergence between the two ports emerged in 2005 in terms of the leas-
ing policy. Officially there was no leasing policy at either port. The pragmatic approach 
was behind closed-doors negotiations, resulting in tailor-made deals depending on the 
tenant, its activity, the amount of cargo it would bring in etc. However, in 2005 the Har-
bor Department of Los Angeles decided to set up a formal lease policy. It was a decision 
made at the city-level, in which the new mayor Antonio Villaraigosa (on the initiative of 
city-controller Laura Chick), addressed the need for openness and transparency of city 
departments’ budgets. Under the proposed leasing policy, a request for proposals will be 
issued by the Harbor Department whenever a port property becomes available for lease. 
Potential tenants can then make competitive bids on the available property in a process 
open to third parties, including the public. After the bidding process, the former tenant 
still has the possibility to match the most competitive bid in order to keep the leasehold. 
There are some pros and cons to this proposed leasing policy. One could argue that it is 
an attempt to abide by the principles of ‘good governance’ as postulated by organiza-
tions such as the World Bank , in the sense that it increases the transparency of govern-
mental actions. The openness of the competition can ensure that environmental stan-
dards or some form of community mitigation is included in the competitive offers, 
rather than offers being limited to immediate material gains to the directly involved 
parties. On the other hand, it limits the scope for strategic actions by the port administra-
tion to deal with businesses, and there have been concerns by the shipping lines that this 
proposed leasing policy might be used strategically by competitors to drive the rents up 
and consequently drive competitors out. Nevertheless, it remains an interesting devel-
opment at the port of Los Angeles. It is especially interesting because the Port of Long 
Beach will not follow the initiative. As a third party, they will be able closely to follow 
the negotiations and bidding processes at the LA-side, while at the same time engaging 
in strategic action and providing tailor-made deals. 
Safety-stipulations play a significant role on the U.S. West Coast. The ILWU has the 
ultimate responsibility for safety concerns of the workers at the terminals, and, it does 
not allow containers to be stacked more than four or five high. This reduces port capac-
ity on existing space considerably. The ILWU has also been successful in blocking the 
application of new technologies which would improve the terminal’s efficiency. In gen-
eral, container operations in the US use land very inefficiently, compared for instance 
with Singapore (see table 5.5). Yet as mentioned earlier, under the latest agreement be-
tween ILWU and PMA, new and environmentally more friendly technologies will be 
increasingly applied, which will increase the efficiency of the terminals and reduce 
emissions. This includes the application of GPS to cargo handling equipment, virtual 
container yards (internet matching service for empty containers) and ‘smart appoint-
ment’ systems for truckers aimed to reduce the waiting time at the gates. The use of one 
central container chassis pool, instead of storing chassis at the individual terminals, will 
also create considerable ‘new’ space at the terminals. In that respect, the private terminal 
operators at the San Pedro Bay with the support of the Waterfront Coalition, an associa-
tion of importers and exporters, launched a promising program in 2004. 
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Table 5.5: Port efficiency at major U.S. seaports compared with the port of Singapore. 
(Source: Natural Resources Defense Council, 2004, p15).  
To reduce the emissions from idling trucks at the container terminals and to reduce the 
congestion on the freeways, the I-710 in particular, the terminal operators in both Long 
Beach and Los Angeles launched a remarkable program in 2004: PierPASS. The initia-
tive came after the Lowenthal Legislation of February 2004 (named after the Democ-
ratic state Congressman Lowenthal) aimed to reduce emissions at the terminals resulting 
from waiting trucks and congested terminals. The PierPASS program began in July 
2005 and stimulates container trucking in off-peak hours and the weekends, from 18h00 
to 03h00. A Traffic Mitigation Fee has been set at $40 per TEU (20-foot equivalent 
unit), or $80 for a 40-foot container during movements at peak-hours. This fee will be 
allocated by the installed nonprofit agency PierPASS to the marine terminals to help 
offset their costs of operating at nights and weekends, estimated at $156 million to $160 
million per year. The fees are paid by the cargo owners. The support of Waterfront Coa-
lition for the program was in that respect essential. The results, even   after only a couple 
of months, are remarkable. Before the PierPass program was operational, around 85% of 
the containers were trucked during peak hours. After only 3 months this share has been 
reduced to around 60%. 
The reduction of container free time at the terminals is another measure to improve the 
efficiency of port operations. This has been an initiative taken by both port authorities. 
Both Los Angeles and Long Beach have reduced the container free time (the time that 
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containers are allowed to remain in the port without being charged extra) for import 
containers from 5 days to 4, for export containers from 7 to 6 days. The port of Los An-
geles planned to reduce this with one more day in 2006, but the decision to do that had 
been put on a hold till July 2007. Nevertheless, the free time reduction is heavily sup-
ported by the terminal operators: "we are not a warehouse", as one representative of 
Hanjin Terminals in Oakland said during an on-site observation, when asked about the 
initiatives at San Pedro Bay. The party affected by these new measures is in fact the 
cargo owner or shipper, (e.g. Wal Mart), who will be deprived of free storage space at 
the terminals. The shipping lines in their turn only want to know the new measures way 
in advance, so that they can plan their services accordingly. 
(3) Governance-structure: Though both ports are governed by a five member Board of 
Harbor Commissioners under the State Tideland Trust Act of 1911, there are some dif-
ferences. This is due to the fact that Los Angeles and Long Beach are two independent 
cities or municipalities within the LA County. A first observation is that both Harbor 
Departments are very powerful players in their respective cities. Long Beach, a city of 
491,564 inhabitants, has suffered tremendously from industrial restructuring since the 
1970s and is highly reliant on the port for jobs and economic growth. In the city of Los 
Angeles (with some 3,694,820 inhabitants, U.S.’ second largest municipality), the Har-
bor Department is considered along with the Airports Department and the Department 
of Water & Power, as one of the crown jewels of the city:
“In Southern California, their [the Harbor Departments] political influence and regional 
impact are rivaled only by the City of Los Angeles’s storied and still-controversial De-
partment of Water & Power; the mammoth Metropolitan Water District of Southern 
California; the Community Redevelopment Agency, responsible for the postwar rebuild-
ing of downtown LA; and the conflict plagued Metropolitan Transportation Authority. 
In contrast, Los Angeles’s City Planning Department has neither the political influence 
nor the transformative capacity of the proprietary departments” (Erie, 2004, p.31). 
But the fact that LA’s economy is more diversified than that of Long Beach, together 
with the fact that the port of LA has to deal with the two affected communities of San 
Pedro and Wilmington, make LA’s Harbor Department position more vulnerable to 
political resistance than that of Long Beach. So, in order to understand the port govern-
ance structures in place, we must take into account the special position which the Harbor 
Departments of Los Angeles and Long Beach have within their overall local govern-
ments’ organization. As argued by Steven Erie (2004), the local constitutions or city 
charters of LA and Long Beach provide a key explanation for the Harbor Departments’ 
political autonomy and transformative capacity. In both cities, the commission-run de-
partments share power with the mayor (and in the case of Long Beach, the city man-
ager) and the city council. They are both proprietary departments with broad formal 
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powers, particularly with respect to their budget in the sense that they have their own 
revenue sources and are not supported by local taxes. The city charter protections ap-
proved by voters limit the scope for the mayor or the city council to interfere in the de-
partments’ daily affairs. The Boards of Harbor Commissioners are ultimately responsi-
ble for the Harbor Departments actions. They need to approve the land use or master 
plan; they set the port’s policy and they manage the port's budget. But this does not im-
ply that the departments are not accountable to voters or elected officials. The electorate, 
for example, can by majority vote approve charter amendments, and thus change the 
rules of the bureaucratic game. This is an issue that became very important in Los Ange-
les during the 1990s as we will see in the next section. But also the elected officials, the 
mayor and city council, can exercise considerable control over the Harbor Department’s 
agenda. This tends to be more the case in Los Angeles than in Long Beach: "Charter 
protections tend to insulate Long Beach port commissioners from city policy agendas. 
Long Beach's council-manager system of government, which features a part-time coun-
cil, also limits municipal political influence over port affairs" (Erie, 2004, p.128). 
In both ports the commissioners are appointed by the mayor and need approval by the 
city council. But, whenever a new mayor is elected in Los Angeles, the entire Board is 
replaced by a complete new one. In the past, the port enjoyed a rather pro-growth atti-
tude from the long sitting mayors Samuel Yorty (1961-1973) and Tom Bradley (1973-
1993), but after the 1992 LA riots the mayor was restricted to a maximum of two 4-year 
terms. This subjected the long term strategic commercial concerns of the port to the 
political interests of a mayor with only an 8-year career horizon. In Long Beach, each 
commissioner is appointed for a period of six years with a maximum of two terms. The 
mayor and city council in Los Angeles also need to confirm the hiring of the Executive 
Director, the civil servant who administers the daily affairs of the department. In addi-
tion, the City Council in Los Angeles needs to approve contracts longer than five years 
or above certain monetary amounts, and can veto any board decision, as long as it acts, 
within time deadlines, by two-thirds majorities.  
A statement about which arrangement is preferable depends on what criteria and moral 
values are used. The continuity and coherence of the port's policy and strategy seem 
better secured by the arrangement in Long Beach, since it has the capacity to build up 
more institutional memory. Furthermore, the arrangement in Los Angeles, where the 
elected mayor can reward loyal campaign sponsors with a board membership, could 
easily play political interests in the card. This became most obvious with the election of 
Jimmy Hahn as city mayor in 2001. Jimmy Hahn, a San Pedro native and inhabitant, 
was particularly responsive to the port community’s environmental concerns, and he 
installed a board of commissioners with similar affections. The practice of commission-
ers raising funds for mayor’s campaigns has however been constrained by 2004 elected 
Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa. On the other hand, the structure in Long Beach might lead 
to negative lock-in effects such as lack of transparency and taken-for-grantedness, by 
which the Board loses its responsiveness to community affairs and public accountabil-
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ity, in favor of capitalist interests and long term strategic objectives. Be that as it may, 
port officials in Los Angeles backed by complaints of the shipping lines regret the poli-
ticized governance structure in place, such as submitting lease contracts to city council 
approval and the open competition for lease contracts, which could put the port of Los 
Angeles at a considerable competitive disadvantage relative to Long Beach and other 
West Coast rivals. 
5.3.4 Regime Politics and Institutional Change 
How do local port-dependent agents adapt the structure of provision of their port in the 
attempt to maintain or improve the competitive position of that port in the international 
transport of containers? The most important question is why both ports are still operated 
and administrated as two independent entities. There have been attempts in the past to 
consolidate the two port authorities. Already in 1925, the California State Legislature 
passed a Port District Enabling Act in which both ports could be controlled by a joint 
powers agreement if both cities approved.  A small majority was in favor in LA, but 
resistance was particular fierce in Long Beach: "Civic pride strongly influenced this 
mutual decision to go it alone, especially in Long Beach" (Queenan, 1986, p.92). An-
other attempt was made in 1965. The Los Angeles City Council proposed the consolida-
tion of the two ports under a single authority led by the state. But, once again the Long 
Beach City Council unanimously opposed the consolidation as ”just another effort in 
Los Angeles to get our oil money to develop their port” (Queenan 1986, p.136). Even 
though there are some clear advantages of consolidation, most notably reduction of ad-
ministrative costs and more efficient land use planning, the merger or consolidation 
under a state port authority is now out of the question and will definitely not happen in 
the near future. As a senior manager of the Long Beach Harbor Department expressed: 
"Once a while we have a state legislator who likes to address the issue of consolidation 
but they [the state] are not going to do that. More recently, there has been the issue of a 
regional port authority, so not in Sacramento at the state-level, but maybe at the level of 
the Los Angeles County. After all, we have the two ports and the County who run the 
Alameda Corridor, so the County has a foot in the door there. That has also been dis-
cussed. But again, these are only cocktail-conversations. I do not give it all that much 
importance. For now, let say the two cities are content and set to continue the ports 
separately" (Interview, Mr. T. Teofilo, Managing Director Maritime Services, Port of 
Long Beach, 11-10-2005).  
But during the 1990s other issues emerged which had a considerable impact on the insti-
tutional arrangement of the ports. These were most notably an attempt by both cities’ 
leaderships to use the harbor departments’ budgets to deal with their own budget defi-
cits; the LA city charter reform with a possible privatization of the LA Harbor Depart-
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ment; and the secession movement in the San Pedro/ Wilmington communities (Erie, 
2004). On the first point, as a result of the reformed state/local fiscal regime under 
Proposition 13 in 1978, both cities were faced with considerable financial troubles in the 
early 1990s. Basically, Proposition 13 centralized fiscal decision making to the state, 
including property tax, thereby effectively eliminating local governments’ flexibility to 
make annual budgetary adjustments. At first, the consequences of this tax reform were 
masked during the prosperity of the 1980s, but hit California's cities twice as hard dur-
ing the recession of the early 1990s. In order to overcome their budgetary problems, the 
leaders of the cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach turned to their proprietary depart-
ments for relief. To put it more bluntly: the Harbor Departments were considered as 
cash cows ready to be milked. So, under Mayor Riordan’s administration (1993-2001), 
the city of Los Angeles substantially increased its request for Harbor Departments pay-
ments such as fire protection and police, from 16.1 million US$ in FY 1994 to 33.5 
million US$ in FY 1995. The municipal transfer demands became even greater in 1995 
after the Nexus Study, when the city stated that the port owed the city an additional 80 
million US$ in back fees since 1977. In Long Beach, city administrations made full use 
of a clause in the city charter, which allows for 10% of the net income of harbor reve-
nues funds to be transferred to the tideland operating fund. This allowed the city to fi-
nance commercial projects in the tidelands such as an aquarium. These financial claims 
by the city governments seriously affected the Harbor Departments' operations on the 
capital market (issuing bonds to finance port expansion projects) and in combination 
with outstanding debts would negatively influence the port's credit rating by bond agen-
cies. The California State Tidelands Commission, responsible for enforcing the Tide-
lands Trust Act, and the shipping lines organized in the Pacific Merchant Shipping As-
sociation, responded by suing the city of Los Angeles, arguing that the money was im-
properly transferred to the municipal treasury to cover services which were not on tide-
lands. The issue was resolved in 2001, when the city of Los Angeles agreed to repay 62 
million US$ to the Harbor Department. 
A second major issue during the late 1990s that affected the port of LA was the city 
charter reform initiated by both the mayor and the City Council in 1996. In the early 
1990s, the city charter was amended a couple of times in favor of city hall relative to the 
Harbor Departments' autonomy. This was most notably in the form of Proposition 5 of 
1992, which provided the city council the right to veto virtually every Board decision. In 
1996, the rules of the bureaucratic game were renegotiated altogether, and the stakes 
were high. One of the issues addressed was the corporatization of the LA Harbor De-
partment. If adopted, the Harbor Department would become an incorporated, profit ori-
entated business with the government as the sole shareholder. Under the proposed new 
legal structure, the corporatized Harbor Department would be run by a chief executive 
officer and a business orientated board of directors with, dividends on profits paid to the 
city general fund. Though this option was discussed, it was not adopted (Erie, 2004 
p.134). According to an interviewee at the port of Los Angeles, this was because a cor-
poratization of the Harbor Department would not be possible under the Tidelands Trust.  
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Yet, the charter reform still provided the port with the chance of improving its govern-
ance arrangement, namely less restrictive rules and oversight vis-à-vis its neighbor rival 
at the other side of the San Pedro Bay. The governance structure in Long Beach was 
regarded as being superior in the sense that it allowed the Harbor Department there to 
operate more independently from City Hall, especially in terms of contract and tariff 
related issues. The new city charter of Los Angeles adopted in 2001, weakened the city 
council's veto-right on Board decisions, as the new rules required two thirds council 
vote to review and veto Board decisions. On the other hand, the new rules increased the 
influence of the Mayor (who could now remove commissioners without council major-
ity approval) and the city controller (who could now initiate industrial, administrative 
and economic surveys). The new rules also require one Board member to be resident in 
the harbor district and furthermore allow for the creation of neighborhood advisory 
councils, who act as standing committees before the Board. The Port Community Advi-
sory Committee was installed the same year with members from homeowner associa-
tions and local chambers of commerce. The last two rules considerably increased the 
voice of the affected communities of San Pedro and Wilmington, and could increase the 
NIMBY-fication of proposed port developments.  
This indeed happened, when the proponed expansion of the China Shipping Line termi-
nal was rejected in 2002. A coalition of environmentalists (NDRC) and the local com-
munity of San Pedro sued the LA Harbor Department, arguing that the Environmental 
Impact Report for the terminal project was not in order. Under pressure from City Hall, 
the Harbor Department settled the case in 2003 and for much more money (in total 50 
million US$) than the Harbor Department would have liked to. In such a way, City Hall 
still managed to indirectly extract money from their own Harbor Department to invest in 
community and mitigation projects (e.g. the construction of a public park in San Pedro) 
even though this was ruled not in accordance with the Tidelands Trust earlier in 2001. It 
also resulted in a loss of containerized traffic to Long Beach, with the China Shipping 
Lines diverting their 8,000 TEU vessels to the Hanjin Terminal at Long Beach. Never-
theless, these last two governance arrangements increased the voice of affected commu-
nities and can be regarded as a step taken by City Hall to counter an even more serious 
threat: the secession of the San Pedro/ Wilmington communities from Los Angeles.  
The issue of secession of the harbor communities was part of broader movement, in-
cluding the communities of Hollywood, Westchester, Venice, South Central, who were 
inspired by the well-campaigned and funded efforts in the San Fernando Valley. The 
city of Los Angeles faced almost complete disintegration at the dawn of the twenty-first 
century. In San Pedro/ Wilmington, the reason for the 140,000 inhabitants to follow the 
strategy of exit was their impression that their concerns about port externalities such as 
pollution and congestion were insufficiently heard at City Hall. Not surprisingly The 
issue of who would control the port became a central concern in the overall harbor-area 
secession movement. The City of Los Angeles did not want to lose one of its main as-
sets. The secessionist on the other hand could use the port revenues to meet one of the 
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secession conditions set by the state of a financially sound budget, while at the same 
they could have a fundamental political say in port policy. Yet, the State Lands Com-
mission and Harbor Department were not keen to transfer the Tidelands Trust to a newly 
created Harbor City and after the defeats of the San Fernando Valley and Hollywood 
secessions in 2002, the movement stopped its case. Therefore, ''if the harbor-secession 
movement had succeeded, Los Angeles ironically would have entered the twenty-first 
century as it did the twentieth - unable to control the port facilities that can so pro-
foundly shape the region's destiny" (Erie, 2004, p141). 
5.3.5 Conclusion: the Competitive Balance 
What can we learn from this double case study? We can conclude that the SoP of both 
ports in some respects have become more identical. Both ports are multi-purpose ports, 
though increasingly focused on the growing container traffic. Both tariffs are the same 
(aside from customized deals) and both ports are landlord ports offering dedicated ter-
minals to the shipping lines, although SSA retains a strong position in Long Beach. Fur-
thermore, both Harbor Departments and the private terminal operators at the ports are 
working together to increase efficiency through the reduction of container free storage 
time and the PierPASS program. However, there remain some important differences in 
spite of almost a century of competition. The governance structure in Long Beach is less 
politicized than in Los Angeles, with the Long Beach Harbor Department enjoying more 
entrepreneurial freedom from City Hall to negotiate contracts with customers. The open 
leasing policy in Los Angeles is exemplary for the different attitudes that exist across 
the San Pedro Bay. Los Angeles has also faced more community opposition since the 
mid 1990s, with the ultimate threat of the secession of the San Pedro/Wilmington com-
munities. An important reason for the differences is that both ports are run by depart-
ments from two independent and rival cities, which are not keen on losing control over 
their economic power houses. Persistent diversity of SoP can be explained by the fact 
that institutional dynamics is contingent on the path dependent and territorially rooted 
structures of power and interests (Jacobs, 2007).
What can we expect for the future institutional development of both ports? Since the 
1980s, we can clearly observe incremental moves towards more structural cooperation 
and coordination. The ports’ mutual dependence on the congested hinterland transport 
system especially, accompanied with the increased competition from ports elsewhere at 
the Pacific Coast, generates sufficient reasons to do so. Besides, the strategic alignments 
between shipping lines and terminal operators have made the competition between the 
two ports less clear cut. Nevertheless, the merger of both harbor departments is not an 
issue. The competition between the two ports is generally regarded as beneficial by both 
port officials and the industry. In that respect we can raise questions for how long Los 
Angeles will be able to maintain its open lease policy. 
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5.4 Dubai: an Emerging Empire 
“The word ‘impossible’ is not in leaders’ dictionaries. No matter how big the chal-
lenges, strong faith, determination and resolve will overcome them.” 
(Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum, World Economic Forum, Amman 2004)  
“Feudal absolutism- the Maktoum dynasty owns the land area of Dubai- meanwhile has 
been spruced up as the last word in enlightened corporate administration, and the po-
litical sphere has been officially collapsed into the managerial”  
(Davis, 2006, p.61) 
Dubai is a fast growing city-state of 1.2 million inhabitants, located at the Per-
sian/Arabian Gulf6. It is one of the seven United Arab Emirates7, an Islamic federation 
founded as late as in 1971 when the British finally abandoned this imperial outpost. 
Though the discovery of oil in the late 1960s contributed to Dubai’s initial economic 
and urban growth, its contribution to the local GDP is currently (2006) only 6% and still 
declining. Dubai has re-invested its initial oil wealth to become the region’s main com-
mercial centre and transportation hub by constructing the most modern port facilities in 
the region. The last decade, Dubai’s state-owned port manager and terminal operator has 
started to successfully expand abroad. Initially this expansion was achieved by acquiring 
terminal lease concessions in smaller ports across the region. Through the corporate 
takeovers of some of the world’s biggest stevedore companies, Dubai has truly become 
a ‘global’ player with operations in ports across all the continents. 
5.4.1 The City of Merchants 
The city-state of Dubai has been dubbed the ‘city of merchants’ and not without reason. 
It is this historically developed openness for private enterprise and initiative that has 
generated an entrepreneurial spirit and secured Dubai’s competitive advantage over its 
regional rivals during the twentieth century. Dubai has been a regional trading post since 
its early beginnings, attracting merchants from across the Arabian Gulf, mainly from 
Persia and the Indian Subcontinent. The town of Dubai was only founded in the early 
                                                          
6 In the Arab world, the Persian Gulf is named Arabian Gulf. This is a politically sensitive issue within the 
Middle East. 
7 The Federation of the United Arab Emirates consists of the capital Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al 
Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al Quwain and Fujairah.
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1800s, when a subsection of the Bani Yas tribe of Abu Dhabi led by Sheikh Maktoum 
(whose family rule Dubai today) split off and located themselves at Khor Dubai (Dubai 
Creek). But unlike Abu Dhabi, the territorial interests of which were at the oases in the 
desert-interior, Dubai focused on fishing and maritime trade, mainly in pearls (Heard-
Bey, 1996). Political decisions at that time were made by the Sheikh but in close rela-
tionship with the local business community organized in the Majlis, a sort of predeces-
sor of the Chambers of Commerce.  
At that time however any form of modern, territorialized statehood was far from effec-
tive. Conflicts and violent clashes between the different tribes and clans frequently oc-
curred. The region was also notorious for piracy and therefore formed a threat to the 
British merchant fleet en route between India and Persia. These made the British move 
into the area and force the little tribal communities and the Sultanate of Oman to sign 
‘trusts’ with the British Crown. Henceforth the area was called Trucial Oman. Daily 
governance practices remained under control of the local rulers, with the British making 
use of tribal land for military purposes. The British created order in the region as they 
intervened in tribal clashes and provided protection against pirate raids and foreign in-
vaders. Later, the British also stimulated modern state-building by setting up local po-
lice forces and by constructing roads and public facilities. This in turn provided condi-
tions for commerce to grow. 
Three examples from the twentieth century illustrate Dubai’s entrepreneurial spirit,
which influenced the city-state’s path of urban and economic development. Firstly, the 
decision by Sheikh Saeed to create a tax-free port in 1906 contributed to Dubai’s initial 
growth. This provision lured many merchants and pearl traders from neighboring areas 
into Dubai, especially traders from Lingah who were hit at that time by taxes imposed 
by the Sjah of Persia. Although this gave an initial boost to the town’s economy, the 
measure lost its effect with the end of pearl fishing in the early 1930s, when the cultured 
pearl from Japan conquered the world market. These were times of economic decline, in 
which Dubai managed to survive through illegal arms trade.  
The second example comes from just after the Second World War. Though concessions 
for the search of oil had already been given in the 1930s, no commercially interesting 
quantities were found at that time. Dubai still relied on its maritime trade concentrated 
along the Creek. The goods were brought in by dhows, traditional vessels used for inter-
regional trade and of which the cargo is bound for the souqs (markets) located along the 
Creek. However, the entrance of the Creek was silting up, endangering Dubai’s mari-
time trade. It was Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum who ordered the dredging of 
the Creek in 1952 in combination with the redevelopment of the harbor-area. This plan 
was executed by Halcrow & Partners, a British consultant, and was financed by loans 
from oil-rich neighbor Kuwait. These investments in infrastructure secured Dubai mari-
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time trade and improved its regional competitive position, since it now could receive 
more and larger vessels than its regional rivals such as Sharjah or Bahrain. International 
liner calls were however still absent, and in a regional study on world shipping from that 
time (Alexandersson & Norstöm, 1963), the tiny ports in what is now the United Arab 
Emirates are not even mentioned. 
The third example is the development of Dubai modern port facilities at Port Rashid and 
Jebel Ali. Blessed with the discovery of oil in 1966, the Emirate’s leadership immedi-
ately started to strategically re-invest the petro-dollars in other sectors of the economy, 
most notably international trade and real estate. The construction of Port Rashid located 
in Dubai City at the entrance of the Creek was accomplished in 1972. The port was one 
of the first in the region capable of handling containers. One year before the opening of 
Port Rashid, Trucial Oman became an independent Islamic federation, the United Arab 
Emirates, with the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai as president and vice-president re-
spectively. Though the rulers of the other, smaller emirates are equal members in the 
federal government, the political power structure resembles the economic status of the 
individual emirates, with oil-rich Abu Dhabi (90% of the oil of the UAE is located in 
Abu Dhabi) as the natural leader.
Not long after completion of Port Rashid, Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum 
launched another port development project at Jebel Ali, some 25 kilometers south of 
Dubai City. The first phase of the project was finished in 1979 and the project was com-
pleted in 1983. Together with the creation of the Jebel Ali Free Zone in 1985, Dubai had 
put in place the most modern infra and superstructure in the region capable of handling 
the Panamax generation of ocean carriers. In doing so, Dubai was able to pick the first 
fruits of the continuous growth of trade and consumption in the region, as it anticipated 
containerization successfully. In 1991, the managements of both ports were merged to 
form the Dubai Ports Authority (DPA). Before that time, the ports were managed sepa-
rately with the expertise of the private sector: SeaLand in Jebel Ali and the local ship-
ping agent Gray MacKenzie & Co (which later became Martime & Mercantile Interna-
tional) in Port Rashid. 
5.4.2 The Regional Competitive Landscape 
The success of Dubai’s ports within the region over the last decades has indeed been 
remarkable. By anticipating quickly trends and developments, like containerization, 
Dubai Ports secured their position as the main trade and transportation hub in the Mid-
dle East, in spite of their less favorable geographical location. Rival ports were slow to 
adapt to new circumstances, or suffered from regional conflicts and political instability. 
Figure 5.7 shows the location of Dubai and other major ports in the region. 
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Fig. 5.6: Major Ports in the Greater Middle East. (Jacobs & Hall, 2007)
The construction of Port Rashid and Jebel Ali provided Dubai with the competitive 
edge, especially among its competitors within the United Arab Emirates. It has consoli-
dated this position ever since. The federal structure of the UAE, in combination with its 
tribal history and organization make the individual Emirates highly competitive among 
each other. The different tribal leaders and rulers are therefore coordinating their eco-
nomic development agenda’s among each other poorly, as they interpret this as a sign of 
weakness. As regards the ports, it is no difference. The other UAE-ports have competed 
aggressively for the same market shares with Dubai Ports over the last decade, espe-
cially through pricing strategies. It is estimated that transshipment handling costs at east 
coast ports are about 10-15% lower than in Dubai (Drewry, 2000). In the end it was to 
no avail, with only Sharjah’s Khor Fakkan Port managing to remain competitive (see 
table 5.7). 
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Dubai Ports 
Growth rate 
Market share
3,058,868 
-
61%
3,501,820 
14%
67%
4,194,265 
20%
69%
5,151,956 
23%
72%
6,428,883 
25%
72%
Khor Fakkan (Sharjah) 
Growth rate 
Market share 
1,014,122 
-
20%
1,089,866 
7%
21%
1,266,131 
16%
21%
1,449,451 
14%
20%
1,819,431 
26%
20%
Port Zayed  (Abu Dhabi) 
Growth rate 
Market share
340,000 
-
7%
176,695 
-48%
3%
235,575 
33%
4%
233,789 
-1%
3%
239,000 
2%
3%
Fujairah 
Growth rate 
Market share 
540,775 
-
11%
379,968 
-30%
7%
286,336 
-25%
5%
202,156 
-29%
3%
229,129 
13%
3%
Port Khalid (Sharjah) 
Growth rate 
Market share
102,018 
-
2%
110,310 
8%
2%
125,515 
14%
2%
151,636 
21%
2%
184,189 
21%
2%
Total Market 5,055,783 5,258,659 6,107,822 7,188,988 8,900,632 
Total Market Growth - 4% 16% 18% 24% 
Table 5.6: Market position of container ports in the UAE 2000-2004 (Source: provided 
by DPA, 2005). 
Yet, in the late 1990s other rivals, besides Khor Fakkan, successfully entered the re-
gional market, challenging Dubai’s competitive position. These ports are the Port of 
Salalah in Oman and the Port of Aden in Yemen. Huge investments have been made in 
these ports’ infra and superstructure by both the national governments and private ter-
minal operators and carriers. The Port of Salalah for instance has upgraded its facilities 
to post-Panamax standards through investments made by the Omani national govern-
ment and APM Terminals of the A.P. Möller- Maersk Group (Maersk-Sealand), a pow-
erful player in maritime trade. It handled its first containership in 1997 and already han-
dled more than 2 million TEU in 2003 (see table 2). It is furthermore developing a free 
enterprise zone around the port. Khor Fakkan has a common user terminal operated by 
Gulftainer Ltd., and it too handled around 2 million TEU in 2004. The port of Khor 
Fakkan is expanding with another terminal and is expected to handle over 3 million 
TEU within the near future. Through the construction of a second container terminal in 
Aden by the Yemen government and PSA, capable of handling post-Panamax vessels, 
the port-city is trying to revive its historically strong position in maritime trade after 
years of isolation and civil war.  The Aden Container Terminal handled its first contain-
ers in 1999 and the port had a relatively low container throughput of 318,000 TEUs in 
2004. The port has suffered from the terrorist attack on the French oil-tanker ‘Limburg’ 
just off the Yemen-coast in October 2002. This might be also one of the reasons why 
PSA sold back its 60% shares to the national government. Major port improvements in 
India (Nheva Sheva) and Pakistan (Port Qasim) by P&O Ports also started to pose 
threats to Dubai’s position as major transhipment hub for the Subcontinent.
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Table 5.7: Market position of container ports in the Greater Middle East 2000-2005
(Source: Jacobs & Hall, 2007) 
These ports have a geo-strategic advantage over Dubai, since they all are located at the 
east coast of the Arabian Peninsula. Vessels on the Europe- Far East trade link can save 
precious time by not having to enter the Arabian Gulf. It takes a vessel for instance 24 
hours to reach Dubai from Khor Fakkan and back again. With highways linking all the 
major centers in the region, hinterland transport by truck becomes an attractive alterna-
tive for cargo bound to Dubai and further. The big ocean carriers also do not have to pay 
high insurance costs for entering the dangerous Arabian Gulf through the narrow Straits 
of Hormuz. Another project that might affect the competitive position of the port of 
Dubai is the Saudi land bridge between the port of Damman in the Arabian Gulf and 
Jeddah Islamic Port in the Red Sea. This proposed direct freight-only rail link will allow 
for the fast and efficient transport of cargo across the Peninsula.
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Indeed, Dubai has lost cargo and businesses to these new rivals (World Bank, 2001, p. 
6). Especially Salalah, with its Maersk-Sealand’s dedicated terminal, has positioned 
itself as a formidable competitor:”[d]uring 1999 the DPA confirmed that 25-30% of its 
Maersk-Sealand transshipment business has been lost to Salalah.” (Drewry, 2000, p.18). 
On the other hand, representatives of the Dubai Ports Authority are confident about the 
future and Dubai Ports still have a regional market share of 33 % (see table 5.8), and 
with the ongoing general growth of trade within the region it is unlikely that Dubai Ports 
will lose its leading position in the near future.  
5.4.3 Structure of Port Provision
(1) Physical conditions: As regards the physical conditions, both Dubai Ports are by far 
superior to their regional competitors. The container terminal area at Jebel Ali offer 115 
ha (1,150,800 square meters) and Port Rashid offer 69 ha. (689,400 square meters). 
Control of all the port land ultimately lies in the hands of the Emir or ruler of Dubai who 
has gifted the freehold to DPA. At the time of writing, port land is not available for lease 
to third parties. The depth of the main channel of Jebel Ali is 17 meters and the width is 
320 meters. Port Rashid’s main channel has a width of 190 meters and a minimum depth 
of 13 meters. DPA not only owns the infra but also superstructure at both ports. Port 
Rashid has 7 Panamax cranes. At Jebel Ali DPA deploys 23 cranes of which 11 are 
super post Panamax cranes, allowing DPA to handle the biggest carriers in the business. 
The monopoly position of DPA in container handling at the ports apparently is not re-
garded as problematic by the shipping lines, apart from the move of a number of 
Maersk-Sealand’s services to Salalah.
An integral part of Jebel Ali port is its Free Zone, which functions as a cluster for value 
added logistics and manufacturing. In 1991 over 300 companies (DPA, 1992) were lo-
cated in the Free Zone. It currently hosts 3,880 businesses originating from over 100 
countries. The size of the Free Zone is approximately 750 ha. The advantages of being 
located in the Free Zone are simple: no taxes and full foreign ownership. Outside the 
Free Zone, only 49% ownership is allowed, with 51% of the shares to be owned by a 
local. There are furthermore no corporate taxes, a concession that is renewable after 50 
years, no personal income taxes, 100% repatriation of capital and profits. There is no 
imposition of duties on imported or exported goods within the Free Zone, whereas out-
side the free zone custom duties are fixed at 5% within the entire Gulf Cooperation 
Council’s customs union8. Land, offices and industrial units within the Free Zone are 
available only on lease, with no freehold ownership allowed. The leasehold terms are 
valid for various periods, depending on the type of land use. The absence of freehold 
                                                          
8 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) consists of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates and Oman. They have formed a customs union in 2003 with custom duties fixed on 5% and with 
single entry point arrangement for imported goods within the Union. This single entry point arrangements 
works largely to the benefit of Dubai, as it is the GCC’s major transhipment hub.  
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ownership apparently does not reduce the attraction of businesses. The Jebel Ali Free 
Zone Authority (JAFZA) manages the Free Zone. 
Fig. 5.7: Location of Dubai Ports and Jebel Ali Free Zone (Jacobs & Hall, 2007). 
The Free Zone and the Port clearly have a symbiotic relationship. The Free Zone’s loca-
tion near the port has given Dubai a focus on transshipment, and the proximity of the 
port (see figure 5.8) has attracted numerous businesses into the Free Zone. Almost two-
thirds of Dubai’s trade volume is re-exported, with exporters and manufacturers benefit-
ing from the tax-incentives in the Free Zone. Among the supply chains routed through 
the Free Zone are construction materials (e.g. steel, fibre optics, machine tools), automo-
tive parts and vehicles, electronics, textiles, food and beverages. The typical value added 
activity includes the assembling, labelling and repackaging of goods that are produced 
in factories in India, China and Southeast Asia and destined for the European and North-
American consumer markets. In addition, the Free Zone hosts the regional trade offices 
of such global consumer product manufacturers such as Sony, General Electric, Philips, 
Honda, LG, Nokia, Pepsi Co to cost-effectively distribute their brands and products to 
fast growing markets in the region. As such, the Jebel Ali ‘free zone- port bundle’ al-
lows Dubai to “tap into global outsourcing trends and to insert themselves in the global 
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production chain” (Wang and Olivier, 2006, p.1487) or as pointed out by one senior 
Arab industry commentator: “[C]learly, the success of Jebel Ali as a port is based less 
on Dubai’s domestic growth than on its ability to handle transshipment bound for India, 
Iraq, Iran and the wider region” (Gulf Business, p.46, February 2005). The planned de-
velopment of nearby Jebel Ali International Airport, will provide opportunities for sea-
air modal shifts and strengthen the port-industrial cluster even more. The symbiotic 
relationship is further expressed by the fact that both JAFZA and DPA are part of the 
Ports Customs & Free Zone Corporation since 2001. 
(2) Institutional Arrangements: Dubai Ports can be best understood as a public service 
port, since all the land, infra-and superstructure are in hands of DPA. As the state-
agency in charge of Dubai Ports and its terminal operations, DPA decides on the termi-
nal tariffs. The port dues are levied on all vessels entering the port except those ex-
empted by the Ruler of Dubai. For vessels moving between Port Rashid and Jebel Ali, 
port dues are assessed as if the vessel is making only one continuous Dubai Port stay. 
DPA also issues the Port Receiving Charge (PRC). PRC is applied against loaded and 
empty containers and against bulk cargo trailers entering or exiting port property which 
arrived from other than Dubai Ports, and also against containers which have stayed out-
side port custody for more than 20 days. This is to discourage the trucking of containers 
to Dubai from other ports in the region. 
Through its tariffs, DPA can provide strategic financial incentives to attract shipping 
lines and their containers. It first of all provides free storage time for containers. Empty 
and transshipment containers have a free storage time of 20 days, import and export 
containers 10 days. Containers subject to PRC are exempted from free storage time. The 
free storage time is rather generous if one compares this with 5 to 6 days that is offered 
in Los Angeles and Long Beach. More importantly, DPA provides considerable dis-
counts on the terminal tariffs  when a shipping line brings in certain amounts of con-
tainer, up to some 285 Dhs discount (77.6 US$) per full container (over 20 feet) when a 
shipping line guarantees 18,000 moves per year (DPA Port Tariff, section D, 2006). 
DPA provides an additional discount when a shipping line or consortium has handled in 
excess of 22,000 chargeable container moves in a guarantee year. The reduced handling 
rates are applied to those chargeable container moves in excess of the following thresh-
old levels as and when these thresholds are achieved: 
Thus, when a shipping line can guarantee within one year more than 80,000 moves with 
a full container (over 20 feet) it receives: 700- 360= 340 Dhs. (92.6 US$) or 48% dis-
count for every container move it subsequently brings in. The question is: how can DPA 
finance these considerable discounts? And one can wonder whether there is not some 
form of subsidy through the state’s oil revenues. DPA senior managers insisted in inter-
views that there is no state subsidy involved at all and that DPA is a financially inde-
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pendent (state-owned) commercial enterprise. No evidence of state subsidy has been 
found by the author. Clearly, the construction of Port Rashid and Jebel Ali has been 
financed from oil-revenues, but most ports across the world have been developed with 
considerable financial support from the state. DPA is part of a larger conglomerate, the 
Port Customs & Free Zone Corporation. As we will see in the next section, PCFC in-
cludes a number of other divisions through which capital can be mobilized and trans-
ferred to DPA. It must be stated, however, that the true financial position of the PCFC is 
not known since they do not publish any annual financial results. 
Additional Volume Discount Thresholds 
Standard 
Rate
>22,000
Moves  
> 40,000 
Moves
> 60,000 
Moves
> 80,000 
Moves
Up to 20’ 
Full 475 Dhs =
129.3 US$ 
282 Dhs= 
76.8 US$ 
277 Dhs= 
75.4 US$ 
265 Dhs= 
72.2 US$ 
253 Dhs= 
68.9 US$ 
Full Tranship 523 Dhs = 
142.4 US$ 
317 Dhs= 
86.3 US$ 
297 Dhs= 
80.9 US$ 
282 Dhs= 
76.8 US$ 
276 Dhs= 
75.1 US$ 
Empty 243 Dhs =  
66.2 US$ 
177 Dhs= 
48.2 US$ 
177 Dhs= 
48.2 US$ 
171 Dhs= 
46.6 US$ 
166 Dhs= 
45.2 US$ 
Empty Tran-
ship
354 Dhs = 
96.4 US$ 
251 Dhs= 
68.3 US$ 
231 Dhs= 
62.9 US$ 
227 Dhs= 
61.8 US$ 
220 Dhs= 
59.9 US$ 
Over 20’ 
Full 700 Dhs= 
190.6 US$ 
400 Dhs= 
108.9 US$ 
384 Dhs= 
104.6 US$ 
374 Dhs= 
101.8 US$ 
360 Dhs= 
98.0 US$ 
Full Tran-
shipment 
729 Dhs=  
198.5 US$ 
441 Dhs= 
120.1 US$ 
431 Dhs= 
117.3 US$ 
406 Dhs = 
110.5 US$ 
400 Dhs= 
108.9 US$ 
Empty 331 Dhs= 
90.1 US$ 
248 Dhs= 
67.5 US$ 
243 Dhs= 
66.2 US$ 
237 Dhs= 
64.5 US$ 
232 Dhs= 
63.2 US$ 
Empty Tran-
ship
509 Dhs= 
138.6 US$  
385 Dhs= 
104.8 US$ 
375 Dhs= 
102.1 US$ 
350 Dhs= 
95.3 US$ 
344 Dhs= 
93.7 US$ 
Table 5.8: Discounts on container terminal tariffs at Dubai Ports. (Source: Dubai Ports 
Tariff April 2006, Section D). 
As regards labor costs and conditions, it makes a lot of difference when labor unions are 
not existent and tolerated, as is the case in the Emirate. In that way, DPA can implement 
the state of the art technology with relative ease as they face no union opposition; while 
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at the same time DPA picks the fruits from the hire-and-fire ethics. The stevedore labor 
is provided by the Dubai Labour Supply Company (Dulsco), a locally based limited 
liability company with strong government ties. Much of the unskilled and cheap labor is 
recruited in India and Pakistan and trained in Dubai. Tough immigration laws and the 
principle of hire-and-fire make the labor force extremely vulnerable and powerless. 
With no civil rights and no collective agreements, DPA enjoys no resistance from or-
ganized labor and with the almost unlimited supply of submissive fortune-seekers from 
the Indian Subcontinent it can capitalize on competitive labor-costs. The costs of labor 
are approximately 125 Dhs./ gang hour (equivalent to some 35 US$/ gang hour) but 
much dependents on the size of the gang. It will come as no surprise that it remains 
cheaper for DPA to employ muscle power instead of state-of-the-art technology. The 
exception is the handling of the (post) Panamax cranes, for which the best in the indus-
try are recruited or trained.  
As regards security, Dubai is the first port in the region that joined the Container Secu-
rity Initiative (CSI) in 2004. Rival ports Colombo and Salalah followed one year later. 
The consequence is that Dubai is the only port in the Gulf that is allowed to handle con-
tainers that are directly bound for the United States. This is a considerable advantage 
over the other ports in a region troubled by armed conflict and terrorism. The tanker-war 
between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s, in which both sides attacked merchant fleets and 
mined the waters, severely affected commercial traffic in the region. The Persian Gulf is 
regarded as a liability by the insurance companies for shippers, such as Lloyd’s from 
London. Walker (1989) argues that the Dubai ports did better than others in the region 
in the 1980s, and that Port Rashid in particular was able to secure its place as the re-
gion’s pre-eminent transhipment port. Dubai and its ports came, however, unharmed out 
of the first Gulf War (1991-92) and to some degree took advantage of it. As DPA’s 
Handbook of 1992 announces: “[a]s a result of the Gulf War, the Port Rashid Terminal 
became the distribution hub for a number of motor vehicle manufacturers” (DPA, 1992, 
p.33). The same can be said about the Second Gulf War and the liberation/ occupation 
of Iraq by the Allied forces: “[i]ts huge port complex at Jebel Ali, for example, has prof-
ited immeasurable from the trade generated by the U.S. invasion of Iraq” (Davis, 2006, 
p. 58). 
According to sources within DPA, Dubai Ports was able to keep its customers during the 
Second Gulf War in 2003 in spite of the high insurance rates, because DPA took full 
responsibility for all vessels bound for Dubai. By taking this financially risky commit-
ment, DPA ensured its growth even in times of armed conflict. The second Gulf War, 
the ongoing reconstruction of Iraq and the United States’ persistence in setting up mili-
tary/ logistical strongholds in the region has in fact brought in more transshipment cargo 
to Dubai. Rumors have it that the Port Rashid has been dedicated almost entirely to the 
logistical supply of the Allied forces in Iraq and the transshipment of materials for the 
reconstruction. How much the U.S. military pays for this privileged use of Dubai Ports 
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is not known, but it does add an interesting dimension to the political discussion in the 
U.S. over DPW taking over container terminal leases in U.S. Ports (see chapter I). 
(3) Governance Structure: One of Dubai’s major institutional advantages is its strong 
and committed political leadership, which runs the Emirate like a corporation. Cur-
rently, the emir and ruler of Dubai and vice-president of the UAE, His Highness Sheikh 
Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum is the leader who makes all the important deci-
sions. He is surrounded by a small group of local elites (the Director-Generals) who are 
in charge of Dubai’s governmental departments and the state-controlled enterprises. For 
example, Mohammed Al Abbar is both the Director-General of the Department of Eco-
nomic Development and the CEO of Emaar, one of Dubai’s major property developers 
responsible for the Burj Al Dubai, the highest skyscraper in the world currently under 
construction. Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al Maktoum is both the Director-General of 
Department of Civil Aviation and President of Dubai-based airliner Emirates Group. 
This type of governance, in which members of local based families are in charge of the 
state’s department as well as the leading companies, resembles a sort of tribal politics in 
which the Al Maktoum Family is the most powerful.The Al Maktoum-clan ensures po-
litical support for its hereditary leadership and growth agenda by mobilizing the mem-
bers of other locally based families into the state apparatus. As Davis (2006, p.61) criti-
cally observed: “[f]eudal absolutism- the Maktoum dynasty owns the land area of Du-
bai- meanwhile has been spruced up as the last word in enlightened corporate admini-
stration, and the political sphere has been officially collapsed into the managerial”. 
Notwithstanding this critique, It ensures swift decision-making regarding development 
projects since there is virtually no opposition. Regarding the development of the ports, 
the authorities do not encounter any problems with environmental pressure groups, nor 
by affected citizens or communities. Labor unions are also not tolerated and there is 
almost unlimited supply of cheap labor from India. The rulers of Dubai can therefore 
implement their economic growth agenda with relative ease. In this respect, the Emirate 
of Dubai can be best understood as an autocratic development state (Painter, 2000), 
comparable to places such as Singapore and Taiwan. 
The man in charge of the ports is Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem. He is the Director-General 
of the Ports Customs & Free Zone Corporation (PCFC), the umbrella company that 
includes DPA and Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority (JAFZA). He also appoints the mem-
bers of the PCFC’s board of directors. The current board is a mixture of local business 
leaders and former directors of CSX World Terminals, a result of the takeover by PCFC 
to be discussed later.  PCFC was formed in 2001 and integrates a number of individual 
operations into one single corporation in order to improve efficiency. Besides DPA and 
JAFZA, PCFC includes the Dubai Customs Department and Dubai Ports World (see 
figure 5.9). The influence of Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem on Dubai’s growth politics is 
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considerable, given the fact that he is also the chairman of Nakheel Properties, the state-
owned property developer responsible for the extraordinary residential projects such as 
“The Palms”, “The World” and “Dubai Waterfront”. Most of the trucks and material 
needed for the construction of these projects need to come from abroad and this in-
creases the cargo throughput of the ports. Bin Sulayem is also member of Sheikh Mo-
hammed´s inner circle, the Executive Council, and a member of the Board of the Dubai 
Chambers of Commerce.  
Under Bin Sulayem’s leadership, Dubai Ports strengthened its competitive position as 
the Gulf´s main maritime hub. PCFC also includes a number of other operations. Istith-
mar is a global investment holding company that owns, amongst other assets, prime real 
estate in Manhattan (Times Square, Park Avenue) and London (Trafalgar Square). Du-
bai Metals & Commodities Centre is basically a global marketplace based in Dubai for 
gold and diamonds, with revenues from commissions on private transactions. Dubai 
Maritime City is an organization involved in the development of the Maritime City near 
Port Rashid which is planned to be cluster for all kinds of maritime-related services such 
as logistical advice, legal advice and ship repair. Finally, Tejari was launched in 2000 
and is a digital marketplace for business-to-business transactions to facilitate trade in the 
region. In 2006, the PCFC became part of an even larger holding company named Dubai 
World.
Fig. 5.8: PCFC Corporate Structure (Jacobs & Hall, 2007).
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5.4.4 Regime Politics and Institutional Change  
At the end of the 1990s, Dubai Ports started to expand abroad with the ambition to be-
come a recognized global ports manager. In order do so, DPA set up an international 
division in 1998, named Dubai Ports International (DPI and later renamed as Dubai 
Ports World), and it rapidly started to expand abroad. Already in 1997, DPA won a 20-
year concession to manage the South Container Terminal at Jeddah Islamic Port in 
Saudi Arabia in partnership with local company Siyanco. One year later, DPI won a 20-
year concession to manage a new container terminal at the Port of Beirut in Lebanon, 
only to pull back after a few years because of claimed miscalculated start-up costs and 
traffic volumes (UNCTAD, 2003, p80). Nevertheless, DPI together with its sister com-
pany Jebel Ali Free Zone International continued to expand and strengthen its interna-
tional position. Together they took over the management of the Port of Djibouti, its in-
ternational airport and the concession to develop and manage a free zone in the Horn of 
Africa. At the end of December 2005, DPI also acquired the lease concession on Aden’s 
former PSA terminal, effectively eliminating the (potential) threat of Yemen’s port city 
to Dubai’s regional hub status. 
CSX World Terminal’s global port business 
Country Terminal Shareholding (%) Timing
China Tianjin 
Yantian
Qingdao 
Hong Kong CT3 
Hong Kong CT8 
24.5 
50.0 
26.9 
56.7 
68.6 
Operational
Operational
2007 
Operational
2005 
Korea PNC Pusan 25.0 2006 
Germany Germersheim 100.0 Operational 
Australia Adelaide 5.5 Operational 
Venezuela Puerto Cabello 50.0 Operational 
Dominican Republic Caucedo 35.0 Operational 
Table 5.9: CSX World Terminal’s portfolio acquired by DPW. (Source: Gulf Business, 
February 2005; Jacobs & Hall, 2007)
The portfolio of PCFC includes in addition the management of the ports of Visakhapat-
nam and Cochin in India. By winning the management contract for the port of Constan-
zia in Rumania in 2004, Dubai Ports has managed to enter the European market also. 
JAFZI manages the free zone of Tangiers in Morocco and of Port Klang in Malaysia. 
PCFC’s  next big step on the world stage happened with the US $1.15 billion acquisition 
of the Florida-based CSX World Terminals in December 2004, by outbidding estab-
lished global terminal operators Hutchison Port Holdings (based in Hong Kong) and 
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PSA (based in Singapore). Interesting detail in this transaction is that CSX’s former 
daughter Sea-Land used to have the management contract at Dubai’s Jebel Ali Port. 
With the acquisition of CSXWT, Dubai Ports took over the management of nine con-
tainer terminals worldwide with a total handling capacity of 14.6 million TEUs, includ-
ing the CT3 and CT8 terminals in the world’s busiest and most expensive port Hong 
Kong. The acquisition provides PCFC the opportunity to capitalize on the world’s fast-
est growing markets in China and Southeast Asia. In this way, Dubai has developed 
from a local port authority to a global terminal operator.  
Not much more than a year after this major takeover, PCFC’s international division, 
now renamed as Dubai Ports World, acquired one of the world’s major stevedore com-
panies, P&O Ports, in a deal worth US$ 6.8 billion. And once again, DPW managed to 
outbid its major competitor PSA. Much of the capital was raised through a sukuk or 
Islamic bond9 (worth in total US$3.5 billion) issued by the Dubai Islamic Bank and 
Barclays Capital. This takeover enables DPW to strengthen its position in India and East 
Asia further while penetrating Australia’s and Europe’s stevedore markets. The takeover 
of P&O Ports’ portfolio in the United States (New York-New Jersey, Philadelphia, Bal-
timore, Miami, New Orleans) has however been blocked by the American Congress in 
early March 2006 out of national security reasons (see chapter I).
In combination with DPA’s home terminal in Dubai, PCFC’s DPW will be capable of 
handling over 35 million TEUs in 2005 and will become the world’s fourth largest port 
operator. Yet, the focus on foreign markets and other regions does not imply that PCFC 
will lose its roots in the Middle East, Dubai in particular. In January 2005 DPW signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Abu Dhabi Seaport Authority and the Port of 
Fujairah to take over the management of their ports. In addition, plans have been made 
to expand Jebel Ali Port with three more container terminals through land reclamation, 
either at it existing location or at a newly developed site in Abu Dhabi. Anyhow, the 
handling capacity of Dubai Ports will increase to over 20 million TEUs by the 2020s 
(PCFC, 2004). 
                                                          
9 The Islamic bond market is based on Shariah, the legal code of Islam, which forbids Muslims 
from receiving or paying interest. In the case of sukuks, assets are sold to a special-purpose com-
pany, which then rents them back
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Country Terminal Shareholding (%) Area size (ha) Throughput
2004 (TEU) 
India Nhava Sheva 
Mundra 
Chennai
100%
100%
75%
29 ha 
34 ha 
13,9 ha 
1,214,333 
177,896 
599,980 
Pakistan Port Qasim 55% 24 ha 494,535 
Sri Lanka Colombo 16,25% 20 ha 146,205 
Russia Vostochny 25% 38 ha 68,084 
China Qingdao 
Shekou (to be de-
veloped)
29%
22.5% Phase I 
22.5% Phase II 
146 ha 
51 ha (com-
bined) 
1,087,358 
474,679 
Philippines  Manila 81.13% 21.5ha  642,858  
Thailand Laem Chabung 34.5% 18.2 ha  357,670 
Indonesia Surabaya 49% 73.8 ha 528,487 
Argentina Rio de Plata 53,1% 42 ha 499,278 
Canada Vancouver 100% 29 ha 346,995 
Australia Fremantle 
Brisbane 
Sydney
Melbourne
100%
100%
90%
100%
13.2 ha 
24 ha 
38,6 ha 
34 ha 
213,908 
352,553 
627,124 
723,708 
Mozambique Maputo 67% 8 ha 44,349 
France Le Havre 
Marseille
Fos
36.67 % 
20.4%
20.4%
48.3 ha 
27.7 ha 
19.5 ha 
354,478 
314,911 
352,000 
Belgium Antwerp 
Antwerp-Gateway 
(bulk)
100% (Derwaide, 
6thHarbour&Hanse)
42.5%
86 ha (Churchill 
not incl.) 
78 ha 
1,631,929 
n.a.
England Tilbury 
Southampton 
34%
51%
32ha
76,5ha
126,449 
1,441,011 
Table 5.10: P&O Ports portfolio acquired by DPW. (Source: website P&O Ports; cf. 
Jacobs & Hall, 2007).
5.4.5 Conclusion: an Emerging Empire 
The growth of Dubai from a small fishing village into the region’s leading centre of 
commerce and trade has been truly remarkable. Though oil has been the Emirate’s ini-
tial blessing, it has been the Emirate’s entrepreneurial spirit which enabled it to outper-
form its regional, oil-rich competitors. Its strategic focus on other economic sectors, in 
particular maritime trade, real estate and tourism has been the Emirate’s true blessing. 
And for good reason: it is expected that Dubai will be out of oil-reserves somewhere in 
the early 2010s. 
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The ports have been central to Dubai’s quest to become the “Singapore of the Middle 
East”. Through the construction of Port Rashid and Jebel Ali Port, Dubai was the first in 
the region that anticipated containerization. In combination with the Jebel Ali Free 
Zone, Dubai had put in place the physical conditions to become the region’s main con-
tainer-hub. At first, Dubai made use of the expertise from the private sector in the man-
agement of both ports. However in 1991 the stage was set to form the Dubai Ports Au-
thority. At that time, Dubai already handled over 1 million TEU’s per year. The best 
was still to come, as the Southeast Asian, Indian and Chinese economies witnessed ma-
jor growth during the 1990s, with the container traffic booming between Europe and 
Asia. The relative political stability in the Gulf- region during that period, in combina-
tion with Dubai’s favorable business climate and modern port facilities, made the ports 
prosper in the burgeoning world trade.  
The success of Dubai can only partly be explained by general market conditions and 
entrepreneurial spirit. Indeed, one of Dubai’s major institutional advantages is its territo-
rial regime, which resembles both a pre-modern tribal community and a twenty-first 
century multi-national corporation. Regarding the first element, Dubai’s leadership is 
hereditary and indisputable, with the members of the most important local families in 
control of both the government departments and/ or Dubai’s major commercial enter-
prises. As such, there is an intimate, historically developed interwoveness between the 
local state and the local merchant community. Regarding the latter element, the state 
resembles a multi-national corporation: it is run by an appointed, not democratically 
chosen, executive council; it is hardly supported by taxes; it has strategically integrated 
its operations, management and responsibilities both vertically and horizontally to create 
both functional-economic and spatial synergy; it has a multi-national workforce and it 
has spread its commercial wings across the globe. Dubai can be regarded as an urban 
growth machine or urban empire (cf. Chapter II) in which the PCFC can be regarded as 
the most successful (and also the most resourceful) department/ state-owned enterprise 
of Dubai (cf. Jacobs & Hall, 2007).
The embeddedness of Dubai Ports within such a territorial regime allowed it to thrive.  
With the PCFC in full control over the ports’ land, infra -and superstructure and with its 
ability to mobilize capital through its other divisions, the ports of Dubai are secured by a 
consolidated governance structure and with sufficient financial means to support the 
port’s development and policy. It can engage in strategic pricing through considerable 
discounts on the terminal tariffs and the custom duties that, in combination with effi-
cient procedures and operations, allow the shipping lines and their clients to capture 
value. Through the Jebel Ali Free Zone it has managed to lure much value-added logis-
tical activity into the port area. In doing so, many global production networks have be-
come territorially embedded in Dubai. At the same time, the territorial regime allowed 
the PCFC to take over terminal lease concessions in ports across the region and through 
the corporate takeovers of CSXWT and P&O Ports. In such as way PCFC has aggres-
sively been engaging in global production networks and become firmly embedded 
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within them. The networks of engagements of the PCFC have also created new spaces 
of dependence in places such as Hong Kong, Antwerp and Nheva Sheva. 
What to expect for the future? A general feature of empires is that they at a certain point 
start to collapse and disintegrate. This is not to say that Dubai’s fortunes are to turn. 
Dubai as a container hub and as global terminal operator is here to stay. But, it remains 
the question to what degree DPA can maintain a monopoly in Jebel Ali, especially when 
the regional market matures and new rivals (with the help of the private sector) emerge. 
Dubai’s position as the leading transshipment hub between Asia and Europe can to a 
large degree also be explained by the poor condition of Indian ports and the decline of 
established hubs such as Colombo and Aden. The Indian ports are however quickly 
modernizing their facilities. Even in Singapore, PSA had to enter into a joint venture 
agreement with COSCO after both Maersk-Sealand and Evergreen moved to Tanjung 
Pelepas in return for a dedicated terminal. The move from Dubai of some services of 
Maersk-Sealand to its own terminal in Salalah is in that respect illustrative. With the 
planned construction of three more terminals at Jebel Ali, the question rises therefore 
whether DPA will dedicate one of these terminals to one of the major shipping lines. In 
line with this scenario is the question to what degree DPA as the port authority can re-
main involved in container-handling or whether DPW should split off as a separate en-
tity, just as what happened in Singapore.  
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Chapter VI 
International Comparison
6.1 Introduction 
The study has looked at four ports in three regions in great detail. The aim of this chap-
ter is to draw empirical conclusions with regards to the main research question. In order 
to do so, this chapter starts with an overview of the principal developments in the port-
maritime sector as discussed in chapter four. This will be followed by a comparative 
overview of the case studies: ports’ history, regional competitive landscapes, structure 
of provisions and regime politics. We end with some concluding reflections.  
6.2 Competition in the Maritime Sector of the early 21st Century 
Starting point of our analyses was the structural developments in the port-maritime sec-
tor, caused by the mass application of the container. The transport cost- reducing effects 
of containerization facilitated international trade through the re-location of manufactur-
ing plants from Western Europe and the U.S. to low-wage countries, and this facilitated 
the emergence of new export-orientated industrialized powers, particularly in Pacific 
Asia. Rising consumer demand in the United States and Europe for high quality, but low 
cost goods (e.g. electronics, automobiles and toys) from these countries added and in-
tensified maritime trade routes. Japan was the first in the early 1970s, together with 
Singapore and Hong Kong, to make full advantage of this new spatial division of labor.
New container ports were quickly developed to stimulate national industrial growth and 
facilitate exports. They were soon followed by Korea, Taiwan and Malaysia during the 
1980s and eventually by the Peoples Republic of China in the 1990s. In 2006, the major-
ity of the world’s busiest ports can be found in Asia.  
In addition to the container, new communication technologies such as the computer and 
the internet allowed for efficiency gains by eliminating the large inventory costs of 
manufactures according to the principle of Just-in-Time. Until the mid 1970s, produc-
tion and manufacturing were still based upon the principle of Fordism: large firms that, 
in the search for economies of scale, had vertically integrated and internalized the whole 
production process, from obtaining raw materials to the delivery of finished products. In 
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the early 1980s, major manufacturers (the Toyota Motor Company from Japan is under-
stood as being the pioneer in that respect) started to outsource most of its production 
components, including distribution, to specialized suppliers. These specialized suppliers 
are expected to deliver the components to the manufacturers’ assembly lines for imme-
diate use, reducing to a minimum the inventory costs for the manufactures. With trans-
port-costs reduced, specialized suppliers could now be found across the globe, wherever 
the production costs for that particular component are most favorable. The elimination 
of national trade barriers under the Global Agreements on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) 
during the mid-1980s made outsourcing of production components even more economi-
cally viable. The latest communication technology allowed for easy and rapid transfer of 
information and the flexible matching of supply to demands. The principle of Just-in-
Time manufacturing allowed for flexible forms of production, specialization and 
economies of scope. In the early 21st century, much production is organized in flexible 
supply chains that are truly global in scope.  
The principle of Just-in-Time, and associated flexible global supply chains, generated 
new demands for the (maritime) transport sector: Just-in-Time logistics. Transporters do 
not produce goods, but are dependent on the geographical distance between supply and 
demand or between production centers and consumption markets. These are nowadays 
world’s apart and decentralized, which demands the optimal efficiency of the transport 
companies’ operations. The organization and efficiency of the logistical chain have be-
come integral to the performance of global supply chains. According to the demands of 
their customers, specialized logistical service providers (such as shipping lines, freight 
forwarders, railroad companies and terminal operators) in the search for economies of 
scale and scope started to integrate their services both vertically and horizontally during 
the late 1990s. In doing so, they effectively reduced uncertainty and transport costs 
through the internalization of transaction costs, the spread of risks and by entering new 
markets.
As a result, these private players have gained further control of the logistical chain and 
have increased their bargaining powers vis-à-vis port authorities. In addition, the ship-
ping lines have been involved in the scale-enlargement in containerized shipping. The 
size and capacity of ocean-going vessels has grown dramatically over the last few years, 
with vessels of 10,000 TEU and more currently in operation. This scale-enlargement 
creates new demands for major capital investments in the infrastructure and superstruc-
ture at the ports, if they want to handle these giants.  
6.3 International Comparison of Port Competition 
International comparative research into ports is scarce. A comparison of the four ports 
will be presented using the same structure as used for the individual case studies. Thus, 
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we start by looking at the port’s histories, then their contemporary regional competitive 
landscapes and their structure of provisions. Finally we look at recent illustrations of 
regime politics and how it led to institutional change. 
6.3.1 History 
The histories of the ports (and their host-cities) are unique stories in themselves. There 
are nevertheless some interesting historical and comparative lessons to be drawn. To 
start with, the four ports and their host cities have different development trajectories, 
which all have to do with the uneven development of capitalism. Europe has been the 
centre of international trade and world politics in modern history, up to the mid-
twentieth century. Rotterdam became a prominent trade depot in the Dutch Golden Age 
(17th century). During this period, the Dutch became the most dominant player in mer-
cantilist trade, navigation and exploration. The city of Dubai and the state of California 
did not even exist: it was from Rotterdam’s Delfshaven where the Pilgrim Fathers 
started their mission for the New World! 
In the Industrial Age of the late 19th century and early 20th century, Rotterdam started to 
thrive on the transshipment of raw materials to Germany’s main industrial centre, the 
Ruhr-area. In Southern California, adequate port facilities and rail-infrastructure were 
slowly but surely put in place that serviced the fast growing metropolis of Los Angeles 
and the agricultural production of California. In both countries, representatives from the 
business sector were initially the driving force behind the ports and cities development. 
In Rotterdam these politically influential entrepreneurs are still known as the Harbor 
Barons. In California, the Railroad Barons were the political economic elite that shaped 
the economic fortunes of the cities and ports. It was in Progressive America at the turn 
of the 20th century however, where port management and development first became a 
formalized public responsibility. The Harbor Departments of Los Angeles and Long 
Beach were put in place by both cities as early as in the 1910s to manage the port lands 
on behalf of the state. Although an underdog, the port of Long Beach turned out to have 
a strategic asset -oil- as opposed to its big neighbor. This allowed the port to keep up 
and heighten the competition by constructing the most modern facilities and by strategic 
pricing. In Rotterdam, the municipal port authority was officially founded in 1932 to 
coordinate the port’s fragmented development. It was through the efforts of initially the 
barons and, later, the local state that the ports could develop into the most modern in the 
region. Compared with the scale of the pre-war developments of the port-cities in Cali-
fornia and the Netherlands, Dubai was a primitive village where time had stood still. 
But times were to change! The world-economy recovered quickly after the Second 
World War.  The destruction of the war allowed Rotterdam to completely rebuilt and 
modernize its port with strong support of the national government. The port became the 
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cornerstone of national macro-economic and industrial politics in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Big petro-chemical refineries were stimulated to locate themselves at large, newly de-
veloped sites near the port. The companies acquired the ‘perpetual usufruct’ of the land 
almost for free. The ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach started to prosper from the 
(federally subsidized) mass re-location of manufacturing plants from the rust-belt of the 
Upper Midwest and the Northeast to the sprawling cities of the Southwest. The fortunes 
of dusty Dubai turned with the discovery of oil in 1968, allowing the local leaders fi-
nally to join the regional club of oil states. During this period all the ports were backed 
by strong and committed local political leadership, in Los Angeles in the form of long-
sitting mayors Yorty and Bradley, in Rotterdam by mayor Thomassen and the director 
of the port authority Posthuma, and in Dubai by Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum. 
Yet the most fundamental development in maritime transport was on the way, one that 
would revolutionize the business and fundamentally change the economic geography of 
shipping, industrial production and international trade: containerization. As Levinson 
put it (2006): “ [t]he box that made the world smaller and the world economy bigger”. 
This is what all the ports have in common and what secured their leading positions 
throughout the rest of the twentieth century: they all successfully anticipated containeri-
zation. The port Los Angeles already allowed pioneer Matson and APL to build and 
operate container terminals in 1960. The port of Long Beach responded directly. In Rot-
terdam, several local stevedore companies were merged to form Europe Combined 
Terminus (ECT) in 1966 which, with support of the port authority, started to devote 
themselves to the handling of containers. A major land fill project added some 5,000 
hectares to the port in 1970, which could immediately accommodate the explosive 
growth of containerized shipping. Dubai used its oil-wealth, as Long Beach had done for 
a long time but unlike its oil-rich neighbors, to construct the most modern port facilities 
in the region. Lacking the knowledge on how to manage and operate container termi-
nals, the government of Dubai initially contracted members from the private sector be-
fore setting up its own public port authority in 1991.  
6.3.2 Regional Competitive Landscapes 
The ports under study are located in three regions: Northwest Europe, U.S. West Coast 
and the Middle East. Each of the ports is the market leader within its region, but all have 
to deal with competitive pressures. These pressures are most notable in Northwest 
Europe, where Rotterdam has lost terrain during the 1990s. In particular, its direct rival 
Antwerp has invested considerably in port expansion projects, with the latest addition, 
the Deurganckdok starting operations in 2005. Another major port development in an 
advanced stage of completion is the JadeWeser Port nearby Bremerhaven. Closer to 
home, Rotterdam is faced with significant competitive pressures from Amsterdam and 
its Ceres-terminal. The development of the Westerschelde Containerterminal at the Port 
of Zeeland (nearby Flushing) is likely to be an expansion of PSA operations in Antwerp.  
The EU-enlargement to the east will more likely benefit the German ports, and new port 
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developments at the Black and Baltic Seas are on the cards. On the other hand, the Eu-
romax Terminal in Rotterdam will start operations in 2007, and with the construction of 
the Second Maasvlakte, Rotterdam will have a considerable increase in capacity.  
At the U.S. West Coast, the ports at the San Pedro Bay enjoy a very strong position. The 
ports of Oakland, Seattle and Tacoma are formidable competitors but lack the sheer 
capacity provided by Los Angeles and Long Beach. Those two remain each others main 
competitors. However their success is now turning against them, as they suffer from 
enormous congestion problems and locally expressed environmental concerns. The chal-
lenge for both ports is to increase the capacity of existing terminal space through a num-
ber of instruments, as well as to implement policies and regulation that will improve the 
direct environment of the ports. However, the ports are also dependent on the hopelessly 
congested hinterland transport system of Southern California, in which the Alameda 
Corridor will provide only small relief. It is here where the other ports at the U.S. West 
Coast have the advantage. The congestion problems, in combination with labor unrest, 
have made the shipping lines look for alternatives elsewhere, in particular Mexico. Even 
though port developments ‘south of the border’ are still in their infancy, experiences 
elsewhere in the world (e.g. Felixstowe, Giao Tauro, Algeciras, Salalah, Tanjung 
Telepas, Laem Chabang) have showed how the private sector can turn sleepy fishing 
towns into major container ports within a decade. 
In the Middle East, the competitive position of Dubai as the transshipment hub between 
Europe and Asia is virtually incontestable. Its main competitors have all failed to keep 
up in the last decade, mainly because of political reasons. Both Colombo and Aden have 
been plagued by civil war, whereas the port of Bandar Abbas suffers from the lack of 
trade agreements between Iran and the West. Other ports in the Gulf such as Abu Dhabi, 
Sharjah City and Damman have been too slow to anticipate developments in the sector. 
Besides, these places all lack the coherent growth strategy, entrepreneurial spirit and 
cosmopolitan appeal, which by Dubai make the competitive difference. The port of 
Khor Fakkan at the Arabian Sea is a serious player, but its space to expand will soon 
reach its limits. The management of the neighboring port of Fujairah has been trans-
ferred to Dubai. The port of the fast growing city of Jeddah along the Red Sea has a lot 
of potential, but here too Dubai has become a stakeholder. The only serious competitor 
is Salalah in Oman, where APM has developed a state-of-the-art container terminal. The 
Omani government is also developing a Free Zone near the port, hoping to enjoy the 
same success as Dubai. Another challenge for Dubai comes from the Indian ports. Noto-
rious for being hopelessly inefficient, the ports on the Subcontinent are nowadays 
quickly being modernized and their management is being restructured in order to facili-
tate the enormous economic growth of the world’s second most populous country. 
Though the development of efficient mega-terminals in India will definitely affect the 
position of the port of Dubai as a transshipment hub, Dubai will still be able indirectly to 
capture value and thrive, through the terminals operations which it has acquired in the 
major ports of India. 
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6.3.3 Structure of Port Provisions 
The structure of port provisions have been discussed in three categories: physical condi-
tions, institutional arrangements and governance structure. These categories will now be 
compared between the four ports studied in a similar way.  
(1)Physical Conditions: The first category refers to the actual physical conditions of the 
port, in casu the quality and capacity of the port’s infra -and superstructure and the de-
velopment capacity of the harbor area. The port of Rotterdam is with 10,500 ha the larg-
est port by far. The ports at the San Pedro Bay together offer some 6,000 ha, while Du-
bai Ports including the Free Zone offer around 950 ha. The differences in size can be 
attributed to the fact that Rotterdam also hosts one of the world’s largest petro-chemical 
complexes, while Dubai is mainly specialized in the transshipment of containers. The 
ports of Rotterdam and Long Beach can offer depths of 22-23 meters and are at this 
moment ready to accommodate the largest container vessels in the business. The depths 
of Dubai (17 meters) and Los Angeles (16 meters) are sufficient to handle the majority 
of the container-vessels, but both ports need dredging if they want to accommodate the 
latest generation of container-vessels also. 
With regard of hinterland connections, the port of Rotterdam stands out, since it can 
truly offer multi-modal transfer possibilities. Its location on Europe’s main river delta 
provides the port with a competitive advantage over Antwerp and its competitors in 
Northern Germany. The port’s rail connection has been improved by the construction of 
the Betuweline, the direct freight link with Germany. However, road trucking remains 
the most dominant modality, and congestion problems are a major headache for trans-
port planners in the Netherlands. Road pricing has been on the political agenda for years 
now, but still lacks sufficient support. Southern California lacks an extensive river sys-
tem and the ports are completely reliant on transport by truck and rail. The harbor de-
partments of Los Angeles and Long Beach have acted together over the last twenty 
years to improve their hinterland connections by rail. They jointly developed and own 
the Intermodal Container Transfer Facility, and they have individually upgraded and 
provided on-dock rail facilities. Both ports also successfully lobbied for the construction 
of the Alameda Corridor, which is managed under a joint-powers agreement by both 
harbor departments and the Los Angeles County. In spite of these projects, the ports 
remain highly reliant on trucking, and suffer from the hopelessly congested roads in 
Southern California. Both ports therefore joined forces to lobby for the much needed 
state and federal funding to upgrade the regional highway system. The ports and other 
responsible authorities are studying the possibilities for road pricing, the development of 
separate truck lanes, as well as stimulating trucking in off-peak hours. Another measure 
to reduce truck movements is the development of (virtual) inland container terminals.  
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Being mainly a transshipment hub between the Far East and Europe and with a sparsely 
populated desert interior, Dubai has no need of hinterland connections as Rotterdam or 
Southern California do. Dubai’s main hinterland is India and Iran, which are serviced by 
feeders. The location of the region’s main production centre, the Jebel Ali Free Zone, is 
directly at the port, and numerous highways connect the port with the urban centers on 
the Arabian Peninsula. As of yet, Dubai does not need a regional integrated rail-system, 
nor does it miss a navigable river system. The highways within Dubai City, especially 
along the coast, are however becoming highly congested, which is starting to affect the 
trucking to local markets. The development of inland container storage facilities is cur-
rently being studied as one of the possible solutions. 
As regards the superstructure there are some considerable differences. In Los Angeles 
and Long Beach, most of the container terminals have been dedicated to the major ship-
ping lines since the early beginnings of containerized traffic. The shipping lines have 
either set up joint-ventures with local stevedore companies or they run the terminals 
with their own stevedore divisions such APM in LA. The exceptions are the three com-
mon-user terminals in Long Beach run by Stevedore Services of America. In Rotterdam, 
ECT-HPH enjoys a near monopoly in container handling. The other locally based com-
petitor, Hanno, was easy prey for the giant from Hong Kong. Intra-port competition 
between operators is thus limited in Rotterdam. APM has however entered the competi-
tion, with its own terminal at the Maasvlakte. In June 2006, APM also signed a contact 
with the port authority to run a 176 ha. container terminal, the first one to be developed 
at the Second Maasvlakte and which is expected to be operational in 2014. The port of 
Rotterdam furthermore wants to find a third major player for the terminals at the Second 
Maasvlakte, and in this way is actively trying to stimulate the intra-port competition 
between operators. The situation in Dubai is simple: all the superstructure is in the hands 
of the port authority DPA, since it is also the main operator. The question here is for 
how long DPA will be able to maintain its monopoly. 
(2) Institutional Arrangements: The port authorities in all the ports in question are the 
owners or developers of most the infrastructure on port lands (streets, lighting, traffic 
signs, garbage disposal, quay walls, channels) and therefore completely responsible for 
that infrastructure within the port. Ownership of the land itself is however arranged 
somewhat differently. In Rotterdam, the port lands remain in ultimate ownership of the 
municipality, and the port authority has the perpetual usufruct over them.  It has the 
freedom to sublease the user-rights to private port users- such as terminal operators- for 
a period of 25 years or more, as long as it pays a fixed amount of ground rent to the 
local government. In Los Angeles and Long Beach, the ultimate ownership of the port 
lands is in the hands of the State of California. While the state allows the municipal 
harbor departments of both cities to transfer the user-rights of the land to private port 
users, that has to be in accordance with the obligations as set by the Tideland Trust Act 
of 1911. Since the harbor departments are proprietary departments of their municipali-
ties, they do not have to transfer revenues from the lease to the local treasury, and they 
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are in that respect completely financially independent. In Dubai the situation is different 
again, with the ownership of the land ultimately residing with the Emir or local ruler.  
In terms of the tariffs, all the port authorities provide discounts to attract shipping lines 
and their cargo. A major difference between the ports is that in Dubai, the port authority 
(DPA) is also the terminal operator and can therefore directly determine the terminal 
tariffs. In Rotterdam and at the San Pedro Bay, the port authorities do not operate termi-
nals themselves. It is here where DPA seems to have a strategic advantage, since it can 
provide direct discounts to the shipping lines through the terminal tariffs. The shipping 
lines on their turn can provide discounts to the shippers through the terminal handling 
charges or THC (THC are charged by the operator, but billed by the shipping line and 
paid by the shipper or cargo owner). DPA provides discounts up to 48% when a certain 
amount of moves are guaranteed. DPA does however not acquire any lease income from 
the land. DPA also discourages the trucking of containers from other ports to Dubai 
through the Port Receiving Charge. Rotterdam does provide discounts on the lease of 
land and the tariffs, depending on the tenant and/ or the amount of cargo it will bring in. 
The tariffs used to be set by the municipal council, constraining the possibility to engage 
in strategic pricing. This has however been changed with the corporatization of the port 
authority in 2004. Rotterdam is the most expensive port in the region, which is possible 
because of its most favorable geographical location. At the San Pedro Bay, the tariffs 
are coordinated through the California Association of Port Authorities and are adjusted 
to market trends. A considerable difference between the two ports is in the leasing pol-
icy. In Los Angeles, the negotiations over available leaseholds are open to third parties 
and the public, whereas in Long Beach this is done behind closed doors. This allows for 
more entrepreneurial freedom and strategic action in Long Beach. Furthermore, con-
tracts longer than five years need city council approval in Los Angeles. 
As regards the costs of labor, which is associated with the position of the labor unions 
and the application of new technology, the ports at the San Pedro Bay seem to have the 
most old-fashioned, if not outdated, arrangement. The labor union ILWU remains a very 
powerful and militant player, with the jurisdiction over port labor at all the ports at the 
U.S. West Coast. This union has been successfully protecting the jobs and the social 
benefits of the longshoremen, but at the cost of modernization. It is only under the latest 
6-year collective agreement of 2002 that the terminal operators are allowed to imple-
ment the new technology that would improve the efficiency of the terminals and the 
ports. A situation such as at ECT Deltaterminals in Rotterdam, where robotic Auto-
mated Guided Vehicles are doing all the stacking of containers, seems unimaginable in 
Southern California or anywhere else in the U.S. for that matter. 
Dubai seems have the most ‘relaxed’ situation since unionized forms of labor are not 
allowed in the port or elsewhere in the Emirate. The supply of labor from the Indian 
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Subcontinent is furthermore virtually inexhaustible, which in combination with the lack 
of collective agreements, allows for easy substitution of the labor force. Dubai can also 
apply state-of-the-art technology without any labor resistance. Longshoremen in Dubai 
are however relatively well-paid, definitely compared with much of the labor force’s 
home countries or with wages in other ‘blue-collar’ sectors in the Emirate. The port 
authority also needs to invest in training the labor force, in order to let them operate the 
latest generation of cranes and other new technology. 
The situation is rather similar when looking at environmental legislation and commu-
nity-outreach. Environmental pressure groups are not tolerated in Dubai, nor do com-
munities have the means to voice their concerns on major development projects. There 
are no time consuming procedures and public hearings in Dubai. This does not imply 
that the government of Dubai, or the port authority do not take into account environ-
mental issues. It remains however the sole domain of the government. Symbolic for this 
technocratic attitude is the construction of major residential development projects 
nearby Jebel Ali Port (e.g. Dubai Waterfront), most of them constructed by the port’s 
real estate developer Nakheel, without any public consultation. This situation is com-
pletely unthinkable in both the Netherlands and California, where major infrastructure 
projects and industrial development are subjected to a range of environmental and plan-
ning regulations set up by the state and are carefully monitored by NGO’s or civic inter-
est groups. The time consuming procedures can frustrate the development of the ports. 
The ‘green light’ for the construction of the Second Maasvlakte was delayed by the 
Dutch Senate in 2005 because the plan had not sufficiently taken into account the EU 
Habitat-Guidelines, which protects some breeding grounds of fish-species in nearby 
waters. In California, the redevelopment of the West Basin Container Terminal, home of 
the China Shipping Line, has been delayed after the court ruled in favor of the Natural 
Resources Defense Council and the community of San Pedro, that the Environmental 
Impact Report set up by the port authority of Los Angeles was not in order.  
(3) Governance Structure: The differences in governance structure also are consider-
able, even between the neighboring ports at the San Pedro Bay. Dubai - a public service 
port- is the most outstanding case: whereas the other ports can be classified as landlord 
ports. But the governance structure of the Dubai Ports stands out for another reason, and 
that is its corporate ties and its symbiotic relationship with the growth strategies of the 
local state. The port authority of Dubai is part of a much larger conglomerate, the Ports 
Customs & Free Zone Corporation, through which it can mobilize huge amounts of 
capital and income including custom duties. The PCFC in its turn forms a separate Di-
rectorate or government department, in which the Director-General is a member of Du-
bai’s Executive Council and is directly accountable to the Emir. The PCFC is the key 
organization in the Emirate’s growth ambition to become the ‘Singapore of the Middle 
East’ by the year 2010: a thriving urban economy not supported by any natural endow-
ments.
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At the San Pedro Bay, the governance-structures of Los Angeles and Long Beach seem 
rather similar: both the port authorities are departments of their respective cities that 
manage the lands on behalf of the state of California under the 1911 Tidelands Trust; 
both Harbor Departments are governed by a 5 member Board of Commissioners; and 
both departments are considered as the crown-jewels of their cities. There are some 
important, historically grown differences. The governance structure in Long Beach 
seems to be less politicized, and allows the Harbor Department to operate more inde-
pendently from City Hall, especially in terms of contract and tariff related issues. In 
Rotterdam, the port authority used to be under control of the municipal council, with a 
special commission dealing with the port’s development and policy. The municipal 
council also set the tariffs and appointed the port authority’s executive director. Since 
the mid-1990s, this governance model became increasingly criticized as unrealistic, as it 
constrained the port authority’s entrepreneurial freedom to engage in strategic action. In 
2004 the port authority was corporatized, with the municipality of Rotterdam and the 
national government as major shareholders. Under the new governance structure, the 
port is governed by a Board of Commissioners which appoints the CEO of the port au-
thority. The port authority is also free to negotiate contracts and fix the tariffs. Although 
the municipality remains the owner of the ports’ land and has a 2/3 equity in the port 
authority, the involvement of the municipal council in the ports’ daily affairs and strate-
gic policy has been effectively removed. 
6.3.4 Regime Politics and Institutional Change 
The remaining parts of the case studies described how port-dependent agents engaged in 
regime politics throughout the 1990s in order to influence and change the ports’ struc-
ture of provision. The port and city of Rotterdam regained national political importance 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The port was designated as ‘mainport’, which was 
part of a wider strategic agenda to strengthen the competitive assets of the national 
economy in a Single European Market. Under this favorable national political climate, 
the port authority and port-dependent agents from the business sector started with suc-
cess to lobby for major investment programs. The Mainport-coalition secured the con-
struction of a direct freight-only rail link between the port and Germany and, in addi-
tion, placed the desired port expansion with the Second Maasvlakte back on the national 
political agenda. In 1996, the port authority addressed the need for more commercial 
freedom and less political control by the municipal council. The idea of privatization 
was also supported by the port’s business community and the national government, but 
initially lacked the local political support of the leading Labor Party in the municipal 
council. The municipal council eventually did agree on more commercial freedom for 
the port authority, however within the existing structure of a municipal service provider. 
After the Labor Party lost in the local elections of 2002, the new right wing government 
made quick work of the issue of port governance. Under a special motion, it was de-
cided that the port authority was allowed to corporatize as of January 2004, in which the 
national government could take a 1/3 equity in the port. The value of the national gov-
ernment’s equity, some €500 million, could then be used for the construction of the 
Second Maasvlakte. 
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In Southern California, the political momentum for growth slipped away during the 
1990s. Although both ports managed to secure the construction of the Alameda Corri-
dor, regime politics started to turn against the Harbor Departments, especially in Los 
Angeles. First of all, many cities in California were facing budgetary problems as a re-
sult of a new property tax system. The local governments of Los Angeles and Long 
Beach turned to the ports for financial relief, although this was not in accordance with 
the 1911 Tidelands Trust that rules that port revenues can only be invested in tidelands 
designated by the state. This resulted in a legal conflict with the State Lands Commis-
sion which enforces the Tidelands Trust. Secondly, the city of Los Angeles experienced 
major political turmoil in the aftermath of the 1992 LA riots and the new property tax 
system. In many of the city’s electoral districts, including the harbor communities, se-
cession movements actively tried to gain independence from the City of Los Angeles. 
Although they were unsuccessful, they managed to gain political leverage at City Hall 
and at the Harbor Department. Environmental issues and community concerns gained 
prominence on both ports’ agendas. Illustrative for this political climate is the introduc-
tion of an open leasing policy in Los Angeles in order to create more transparency in the 
port’s strategic decision-making. Regime politics made the Harbor Departments look for 
alternative ways to accommodate the growth in containerized traffic than just another 
land fill project. The labor lockout in 2001 and the ongoing congestion in the ports’ 
shared hinterland have made the shipping lines look for alternatives elsewhere, in par-
ticularly Mexico. In spite of common challenges and dependencies, the merger or con-
solidation of the two ports remains out of the question, due to the fact that both ports are 
regarded by the municipalities as vital economic assets of the local economy.  
In Dubai, the ports have been the cornerstones of the Emirate’s aggressive growth strat-
egy from the moment oil-revenues became available in the early 1970s. Dubai’s growth 
agenda has been explicitly aimed at reinvesting the petro-dollars into the diversification 
of the economy, as the oil-reserves are expected to run out near 2010. In 1991, the man-
agements of the two ports were merged to form the Dubai Ports Authority. During the 
late 1990s, DPA started to expand its business abroad rapidly, in its ambition to become 
an international terminal operator and to face competitive challenges. Dubai’s leading 
position as the major transshipment hub between Europe and Far East came under pres-
sure as new ports in the region with a superior geographical location were being devel-
oped. In order to counter this threat Dubai initially set up an international division that 
targeted terminal lease-concessions in several ports in strategic markets across the re-
gion. In 2001, DPA and its international division became part of the state-owned enter-
prise Ports Customs & Free Zone Corporation. Through two major takeovers -CSX 
World Terminals and P&O Ports- PCFC has truly become a global player in port man-
agement and development with operations in major ports across the world.  
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6.4 Empirical Reflections
It is now time to look back at the empirical data and reflect upon the empirical research 
that has been carried out. Were the research methods appropriate? How valid and reli-
able are the research findings? The case study-approach was chosen because of the 
qualitative nature of the research. The applied methods proved to be adequate, and the 
interviews which were one of those methods were of enormous value. The face-to-face 
interviews were especially valuable since the research dealt with sensitive issues such as 
‘strategy’, ‘power’ and ‘business relationships’, about which organizations are in gen-
eral not very open. In that respect the quality of the interviews and not the number of 
interviews is important. The interviews were in most cases with senior managers of the 
port authorities or the port business community. It would have been better to have con-
ducted more interviews with representatives from levels of government or the major 
companies involved in the international transport of containers, but there was too little 
time for this. As a result, the research is rather centered on the role and behavior of the 
port authority. 
The selection of cases was based upon on three reasons: the leading roles of the ports in 
containerized transport within their region, their embeddedness within a particular terri-
torial regime and the possibility to communicate in either English or Dutch. Other pos-
sible case studies would have been Singapore or Hong Kong, but a choice had to be 
made because of limited resources. Regarding the analysis of the territorial regime, with 
the benefit of hindsight, it would have been better to have analyzed this separately in 
each case, rather than more or less integrated within the different sections of each case 
study. 
Regarding the individual case studies, Dubai is without a doubt the most problematic for 
a number of reasons. First, not much had been published about Dubai at the time of the 
research, aside from some press announcements on the launch or success of some of the 
extra-ordinary urban development projects. Critical and academic work on Dubai, and 
even more so on the ports there, was more or less absent. This made little to draw upon, 
but on the other hand provided an interesting gap to fill. In addition, there is the danger 
of ‘bias’ by the researcher. Though this danger always lurks below the surface of any 
qualitative research, it becomes especially relevant when doing international compara-
tive research and even more crucial when looking as a researcher with ‘Western eyes’ at 
a region as the Middle East. As stated by Elsheshtawy (2004), much of what has actu-
ally been written (and socially reproduced) in the West on the Middle East has been 
done by Westerners. In a true critical realism-fashion and structuralist tradition one 
could go as far as to state that the acclaimed ‘universalism’ of scientific method and 
research are both instrumental and subjected to the geopolitical and economic interests 
of the West with its, often implicit, claims of ‘moral superiority’. I do not want go that 
far, but I as a Dutchmen cannot claim to be completely unbiased regarding the research 
conducted abroad. 
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More significantly for the outcome of the research in Dubai were problems related to the 
accessibility of reliable data. These problems can be associated to rather intangible fac-
tors such as language and culture, as well as to more structural features of Dubai’s soci-
ety. Although the UAE are officially bi-lingual with English and Arabic as the official 
languages used by the government, this does not automatically imply that there is a 
‘common understanding’ in English. It would have made a difference if I was able to 
speak and read Arabic, not only because some of the written documents were only 
available in Arabic. The ability to speak in the native tongue during interviews with 
locals could perhaps have invoked them to speak more openly or to open bureaucratic 
doors. Noteworthy in this respect was that the most useful information was provided by 
the expatriate workers, although most of them were quick to call upon their anonymity 
or to make statements ‘off the record’. This latter aspect is related to the more structural 
features of Dubai (and of many other societies in the region in that respect).
The lack of democratic institutions and an empowered civil society has made it indeed 
much more difficult to acquire and verify data.  For example, the press is state con-
trolled and censored, (although it enjoys more freedom than for example in Saudi Ara-
bia), which leaves out a critical source of information. Academic institutes are almost 
entirely sponsored or controlled by the state. There are no NGO’s active in Dubai which 
might provide views on Dubai’s development and state of affairs alternative to the offi-
cial statements by the government. As mentioned above, expatriate workers and foreign 
businesses are careful in what they say during interviews, out of fear for government 
reprisals in the form of the termination of their visas or lucrative contracts. As one will 
quickly notice when working in Dubai as an expatriate, there are a lot of ‘rumors’ in 
Dubai. These rumors provide good hints (in most cases the only hints) in what to look 
and critically ask for when dealing with the official governmental channels. However, 
most of the critical issues were often quickly denied by the officials in interviews, re-
futed as unable-to-answer-without-the-approval-of-my-superiors or (at best) responded 
to with ‘off the record’ statements. Alternative research methods such as a survey might 
in this case be more appropriate as it would have allowed the respondents to express 
their opinions more freely and anonymously, without the fear of reprisals by their supe-
riors or the risk of being personally linked to the research results. 
Generally speaking there is a severe lack of transparency in Dubai’s state apparatus, and 
the intrinsic and intimate relationships between government agencies and local busi-
nesses make it even more confusing to discern the public from the private sector. With-
out direct access to the rulers of Dubai, the emir and his associates of the Executive 
Council, it is hard to tell what the real motives are behind Dubai’s growth strategy, what 
private interests are at stake, how government money is allocated and transferred etc. 
This direct access to the top is hard to achieve for most foreigners, especially if they do 
not bring in investments, let alone to a scholar with critical questions. Thus, the irony of 
it is that the reason for including Dubai into the research- the unique features of its po-
litical economy- also placed considerable constraints on acquiring reliable and verifiable 
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data. Doing academic fieldwork in a non-democratic state where critical questions about 
government actions are not welcome requires in that respect a special approach in itself. 
Nevertheless, I am confident to state that the research results found in Dubai are valid 
and reliable and where ‘the rumors’ could not be verified it has been explicitly stated in 
the case study. 
Collecting the information for other two case studies was considerably easier. In particu-
lar, there were sufficient sources to be able to check what source said about a certain 
subject against what other sources said about that same subject (the method of triangula-
tion). For that reason, I am more confident about the validity of statements about Rot-
terdam and Los Angeles and Long Beach than statements about Dubai.
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Chapter VII 
Conclusions and Theoretical Reflections 
7.1 Introduction 
In the early 21st century, ports are facing the processes of containerization, organiza-
tional restructuring and the global integration of supply chains. What we observe is a 
trend towards integration of activities and services by firms. Shipping lines, private ter-
minal operators and land-based hinterland transporters have rationalized and integrated 
their operations and services through strategic alignments, corporate takeovers and ap-
plication of new technologies. In this way, the bargaining power of these players (about 
tariffs, terminal lease concessions and service provision) has grown considerably vis-à-
vis (public) port authorities that are, in contrast to the shipping firms, constrained by 
their physical immobility and political accountability to the public. At the same time, we 
witness a process of market maturation: with the ongoing growth of containerization, 
new private container ports and port operators are entering the regional competitive 
game. That makes established ports reconsider their services, overall capacity, property 
rights arrangements, pricing policies and hinterland connections; all issues directly re-
lated to the ‘structure of provision’ of the port. This is the reason for our asking the re-
search question: how do port-dependent agents change the port’s institutional and mate-
rial structure in order to optimize their competitive positions in the international trans-
port of containers? 
The answer to this research question is given explicitly in section 7.3. In the next section 
we readdress the main propositions upon which the research in this book is based, as 
well as the main theories that inspired the development of our conceptual model. This 
final chapter concludes with a theoretical reflection.
7.2 Theoretical Approach 
The research in this book is based upon the following five propositions. First, port de-
pendent agents, most notably port authorities (but also operators, labor unions, hinter-
land transporters, governmental departments) want to maintain and strengthen the com-
petitiveness of the port, since these agents are to some degree dependent on the growth 
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of the port through their investments in the port’s built environment and through profits, 
wages, taxes and jobs. This is a rational response to changing regional market conditions 
and to structural developments at a more global level. The second proposition is that 
institutions matter in the economic performance of ports. Institutions, understood as a 
set of formalized social relations, constrain and enable economic behavior in a territori-
ally/ geographically discriminatory way. Institutions such as tariffs and labor laws have 
become instrumental in the quest for competitive advantage. The third proposition is 
that institutional change will not necessarily lead to increased economic performance, 
due to lock-in effects, compromises, incrementalism, or unique or unusual events such 
as a terrorist attack. The fourth proposition is directly related to this latter one. Although 
the competition between ports might lead to some convergence (e.g. stronger role of the 
private sector in port operations, development, finance and management) it will not 
necessarily lead to exactly similar institutional structures or a universal model because 
of contingent factors such as local politics, the role of the (nation-) state, history and the 
embeddedness of firms and communities. The fifth and final proposition is that when 
the global integration of supply chains materializes through investments in the built 
environment of ports, this happens under new forms of regulation that are formulated at 
various scales. This implies that the gamut of strategic actors involved in port develop-
ment and governance has widened from the urban-regional to the national-international 
level.
Against the background of propositions sketched in the previous section, we deployed 
an analytical model (cf. par 2.7) that allowed to study the complex realities and materi-
ality of the interrelationships between institutions (and other forms of social relation-
ships) and the behavior and role of port-dependent agents within the multi-scalar context 
of port competition. Port competition has been defined as a territorial governance proc-
ess in which port dependent agents (both public and private and at various scales) en-
gage in strategic action to strengthen the competitive position of the port. For this pur-
pose we borrowed ideas from Regulation Theory, New Urban Politics, and the Global 
Production Network Perspective and the Structure-of-Provision approach.
7.3 Answer to the Research Question 
It is now time to answer the research question: how do port-dependent agents change 
the port’s institutional and physical structure in order to optimize their competitive po-
sitions in the international transport of containers? We observe shifting interactions 
between agents at various spatial scales as a result of changing positions and dependen-
cies of the agents involved in the international transport of containers. The world wide 
distribution of goods is more and more organized in global integrated logistical chains 
and networks. Shipping lines in particular have been involved in processes of both hori-
zontal and vertical integration and in this way have gained more control and power over 
the global logistical chain. A global company such as the A.P. Möller- Maersk Group, 
for example, includes the world’s largest shipping line (Maersk-Sealand), one of the 
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world’s largest terminal operators (APM Terminals) and furthermore owns several 
feeder services (Norfolk Line) and rail services (European Rail Shuttle). It can offer 
shippers completely integrated transport from a production centre in China to a con-
sumer-market in Germany.  
In order for port authorities and locally based port-dependent agents (such as terminal 
operators and hinterland transporters) to remain competitive, they must become embed-
ded within these global production networks. The fact that many different agents are 
dependent on the port’s performance stimulates collective actions through the formation 
of coalitions and the coordination of strategic action. In order for port-dependent agents 
to strengthen the performance of the port and consequently their own position, their 
collective strategies are aimed at changing the “structure of provision” of the port. The 
most appropriate agent in this respect is the port authority, since it has ultimate public 
responsibility over the port’s overall performance, and it holds ultimate regulatory 
power within the port.  
The most obvious and traditional way in which a port authority attracts container flows 
and becomes embedded in these global networks is to offer sufficient capacity and com-
petitive infrastructures, and to guarantee efficiency. The increase in size of ocean-going 
container carriers and the overall growth of containerized transport demand this. How-
ever just offering a piece of land or sufficient depths of the port’s channels is not 
enough, especially in a region where there is oversupply or competitive alternatives. 
Port authorities therefore try to attract shipping lines and their cargo by offering extra 
benefits. One way is to offer dedicated container terminals to shipping lines, who are 
then guaranteed berthing space and who can internalize the terminal handling charges.. 
Another way port authorities attract container flows is to engage in strategic pricing and 
to provide discounts on either the lease of land or the port tariffs. These discounts are 
mostly based upon certain container thresholds that a shipping line or operator guaran-
tees to bring in or to handle. The discounts are most of the time negotiated behind closed 
doors.
However, the historically grown institutional and organizational constraints and depend-
encies of a port authority have an important influence on its ‘capacity to act’ and on its 
strategic possibilities. We have seen, for example, a case in which a port authority is not 
allowed by law to use its revenues to develop sites inland or outside its jurisdiction. In 
another case, the port authority can strategically invest in ports across the region, effec-
tively transforming itself into a trans-national terminal operator. Similarly, some port 
authorities are not constrained in their pricing policy, whereas others are subjected to 
political decision-making over tariffs. Port authorities also are responsible for a number 
of public duties not directly related to commercial interests such as safety, security and 
issues related to environmental quality. 
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The interests and stakes of other port dependent agents (i.e. other than the port authori-
ties) are less simple to reveal, and their commitment to the port’s performance as a 
whole is largely determined by their degree of dependency. Some terminal operators 
have invested substantially in the superstructure of the port, which commits the operator 
for a period of time to the port. The terminal operator can, however, leave the port when 
investments made have been recouped and profits have dried up. In a worst case sce-
nario, the costs of pulling back during contract time are less than continuing the opera-
tions. The dependency of the operators nowadays stretches along corporate ties and 
logistical networks to distant locations in the port’s fore- and hinterlands. The primary 
interests of operators are profits and continuity. Hinterland transporters are also to dif-
ferent degrees dependent on the port for their business. Especially railroad companies, 
due to their large fixed costs in rail-infrastructure (or in the user-rights), are literally tied 
to ground. Also barge operators are, precisely because of the nature of their business, 
tied to the rivers that connect the port with inland sites. These port dependent agents are 
themselves organized in several branch associations which lobby the port authority and 
the government for their specific interests. Not all port-dependent agents are totally 
committed to the growth of the port. Labor unions for example are not always in favor 
of growth per se, if that would be accompanied by the loss of jobs or social benefits. 
Some port-dependent agents might not be interested in growth at all, e.g. environmental-
ists and local communities. They can organize themselves in powerful (multi-scalar) 
coalitions and networks of engagement that are able to delay port development and frus-
trate growth agendas.
The embeddedness of ports and port dependent agents in these global logistical net-
works is therefore crucial in their quest to remain competitive. However, ports are not 
only embedded within these logistical networks but also within a politicized territorial 
regime that can exercise considerable control over the port’s development, especially 
through the actions of the state. The state can indeed have a decisive role in the competi-
tiveness of ports. Ports are, for instance, usually dependent on the state for the finance 
and construction of the port’s hinterland infrastructure. The influence of the state further 
includes strategic trade agreements, environmental legislation, labor and immigration 
laws, taxes and customs. Its contribution and role largely depend on its own constitu-
tional structure, administrative expertise, economic condition, and political system. In 
the fast growing and moving world of containerized traffic, democratic states are con-
strained in their support for port development by the wide variety of interests of its con-
stituency, in which ‘cargo does not vote’. States have subsequently set up all kinds of 
legislation and procedures to deal with the social costs of port development and growth. 
Non-democratic states do not have the ‘burdens’ of public accountability and political 
opposition, but often lack the means (capital, knowledge), economic base (imports and 
exports, consumer-markets) and willingness to invest in ports. Exceptions are some 
rather autocratic states, e.g. Dubai and countries in Asia, which progressively pursue 
economic development through mercantilist policies and large scale investments in port 
infrastructure. Some of these states have also been actively involved in stimulating the 
creation of a ‘national champion’ (shipping line or terminal operator) in the interna-
tional maritime sector, that is a territorially embedded firm that can successfully engage 
and compete within a global production network.  
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In their turn, states operate in an international arena in which all kinds of regulatory 
agreements for international trade are set through the World Trade Organisation. Other 
forms of international regulation are formulated by the United Nations’ International 
Maritime Organisation, which deals with safety and security and the use of the world’s 
oceans. But at a regional level also, nation-states are involved in all kinds of interna-
tional strategic agenda’s of political cooperation, institutional coordination and eco-
nomic integration. Supra-national regional trade blocks have been formed during the 
1990s such as the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) between the U.S., 
Canada and Mexico, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) between the Arab coun-
tries of the Persian Gulf. These blocks are formed to facilitate trade among its members 
by easing customs procedures and eliminating trade barriers. The most significant in that 
respect is the European Union, with its common internal market, customs union and 
high degree of political integration. The EU has set up all kinds of regulation and has 
formulated policies that directly affect the performance of ports. The EU’s environ-
mental legislation in particular, such as the Bird & Habitat Guidelines and the obligatory 
Environmental Impact Assessments for major development projects are constraining 
port expansion and they are useful instruments for environmental pressure groups to 
gain leverage. In addition, the EU has set up regulations which prohibit member-states 
from subsidizing their ports and port development, as it would distort the common mar-
ket. These kinds of regulations prevent EU member states from creating ‘national cham-
pions’, even though these member states often try to secure the interests of their port 
dependent agents.
The study concludes that competition within the maritime transport sector is not solely 
an economic game being played out between fully rational and completely informed 
agents. Neither does it unfold according to the ‘Invisible Hand’ of some God-given set 
of rules of ‘fair play’, nor does it ultimately results in some competitive equilibrium in 
which it is no player’s interest to change the way the game is played. Rather, competi-
tion must be understood as a historically and institutionally biased process which favors 
some sectors over others, some agents over others and some territories over others. This 
study has made clear how the economic activity of ports and strategic actions of port 
dependent agents are both constrained and enabled by path dependent institutional struc-
tures and territorially-bounded political agendas. Thus, in spite of the neo-classical eco-
nomic ( neo-liberal) call  for the establishment of economic level playing fields in the 
spirit of the ‘free market’- ideology, the market economy remains a ‘public creation’ 
subjected to political contests over the ‘rules of the game’ at any spatial level.  
It is only by taking into account the historical-materialism of port competition, that we 
observe the fundamental role of agency in the evolution of institutions and local eco-
nomic development. The case studies have shown how agents operating at various levels 
try to strategically position and maneuver themselves institutionally and politically, to 
gain a competitive edge over others. This strategic behavior results in new rules of the 
game, new spaces of dependency and new spaces of engagements: from the local to the 
157
Krips
global. Competition is therefore not only a structural feature of the (global) market 
economy, but also the outcome of strategic and political interaction among public and 
private agents in space. 
7.4 Theoretical Reflections 
It is time to reflect upon our theoretical endeavor. The conceptual model in its present 
form is rather holistic in its approach. The case studies provide further specification of 
the conceptual relationships, in terms of what constitutes a space of dependence and 
space of engagement of different agents within different institutional contexts. By look-
ing at ‘structures of provisions’ we were able to show how the processes of local institu-
tional embeddedness occurred within the maritime sector and what the historical role of 
agency is in structural developments. However, the model still requires fine tuning.  
For example, the link between a particular ‘structure of port provision’ and the eco-
nomic performance of ports has not been examined in this study. Within the academic 
debate, this remains an important question (cf. Brooks & Cullinane, 2006): is there a 
particular type of ‘structure of port provision’ that serves the economic interests best? 
Based upon this study we could easily argue that the Dubai-model is most effective and 
most efficient, in the sense that it presents a coherent functional-economic and territori-
ally based strategy. But what would happen if we were to include indicators of account-
ability, sustainability and transparency into the equation? Especially the role and very 
nature of territorial regimes in the light of ‘global’ competition and strategic agenda 
formulation, deserves more empirical attention. In any case we should more deeply in-
vestigate in what manner certain regimes are capable of shaping ‘structures of provi-
sions’ and to what degree the constitution of these regimes is inter-related with the 
structural features of the global economy. 
A more specific limitation of this research is that it did not (and could not) identify the 
contents of the containers. For analyzing the constellation of global production net-
works, this is of particular relevance, since ultimately it is not the container but its con-
tent which is being shipped across the world. Without identifying the contents of the 
individual container, it remains hard to identify the relationships between a particular 
shipper or cargo-owner and the shipping lines and other logistical service providers. The 
world’s major shippers (the contractors of shipping services, such as Wal Mart, IKEA, 
IBM, General Electric, the U.S. military to name just a few) are not difficult to identify. 
Similarly, it would not be that hard to locate where exactly they manufacture their prod-
ucts (be that in Vietnam, Texas, Peoples’ Republic of China or Indonesia). More dis-
guised, though perhaps not too difficult to find out, is from whom and where the ship-
pers and manufacturers get their supplies. In the light of this research, it would be inter-
esting to identify and analyze the relationships between the major shippers and the ma-
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jor shipping lines and how these relationships are materialized in unique and durable 
GPN-configurations, both in time and space. To what degree and on what terms does 
IKEA make privileged use of the services of for example APL-NOL shipping line, when 
shipping its furniture from Southeast Asia to the American consumer market? In other 
words: without knowing the content (and its origins), as well as the quantities or vol-
umes, of the containers that are being shipped daily by a particular shipping line for a 
particular client to a certain destination; it is very hard to completely know the very 
nature of entire GPNs. The container is in that respect, truly a black box!
In spite of the limitations, the theoretical framework developed here has the potential to 
be applied to and empirically tested on other economic sectors, in particular those that 
involve global patterns of distribution, that are in the need for ‘hard’ infrastructure and 
in which the territorial stakes are high. Here we could think about the aviation sector 
and the energy sector. Regarding the latter, it would be interesting to identify the ‘struc-
ture of energy provision’: who owns, constructs, finances and uses the infrastructures 
and energy fields that link the world’s markets? What is the exact spatial distribution 
pattern of different types of energy? What institutional arrangements at what spatial 
levels regulate these markets? What is the role of politics and territorial regimes? The 
energy-sector recently received much attention (cf. Friedman, 2006), in particular be-
cause of the actions of Russian energy giant and ‘national champion’ Gazprom and its 
alleged ties with the geopolitical agenda of the Kremlin. Another example is within the 
European Union, where after liberalizing and privatizing its energy market the Spanish 
state tried to block the takeover of locally based company Edersa by the German firm E-
On. The reason: Madrid politically favored the creation of a national champion, that is a 
merger between Edersa and another major Spanish energy-company. Therefore: what is 
the political economy of energy-provision?  
Perhaps less politically controversial but nonetheless potentially interesting to study 
within this framework, is the aviation sector and the ‘structure of airport provision’. 
Airports and the dynamics of the aviation sector show many similarities with seaports 
and the maritime sector. Both sectors are in the midst of restructuring, in which strategic 
alliances, takeovers, mergers and transnational transfer of property rights have become 
prominent. Both sectors are increasingly subjected to international regulation regarding 
safety, security, the environment, state support and cartel formation. Airports, like sea-
ports, are highly capital intensive to develop and maintain and produce considerable 
externalities for both the national economy and local communities. Both type of ports 
experience greater private sector involvement over the last decade and are confronted 
with fierce competition to attract the major inter-continental carriers. In that respect it is 
interesting to note that the City of Amsterdam (as one of Schiphol’s major shareholders) 
successfully blocked the full privatization of the Dutch national airport Schiphol, as 
initially proposed by the national government. This latter example shows once again, 
that ‘market economies’ are constantly confronted with political and place dependent 
interests over the access and control over vital territorial assets.  
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This latter example takes us back to the illustration with which we started chapter I 
about Dubai’s initial takeover of the rights to operate terminals in American ports. Is it 
‘okay’ that a foreign-based and state-led firm takes over vital economic infrastructures 
at a certain place? Is that not a market economy? What if an American or European 
state-led firm would take over the ownership of vital assets within the Middle East or 
Asia? Is that an act of imperialism? Or are these just examples of market opportunities 
made possible by the intrinsic uneven development of capitalism in time and space? 
Apparently, the state and political agenda’s remain to play a crucial role in the develop-
ment of the globalizing economy. That is exactly why ‘political economy’ still counts!  
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Summary
Ports have always historically played a key role in the economic development of loca-
tions and communities. At the beginning of the 21st century this is still the case. The 
playing field has however changed considerably the last twenty years as a result of 
processes associated with economic globalization. The political economy of port compe-
tition implies that we are interested how political factors affect economic processes. In 
this we apply an institutional analysis since institutions represent territorially rooted, and 
historically determined, structures of power and interests. More specifically, this re-
search wants to answer the following central question: how do port dependent agents 
change the port’s institutional and physical structure in order to optimize their competi-
tive positions in the international transport of containers? 
On the basis of theoretical insights from economic geography and (urban) political 
economy this study has developed an analytical framework. The core of this framework 
is the ‘structure of provision’ (SoP), defined as a network of social relationships, institu-
tions and organizations, involved in the provision of ports and port related infrastructure 
and facilities.  A SoP consists of three inter-related dimensions. First there is the actual 
physical condition of the port: the location, capacity and quality of the port’s land, infra-
structure and superstructure (e.g. cranes, storage facilities, bunkers etc.). The second 
dimension is the institutional arrangements of the port such as the tariffs, contractual 
agreements, property rights, environmental regulations and stipulations regarding safety 
and security, which are crucial in the use and development of the port and port facilities. 
The third dimension encompasses the governance structure of the port, responsible for 
the coordination among port dependent agents and for the decision-making regarding 
the physical and institutional dimensions of the port.  
A SoP is port specific, dependent on a wide variety of historical factors and contingen-
cies such as the economic development of a region, the political structure and ideology 
of a country, the contribution of the port to the local/national economy, the commitment 
and investments of the government and the private sector etc. In other words, a SoP is 
embedded within a territorial regime: a specific constellation of (inter) national and 
local regulation and governance arrangements responsible for the political economic 
order and development of a country. The territorial regime on the one hand sets the in-
stitutional terms for ports to grow, e.g. trade agreements, property law, taxes and sub-
sidy, customs procedures, legislation regarding the environment, land use and labor. On 
the other hand, the territorial regime consists of governance arrangements through 
which public and private actors try to secure their strategic interests through institutional 
power, strategic cooperation and association, lobby and other forms of collective action.  
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A seaport is not only embedded within a particular territorial regime. More important to 
the competitiveness and growth of ports is the degree to which they are inserted and 
integrated within international logistical chains. These are more and more global in 
scale- transport is a derived demand- as a result of the relocation of production proc-
esses and suppliers to low wage countries far away from consumer markets. In order to 
conceptualize the degree to which a port is embedded within these international chains, 
the research makes use of the perspective of global production networks (GPN). A GPN 
can be defined as the globally organized nexus of interconnected functions and opera-
tions through which goods and services are produced, distributed and consumed. They 
are constructed and transformed over time by the interaction between public, private or 
collective agents with asymmetrical positions of influence and power at different spatial 
scales.
The relationship between SoP, territorial regimes and GPNs is that they are mutual con-
stituting and co-evolving. It is through a SoP that a firm operating in a GPN becomes 
territorially embedded and dependent on the development and performance of ports, e.g. 
by acquiring lease concession to exploit a terminal for 25 years. At the same time GPNs 
become embedded within a broader set of social relationships, the territorial regime, 
responsible for setting the broader conditions of economic growth, for example, through 
the state’s fiscal and trade policies or the political willingness to invest in the port’s 
hinterland infrastructure. The territorial regime in its turn sets the conditions for GPNs 
to become embedded through a port SoP, while at the same time providing the opportu-
nities for port dependent agents to become embedded within a GPN. The way port de-
pendent agents actively try to adapt the SoP in order to strengthen the competitive posi-
tion of the port is the subject of regime politics.
The analytical framework has been applied to three case studies: Rotterdam, Los Ange-
les- Long Beach and Dubai. The selection of the cases has been based upon the follow-
ing criteria: the ports are regional market leader in the container sector, they are located 
in three of world’s major trade regions (US West Coast, Northwest Europe and the Mid-
dle East) and the ports are embedded within three completely different territorial re-
gimes. However, they are all subject to global developments in the maritime transport 
sector such as scale enlargement, processes of horizontal and vertical integration, the 
increased importance of value added logistics and continuing deregulation and growth 
of world trade. 
The three cases show a great diversity in the competitive strategies and strategic action. 
In Rotterdam we see how the corporatization of the municipal port authority is strategi-
cally coupled with the decision to construct the Second Maasvlakte (major port expan-
sion project in the form of a land fill). The corporatized structure of the port authority 
allows for a more business-orientated role and for entrepreneurial action. Under the new 
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structure, the port authority is no longer held accountable to the municipal council over 
issues such as the tariffs, strategic investments and contractual agreements. The corpora-
tization also allowed the national government to acquire 1/3 of the shares that conse-
quently could be used to finance the construction of the Second Maasvlakte, Rotter-
dam’s primary asset for future growth. As such, the case is a good example of how 
physical investment strategies of ports have become accompanied with more institution-
ally related strategies.  
The case of Southern California tells the story about the historical competition between 
the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The ports remain to be governed by two dif-
ferent port authorities despite the fact that they are located directly next to each other 
and are dependent on the same hinterland and labor pool. Although there have been 
some clear incremental moves to more structural cooperation during the last twenty 
years, competition remains the normal state of play. At this moment, a merger or con-
solidation of the two ports is politically not opportune. In spite of almost a century of 
competition the two ports still remain institutionally different. The governance structure 
in Long Beach is less politicized than in Los Angeles. As a result, the port authority of 
Long Beach enjoys more entrepreneurial freedom to engage in commercial and strategic 
action, e.g. through its lease policy and contractual agreements. Nevertheless, in both 
cities the political momentum for growth slipped away during the late 1990s in favor of 
environmental concerns, community outreach and labor conditions. The case study 
therefore shows that competition does not result in institutional convergence, exactly 
because institutions resemble territorially rooted structures of power in which efficiency 
and economic performance are not always the decisive interests.  
Dubai resembles a radical case and deals with how its twin ports have developed into 
region’s most important logistics and transport hub over the last 20 years. In addition, 
the case shows the successful transformation of the local port authority into the world’s 
third largest terminal operating company under rather unique geopolitical, economic and 
institutional conditions.Through the construction of the most modern port facilities in 
the region, in combination with a sophisticated package of investment incentives for 
foreign businesses, Dubai managed to lure many leading manufacturers and suppliers to 
the port’s Free Zone and, as such, has become firmly inserted within their global supply 
chains. With the port authority in full control over the ports’ land, infra-and superstruc-
ture and with its capability to mobilize resources through its position within the PCFC / 
Dubai World conglomerate, it can engage in strategic pricing through considerable dis-
counts on the terminal tariffs and the custom duties. At the end of the 1990s, the port 
authority decided to expand its business across the region, partly because the position of 
Dubai became threatened by competitive operations that enjoy a more favourable geo-
graphical location. Initially, this strategy was targeted at lease concessions in ports 
across the region. Through the corporate takeovers of CSX World Terminal and P&O 
Ports the port authority of Dubai has truly transformed itself into a global player. Most 
significantly, however, is the Emirate’s territorial regime. The state itself resembles a 
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multi-national corporation: it is run by an appointed, not democratically chosen, execu-
tive council; it is hardly supported by taxes, and hence is not accountable to a polity; it 
has strategically integrated its operations, management and responsibilities both verti-
cally and horizontally to create both functional-economic and spatial synergy; it has a 
compliant, multi-national workforce; and it has spread its commercial wings across the 
globe The PCFC can be regarded as the key government department or state-owned 
enterprise of Dubai in the Emirate’s quest to become the ‘Singapore of the Middle East’. 
The study concludes that competition within the maritime transport sector is not solely 
an economic game being played out between fully rational and completely informed 
agents. Neither does it unfold according some god-given set of rules of ‘fair play’, nor 
does it ultimately result in some competitive equilibrium in which it is in no player’s 
interest to change the way the game is played. Rather, competition must be understood 
as a historically and institutionally biased process which favors some sectors over oth-
ers, some agents over others and some territories over others. This study has made clear 
how the economic activity of ports and strategic actions of port dependent agents are 
both constrained and enabled by path dependent institutional structures and territorially-
bounded political agendas in which ‘cargo does not vote’. Contrary to what neo-liberal 
ideologists and neo-classical economists might claim, the ‘free market’ as such remains 
to be a public creation subject to political contests about the ‘rules of the game’ at any 
spatial scale. 
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Samenvatting (Dutch Summary)
Zeehavens hebben historisch gezien altijd een sleutelrol gespeeld in de economische 
ontwikkeling van locaties en gemeenschappen. Aan het begin van de 21st eeuw is dit 
nog steeds geval. Het concurrentieveld waarin havens zich bevinden is de laatste twintig 
jaar echter drastisch veranderd door processen die worden toegeschreven aan economi-
sche globalisering. De politieke economie van de concurrentie tussen zeehavens im-
pliceert dat we geïnteresseerd zijn in hoe politieke factoren economische processen 
beïnvloeden. Een institutionele analyse wordt gehanteerd omdat instituties territoriaal 
gewortelde en historisch ontwikkelde machtsstructuren vertegenwoordigen. Meer speci-
fiek stelt deze studie de volgende vraag: welke institutionele en fysieke strategieën ont-
wikkelen havenbedrijven en havenafhankelijke actoren om hun concurrentiepositie te 
versterken in het internationale transport van containers?  
Op basis van theoretische inzichten uit de economische geografie en de politieke eco-
nomie, presenteert deze studie een analysekader om deze vraag empirisch te onderzoe-
ken. Centraal staat de ‘structure of provision’ (SoP), gedefinieerd als een netwerk van 
sociale relaties, instituties en organisaties, die verbonden zijn aan de voorziening van de 
haven en havengebonden faciliteiten. Een drietal, sterk aan elkaar gerelateerde, variabe-
len bepalen een SoP voor een haven. Ten eerste is er de fysieke omgeving, dat wil zeg-
gen de locatie, capaciteit en kwaliteit van de infrastructuur en superstructuur (bijv. kra-
nen, opslagfaciliteiten, bunkers etc.). De tweede variabele is de institutionele arrange-
menten van de haven zoals de tarieven, contractuele voorwaarden, eigendomsrechten, 
veiligheids- en milieunormeringen die bepalend zijn voor het gebruik van de haven-
voorzieningen en de investeringen die plaatsvinden. De derde variabele is de ‘governan-
ce’ structuur van de haven, die bepalend is voor de coördinatie tussen havengelieerde 
partijen als ook voor de besluitvorming over zowel de fysieke als institutionele ruimte 
van de haven.  
Een SoP is dus havenspecifiek, afhankelijk van tijd en plaatsgevoelige factoren, zoals de 
economische ontwikkeling van een regio, de politieke structuur en ideologie van een 
land, de bijdrage van de haven aan de nationale of regionale economie, de betrokken-
heid en investeringen van de overheid of van private partijen en uiteindelijk van de 
structuur van de staat zelf. Met andere woorden, een SoP is ingebed in een bepaald terri-
toriaal regime: een specifieke constellatie van (inter) nationale en lokale regulering en 
‘governance’ arrangementen die bepalend zijn voor de politiek-economische ordening 
en ontwikkeling van een land in het algemeen en- in deze studie- van zeehavens in het 
bijzonder. Het territoriale regime is enerzijds verantwoordelijk voor de institutionele 
randvoorwaarden voor havens om te groeien, zoals handelsovereenkomsten, eigen-
domsrecht, douaneprocedures, belastingen en subisidies, milieu, arbeids- en ruimtelijke 
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ordeningswetgeving. Anderzijds bestaat zij uit territoriale ‘governance’ arrangementen 
waarin publieke en private actoren trachten hun strategische belangen te waarborgen 
door middel van institutionele macht, strategische samenwerking, lobby en collectieve 
actie.
Een haven (en daarmee havengebonden actoren) is niet alleen ingebed in een bepaald 
territoriaal regime. Belangrijker voor de ontwikkeling van een haven is om ingebed en 
geïntegreerd te raken in internationale logistieke ketens waarlangs transport en distribu-
tie van goederen plaatsvindt. Dit laatste is steeds meer mondiaal georganiseerd- trans-
port is immers een afgeleide vraag- gezien de globalisering van de wereldeconomie en 
de verplaatsing van productieprocessen en toeleveranties naar locaties ver van de 
eindgebruikers. Om deze vorm van inbedding te conceptualiseren wordt gebruik ge-
maakt van het perspectief van Global Production Network (GPN). Een GPN kan worden 
gedefinieerd als de mondiaal georganiseerde keten van met elkaar samenhangende func-
ties en handelingen waarlangs de productie, distributie en consumptie van goederen 
plaatsvindt. GPNs worden gevormd en veranderen als gevolg van de interactie tussen 
publieke, private en collectieve actoren met ongelijke machtsposities.
GPNs, territoriale regimes en de SoP beïnvloeden elkaar wederzijds en evolueren geza-
menlijk. Via de SoP raken GPNs ingebed in de haven, bijvoorbeeld door het verkrijgen 
van een terminal leaseconcessie, en worden ze afhankelijk van de ontwikkeling en pres-
taties van de haven. Omgekeerd raakt de haven op deze manier ingebed in een GPN. 
Tegelijkertijd raken deze GPNs ingebed in een territoriaal regime waarin de randvoor-
waarden voor economische groei worden bepaald, zoals het belastingklimaat of de poli-
tieke welwillendheid om te investeren in achterlandverbindingen. Het strategische han-
delen van havenafhankelijke actoren gericht op het veranderen van de SoP ten behoeve 
van de concurrentiekracht en groei is dan het onderwerp van regime politics.
Het analysekader is toegepast op drie case studies: Rotterdam, Los Angeles-Long Beach 
en Dubai. De selectie van de casussen is gebaseerd op de volgende criteria: de havens 
zijn regionale marktleider in de containersector; ze vertegenwoordigen drie verschil-
lende economische kernregio’s in de wereld (namelijk Noordwest Europa, Midden Oos-
ten, Noordamerikaanse westkust); en de havens zijn ingebed in drie compleet verschil-
lende territoriale regimes. Echter, ze zijn allemaal onderhevig aan de mondiale ontwik-
kelingen in de maritieme transport sector zoals schaalvergroting, processen van horizon-
tale en verticale integratie in de logistieke keten, toenemend belang van waardetoevoe-
gende logistieke dienstverlening en verdergaande deregulering en groei van de wereld-
handel.
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De drie casussen laten een grote verscheidenheid zien in zowel de marktdynamiek en de 
concurrentiestrategieën die worden ontwikkeld. In Rotterdam zien we hoe veranderende 
vraagcondities in de mondiaal georganiseerde containersector aanvankelijk slecht rijmen 
met de bestaande institutionele structuur van het gemeentelijke havenbedrijf, resulterend 
in een afnemend marktaandeel gedurende het laatste decennium. Aan de andere kant kan 
deze afname ook gedeeltelijk worden toegewezen aan het volwassen worden van de 
regionale markt en daarmee de toenemende concurrentie. De druk in Rotterdam voor 
hervormingen is daarmee alleen maar opgevoerd. De strategische uitdaging van het 
havenbedrijf wordt uiteindelijk de de-politicering van haar strategisch handelen in com-
binatie met het steun zoeken voor de gewenste uitbreiding van de capaciteit door middel 
van de aanleg van de Tweede Maasvlakte. Na een moeizaam politiek proces, wordt de 
verzelfstandiging van het gemeentelijke havenbedrijf strategisch gekoppeld aan het 
besluit tot de aanleg van de Tweede Maasvlakte. Het havenbedrijf kan zich door de 
verzelfstandiging commerciëler en strategischer opstellen richting klanten. Bovendien 
hoeft zij geen verantwoording meer af te leggen aan de gemeenteraad over het dagelijk-
se beleid op het gebied van tarieven, investeringen en contractuele afspraken. Door de 
verzelfstandiging kan ook het Rijk een belang van 1/3 nemen in het havenbedrijf, dat 
vervolgens kan worden gebruikt om de aanleg van de Tweede Maasvlakte te financie-
ren. Via de Tweede Maasvlakte heeft Rotterdam de grote troef voor toekomstige groei 
in handen. De case van Rotterdam is een mooi voorbeeld van de wijze waarop groeistra-
tegieën door middel van fysieke investeringen hand in hand gaan met institutionele her-
vormingen.  
De casus van zuidelijk Californië beschrijft de historische concurrentiestrijd tussen de 
havens van Los Angeles en Long Beach. De havens liggen direct naast elkaar en vormen 
als zodanig een functioneel gebied, maar ze worden bestuurd door twee gemeentelijke 
havenautoriteiten. Hoewel er de afgelopen twintig jaar wel degelijk incrementele stap-
pen zijn genomen naar meer gestructureerde vormen van samenwerking, blijft een fusie 
tussen de twee havenbedrijven uit den boze. Er zijn een aantal opmerkelijke institutione-
le verschillen ondanks het feit dat beide havens gebruik maken van dezelfde arbeids-
markt en achterlandverbindingen. De ‘governance’ structuur in Long Beach is minder 
gepolitiseerd dan in Los Angeles met als gevolg dat de haven in Long Beach slagvaar-
diger en commerciëler kan optreden ten opzichte van rederijen en operators in termen 
van grondbeleid, tarieven en contractuele afspraken. In beide gemeenten zien we dat het 
politieke momentum voor groei eind jaren negentig is weggeëbd ten faveure van het 
milieu, de belangen van buurtgemeenschappen en van de vakbonden. De casus laat zien 
dat concurrentie niet leidt tot institutionele convergentie, precies omdat instituties terri-
toriaal gewortelde machtsrelaties vertegenwoordigen waarbij operationele efficiëntie en 
economische groei niet de enige factoren van belang zijn.  
Dubai vertegenwoordigt een radicale casus en beschrijft hoe haar twee havens de afge-
lopen 25 jaar zijn uitgegroeid tot de belangrijkste logistieke ‘hub’ in de regio. Ten twee-
de laat de casus zien hoe de lokale havenautoriteit zich heeft weten te transformeren tot 
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het derde grootste containeroverslagbedrijf in de wereld. Dit alles onder vrij unieke 
geopolitieke, economische en institutionele omstandigheden. Via de constructie van de 
meest moderne havenfaciliteiten in de region, in combinatie met een uitgekookt pakket 
aan prikkels voor buitenlandse investeringen, heeft Dubai optimaal gebruik gemaakt van 
haar strategische ligging ten opzichte van het alsmaar groeiende containerverkeer tussen 
het Verre Oosten en Europa. Het havenbedrijf is in handen van de staat maar opereert 
als een commerciële monopolist die via kortingen en agressieve prijsstrategieën de con-
currentie uit de markt heeft geprijsd. Eind jaren negentig besluit het havenbedrijf om 
zich op de internationale markt voor containeroverslag te gaan positioneren, mede door-
dat de sterke positie van de haven(s) wordt bedreigd door de opkomst van nieuwe en 
gunstiger gelegen havens die bovendien de financiële steun genieten van gevestigde 
private spelers in de containeroverslag. Aanvankelijk kreeg deze strategie vorm door het 
verkrijgen van leaseconcessies in havens in de regio, maar door de overnames van CSX 
World Terminals en P&O Ports heeft de internationale divisie van het havenbedrijf zich 
getransformeerd tot ‘global player’. Belangrijke factor achter deze transformatie is het 
territoriale regime. De staat zelf kan het beste worden opgevat als een multinational. Het 
wordt geleid door een benoemde en niet democratisch gekozen raad van bestuur; het 
wordt nauwelijks ondersteund door belastingen; het maakt gebruik van een multi-
nationale arbeidskracht en het heeft haar taken en departementen horizontaal en verti-
caal geïntegreerd ten behoeve van een coherente groeistrategie waarbij de haven en het 
havenbedrijf de meest succesvolle componenten zijn.  
De studie concludeert dat competitie in de martieme transport sector niet alleen een 
economisch spel is dat wordt gespeeld door volledig rationele en compleet geinfor-
meerde actoren. Dit spel wordt niet overal onder dezelfde god-gegeven spelregels en 
institutionele condities gespeeld. Competitie leidt daarom uiteindelijk ook niet tot een 
economisch optimaal equilibrium waarin het voor geen enkele speler loont om het spel 
anders te gaan spelen. Competitie moet worden opgevat als een historisch, ruimtelijk en 
institutioneel bevooroordeeld proces dat in het voordeel werkt van bepaalde econo-
mische sectoren ten opzichte van anderen; van bepaalde actoren ten opzichte van an-
deren, en van bepaalde havens ten opzichte van anderen. De studie heeft duidelijk ge-
maakt dat de economische actitiviteit en handelingen van havens en havenafhankelijke 
actoren tijd-plaats gebonden zijn. Zij worden zowel beperkt als in staat gesteld door 
heersende institutionele condities en territoriaal gedefinieerde politieke agenda’s, waar-
bij geldt: ‘cargo does not vote’. In tegenstelling tot wat neo-liberale denkers en neo-
klassiek economen beweren, blijft de ‘vrije markteconomie’ een ‘publieke creatie’ on-
derhevig aan politieke strijd over de ‘spelregels’ op elk ruimtelijk schaalniveau. 
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